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Abstract
The literature on pricing has hardly used the 
concepts of organization theory to emphasise the 
indigenous factors that seem to influence the mech 
anics of pricing decisions. It is this missing theme 
to which this thesis attempts to draw attention by 
arguing that pricing decisions are influenced by 
organizational sub-units' power which is not constant 
over time. This was made possible by examining the 
impact of the Price Commission, which was in opera­
tion in the U.K. between 19 73 - 79, on companies 
pricing decision making processes.
The concept of competition as defined in economic 
theory has been investigated and a new meaning has 
been developed based on the notion that the decision 
maker's own perception of competition, not just market 
structures, is an important determining factor in 
pricing decisions.
Consideration has also been given to the adapt­
ability of companies' information systems to the re­
quirements of the Price Commission and the effect 
which this extra work had on the provision of other 
accounting information.
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"One only stands to understand an 
issue, any issue, when he has 
witnessed the strongest possible 
debate take place about that 
issue" (Mitroff, 1971:647).
Pricing is most certainly one of these issues as Aubrey 
Silberston may have recognized in his comprehensive and 
rigorous survey of the subject. He acknowledges that:
"The determination of prices has 
played a central part in economic 
theory for a hundred years or
more,......yet it has been, and
remains, a subject of considerable 
controversy" (Silberston, 1970:511-12).
However, that such an issue should still be 
problematic can be attributed paradoxically to the degree 
of scrutiny which it has received. As the social sciences 
have splintered into discrete disciplines with subtle 
differences in their canon of logic, then so too has the 
analysis of pricing been pursued from a variety of 
intellectual standpoints.
In economics, there has been benign acceptance of 
marginal analysis as the dominant method for examining 
pricing decisions within the spectrum of market forces.
The accounting literature, on the other hand, has merely 
concentrated on the costing techniques that are claimed to 
be used in fixing prices. As for the behaviouralists, they
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seem to have set to themselves the task of vehemently 
challenging the profit maximization goal which, economists 
generally assert, affects pricing decisions.
This thesis, however, attempts to walk a line between 
what has been argued by the above disciplines. In 
particular, it addresses itself to bridging the lacuna in 
the literature on pricing by allocating more weight to 
some of the changing organizational pressures that are 
hypothesized to influence pricing decisions. As such this 
thesis is more concerned with improving our understanding 
of pricing processes rather than specific price levels 
established. Following a grounded theory approach to the 
generation of hypotheses, this research project availed 
itself of the superb opportunity provided by the advent 
and abolition of the Price Commission in the U.K. to argue 
that pricing decisions are influenced by organizational 
subunits' influence which does not necessarily remain 
constant over time. This would suggest that disputes over 
the absolute dominance of accounting pricing procedures 
over micro-economics or vice versa are simplistic. The 
tools used may change in dominance over time as 
organizational subunit influence changes.
Furthermore, misgivings regarding the concept of 
competition as depicted by economic theory are brought to 
light. The alternative idea that is being propogated 
stresses the decision maker's perception of what constitutes 
competition and how this is affected by the interaction
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process that takes place between the firm and the market.
In addition, the extent to which it was necessary to 
modify company information systems to comply with the 
Price Commission will be examined and whether that has had 
negative repercussions upon the provision of other 
accounting information.
The following material is presented in eleven 
chapters. Chapter 2 draws from economics, accounting, and 
some behavioural and managerial theories to provide a 
brief review of the literature on pricing. The chapter 
also includes a short description of the two prices codes 
and what has been suggested regarding their impact on 
companies' pricing decisions.
Chapter 3 sets out to demonstrate how the 
organizational changes that took place in terms of sub­
units power and information processing overload were 
identified as the salient issues that were most affected 
by the introduction of the Price Commission and which had 
an impact on pricing decisions. This is followed by a 
summary of the literature on these issues, and then the 
development of broad hypotheses which guided the further 
empirical work.
In chapter 4, the case of Hekmats Limited is presented.
1. A large U.K. based company which has been given this
pseudonym.
1
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Its aim is to give an overview of the pricing decision 
making process in the company during the pre - Price 
Commission, the two prices codes, and the post - Price 
Commission phases.
In chapter 5, the case study is analysed and more 
specific hypotheses are generated as well as a framework 
to be used in analysing the data collected for testing 
these hypotheses.
Chapter 6 discusses the methodology which is 
implemented in testing the hypotheses developed from the 
case study. It also offers a new meaning to the concept 
of competition based on the decision maker's perception.
Chapter 7. seeks to demonstrate the empirical support 
received from the data elicited regarding the developed 
notion of competition. This is then compared with the 
classification suggested by concentration ratios.
Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 offer a qualitative analysis 
of the interview data for the four phases of our study and 
the extent to which each of the hypotheses are supported 
in each of the aforementioned phases of the Pri.'ces Codes.
Chapter 12 considers the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this piece of work and the implications it has for 
further research.
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Chapter Two 
Pricing and Prices Code Literature
This chapter purports to scan the major theoretical 
basis of pricing decisions that are put forward in the 
economics, accounting and behavioural literature, as well 
as to present outline details of the prices codes that 
were introduced in the U.K. and the discussions which their 
implementation have evoked.
2.1 The theoretical basis of pricing decisions
The basic economic techniques for pricing under 
different market structures revolve around the same 
principle. Neo-classical economic analysis assumes that 
the firm's objective is to maximise profits. Given this 
objective, and that the firm knows its demand curve, the 
economic approach determines a price at which marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. This basic notion of 
equating marginal revenue with marginal cost to determine 
price is common under all industry structures.
It is argued that under conditions of perfect 
competition firms will continue to produce until their 
marginal cost equals price. In this situation the firm is 
a 'price taker' and it can only determine its output. In 
the long run, price is equal to the average cost of 
production at the scale of output where long-run average 
costs is at its minimum. Under such conditions firms earn 
only 'normal' profits and this is mainly due to competition.
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Under conditions of imperfect competition the demand curve 
is not horizontal; unlike perfect competition the firm is 
a 'price maker'. It maximises profits by choosing that 
combination of price and output at which marginal:revenue 
equals marginal cost. The monopolist or monopolistically 
competitive firm can determine either price or output, but 
not both. It depends on the market conditions whether 
firms in the long run may earn more than normal profits.
In conditions of monopoly with effective barriers to 
market entry there will be no tendency for supernormal 
profits to be competed away, but where there are many firms 
in an industry, supernormal profits may be eliminated 
altogether. '
Regarding pricing and output decisions, economic 
theory assumes that market considerations dominate the 
internal structure of the firm. In addition, it assumes 
that the firm's goal is profit maximisation and that the 
firm's demand curve is known. Cyert and March (1963) as 
well as the empirical findings of Hall and Hitch (19 39) 
and Hague (1971) have thrown grave doubts on the goal 
assumption. As for the demand assumption it could be 
easily appreciated how difficult and possibly expensive 
task it would be to predict a firm's demand. Indeed, it 
has been argued that "the labour and skilled guess-work 
needed for making detailed demand studies for a wide range 
of items would generally be prohibitive" (Baxter and 
Oxenfeldt 1961:84).
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The accounting models that are most often used for 
pricing are
(a) absorption costing,
(b) direct costing, and
(c) rate of return*
With the absorption costing method, the practice is to 
calculate the full cost per unit and then add a mark-up of 
profit to arrive at the price. With the direct costing 
method, the practice is to calculate the variable cost 
per unit and then add a mark-up which serves as 
contribution to both fixed costs and profit. Hence, the 
term contribution margin is often used. With the rate of 
return approach, the practice is to add to the full cost 
per unit a percentage mark-up which is arrived at by 
multiplying the rate of capital turnover by the planned 
rate of return on capital employed.
The main difference between the first two techniques 
centres around the allocation of fixed costs. Supporters 
of the former hold the view that it is important to 
allocate all fixed costs to individual products while
those who support the later argue that since it is not 
possible to allocate fixed costs accurately to individual 
products, it is pointless to try to do so. Instead, one 
should first decide what total contribution to fixed costs 
and profit is required from the whole firm. One can then 
look at the contribution going into that total from each 
individual product. One of the strong criticisms that is 
usually cited against the absorption costing method is
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that it does not take into consideration the demand 
situation in setting the price. Another major problem is 
that it fails to reflect competition.^ However, in order 
to exploit the advantages of the direct costing approach, 
it is necessary to have a reasonably accurate estimate of 
the demand situation. If such an estimate is available 
and this approach is pursued, it may be possible to arrive 
at a price that will approach a maximum profit position 
(Moore and Jeadicke 1976).
The rate of return approach may be considered as a
refined variant of absorption costing. It assumes that
the capital employed, particularly cash, accounts
receivable, and inventories, varies in direct proportion
with sales.. The NAA Research No 35 (1959:44) states that
"a possible objection to the above 
method is that a change in selling 
price, by itself, would have no 
direct effect on the investment in 
inventory since the later is stated 
at cost. The objection can be 
avoided by introducing inventory as 
a ratio to factory cost rather than 
as a ratio to selling price".
Recent developments have challenged the following 
behavioural assumptions:
1 that the firm has a single objective which is 
profit maximisation;
2 that it omits any real notion of uncertainty;
The imperfections of absorption costing are cited 
throughout the literature. See Khalla 19 64, Dean 1951, 
and Baxter and Oxenfeldt (19 61)
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3 that it takes decisions on various different 
fronts simultaneously rather than sequentially, 
and;
4 that the influence of the firm's decision making 
of its organization form and structure and 
information system may be ignored.^
It should be appreciated that these assumptions when 
taken into consideration will in general lead to a 
different price-output decision being taken. These 
managerial and behavioural theories tend to differentiate 
between the conventional entrepreneur as the decision­
maker in the firm and the situation now so frequent in 
practice, i.e. the separation of ownership and control in 
the large corporation.
The managerial theories emphasise the role of the 
manager and his motivations. Because it is assumed that 
the manager is motivated by considerations other than 
maximising the profits of his firm, the decisions taken 
are likely to be different in many situations from those 
to be expected from more conventional theory.
Williamson's (1963) model treats the firm as a 
maximiser but of utility rather than profits. He argues 
that managers will operate the firm so as to maximise 
their own utility function rather than to maximise profits
1 For a general review of price behaviour of firms see 
Silberston 1970
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which maximise the utility of owner-shareholders. This is 
represented as a function of staff, managerial emoluments 
and discretionary spending of investment, defined as the 
differences between reported profits and the minimum 
profits required by shareholders. The price output 
decision rules of his model are of the same form as for 
a profit maximising objective, i.e. equating marginal 
revenue with marginal cost.
Baumol (1967) argues that oligopolistic firms aim 
to maximise their sales revenue in the long run, subject 
to a minimum profits level. The justifications he offers 
for pursuing such a goal are: the separation of ownership 
from management characteristic of the modern firm which 
gives discretion to the managers to pursue goals which 
maximise their own utility and deviate from profit 
maximisation which is the desirable goal of owners. He 
asserts that, in his experience, managers always emphasise 
sales rather than profits and that the prestige of the 
manager is associated with his firm's sales. Baumol's 
model assumes a known downward-sloping demand curve, 
from which total revenue is presumably derived. Further, 
in his model profits will be sacrificed for the sake of 
greater sales which implies adopting price-output policy 
at which its marginal revenue is less than its marginal 
cost.^
According to Marris (1963), the goal of the firm is
1 See Koutsoyiannis (19 77) for more comments on Baumol's 
model
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the maximisation of the balanced rate of growth of the 
firm, that is, the maximisation of the rate of grpwth of 
demand for the products of the firm and of the growth of 
its capital supply. However, he points out that firms in 
trying to achieve this goal are confronted with two 
constraints. The first is that set by the available 
managerial team and its skills. The other is a financial 
one which is set by the desire of managers to achieve 
maximum job security. Regarding price determination. 
Marris states that it is not his main concern. He implies 
that the price structure will emerge either after a period 
of economic warfare or by collussion in the form of trade 
associations or price leadership. In addition the level 
of output is not explicitly determined in his model.^
The behavioural theories allow the firm to have 
multiple objectives. Cyert and March (19 63) argue that 
these goals can normally be reduced to five: production, 
inventory, sales, market share and profits. It is argued 
that the profit goal is closely linked to pricing and
resource allocation decisions. However, in their 
simplified model, Cyert and March show the key process at 
work in an oligopolistic firm when decisions regarding 
price, output, etc. are made. In this model they assume 
the firm has three goals (production, sales and profit) 
for which three basic decisions are to be made (output, 
sales effort and price). At the beginning of each period
1 See Koutsoyiannis op.cit.
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the firm's environment reflects its past history; its 
aspiration level ii modified in the light of experience 
and organisational slack is allowed for. It was found 
that price was primarily sensitive to factors influencing 
increases and decreases in the amount of organisational 
slack, to feasible reductions in expenditure on sales 
promotion and to changes in profit goals following actual 
profit performance. It has been argued by Amey and 
Eggington (1975) that Oxenfeldt (1960) has suggested the 
extension of this separation of price-output decision to 
the pricing decision itself, i.e. that the pricing 
decisions could be made in stages, to be undertaken in a 
certain prescribed sequence. These stages are :
1 selecting marketing targets
2 choosing a brand image .
3 composing a marketing mix
4 selecting a pricing policy
5 determining a pricing strategy and
6 arriving at a specific price.
It seems appropriate now, after we have scanned some 
of the theoretical analysis of pricing, to have a look at 
a sample of the emptical studies that have been conducted.
2.2 Empirical Studies of Pricing Behaviour
Research into the question of actual pricing practices 
appears to indicate that most firms set prices without an 
explicit analysis of the marginal relationships. The Hall 
and Hitch (19 39) study was a pioneering attempt. They
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analysed answers to questionnaires from thirty-eight 
businessmen. Thirty of these respondents used a full 
cost pricing system all or some of the time with twelve 
adopting a rigid adherence to this principle. Hall and 
Hitch combined their full cost pricing model with the 
kinked demand curve theorem. According to them, each 
individual businessman faces a demand curve which has a 
kink at the existing price. This demand curve seems to 
him very elastic with respect to price increase, because 
he is afraid that, if he raised his price, his immediate
rivals would try to deprive him of some of his customers 
by not following suit. Conversely, the demand curve seems 
to the businessman to be rigid with respect to a price 
reduction, because he feels that, if he were to lower his 
price, his rivals would at once do the same so as not to 
lose their own customers. Consequently, marginal revenue 
is discontinuous below the kink in the demand curve. As 
mentioned above, this price is not determined on the basis 
of equality between marginal revenue and cost but 
according to the full cost principal.
Hall and Hitch's findings threw grave doubts on what 
had appeared to be previously received doctorine. 
Apparently, the emphasis that many firms give to costs as 
the pricing base has been widely confirmed in other 
studies, for instance, Pearce (1956), Hague (1971), and 
Skinner (19 70), all of which relate to pricing in Britain.
In attempting to explain why cost-plus methods are 
often used, Wilkes and Harrison (19 75) suggest the
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following:
"First, it looks straight forward 
and uncomplicated to administer 
since data can be generated 
internally, are familiar and 
therefore allow management to 
quickly identify inconsistencies 
and data requirements can be 
incorporated into the normal 
recording systems of the relevant 
departments. Second, it will not 
only invite price stability in 
the product market (if 
competitions have similar structures 
of cost and a similar markup 
philosophy) but will consequently 
also invite stability of production 
and employment. Finally, it has the 
value of appearing to be equitable 
socially, creating an image of the 
company and themselves as aiming to 
make a 'fair' rate of return on 
investments."
Another major study of pricing in private industry 
was that carried out by the Brookings Institution in the 
U.S.A. and published in 19 58 by Kaplan, Dirlam and 
Lanzillotti (19 5 8). The main strands of the evidence 
are reproduced in an article by Lanzillotti (1957). The 
study was based on a series of interviews with the top 
management of a representative group of large-scale 
enterprises engaged in primary production, manufacturing 
and distribution. In analysing company pricing policy 
the authors distinguished five broad patterns of corporate 
pricing policy. These were pricing to achieve a target 
return on investment, stabilisation of price and margin, 
pricing to maintain or improve market position, pricing 
to meet or follow competition, and pricing related to 
product differentiation i.e. different policies for 
different products. The general conclusions of this study
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were
(a) that large corporations 
generally have a fairly well 
defined pricing goals related 
to a long-range profit horizon,
(b) management usually seek a 
simultaneous decision with 
respect to price, cost and 
product characteristics,
(c) pricing formulas are handy 
devices for checking the 
internal consistency of the 
separate decisions against a 
general company objective.
In his sample of 110 "excellently managed 
companies" as listed by the American Institute of 
Management, Early (1956) claimed that the majority 
followed pricing, marketing and new product policies 
that were essentially marginalist. According to Early, 
marginalist behaviour implied such techniques as 
marginal accounting. This, as practiced by well- 
managed, multi-product companies, included such things 
as segmentation of costs and revenues— by market area,
division, plant, etc..— and segmentation in 
organisational structure, each sector being profit- 
making entity. It also embraced marginal techniques, 
of planning and decision, policy making being 
associated with a short-dated time horizon and a
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lively sense of impending innovation and obsolescence.
Early reported a widespread distrust of full-cost 
principles among these firms, and the pursuit of 
marginalist policies in both the long and the short term. 
"Marginalism-on-the^wing^is how Early referred to their 
general attitude.
The above empirical works are not the only ones to 
have been published. However, it should be appreciated 
that there is a paucity of published work of an empirical 
kind in pricing.
It is one hypothesis of this research that where the 
literature on pricing has gradually become more 
sophisticated in developing away from its original micro- 
economic theory perspective to take on board first, 
accounting practices and then some rather simple
behavioural and organisational goals, our knowlëdge of 
decision making in organisations has been extended well 
beyond that mentioned in the above review of pricing. Our 
advances in understanding organisational theory concepts, 
especially the recognition that decisions are often 
negotiated and influenced by sub-unit power, have not yet 
been recognised in literature on pricing decisions. It is 
suggested that while prices will be influenced by external 
market forces the mechanism by which prices are settled will 
be determined by organisational sub-unit influence which 
will not necessarily be constant over time or determined 
solely by economic market structures as measured by
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economists. Both economics and accounting studies may 
play a part in explaining price levels but they do little 
to explain the process by which prices are determined and 
this is the focus of this study.
The advent and abolition of the Price Commission 
provides a superb opportunity to study such matters. The 
next section reviews the basic provisions of the Price 
Codes and the research relating to it to date. It will 
also be seen that no study has been made of the way the 
Codes affected organisational power and so this project
has another unique dimension.
2.3 Background about the Price Commission
2.3.1. The 1973 - 77 Price Code
As a result of the increasing rate of inflation, the 
U.K. government introduced in 19 73 what was known as the 
Counter-Inflation Act which was administered by the Price 
Commission. The major purpose of what was produced by the 
Price Commission and known as the Price Code^ - a large 
body of rules applicable to virtually all enterprises - 
had been
1 to limit the extent to which prices .may be increased 
on account of increased costs, and to secure price 
reductions as a result of reduced costs
2 to reinforce the control of prices by a control on 
profit margins while safeguarding investments: and
1 See the Counter-Inflation Act 1973
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3 to reinforce the effects of competition and to
secure its benefit in the general level of prices.^
Prices could only be increased in proportion to 
increases in certain allowable costs per unit of product. 
Allowable costs included the main production costs for most 
enterprises; labour, materials, components, energy, rents 
and rates, interest and depreciation later on. Part of 
labour costs were disallowed until 19 76 on the grounds that 
it would induce gains in productivity. The increases in 
these allowable costs could lead to an increase in price 
provided that they did not result in the profit margins 
moving above the firm's reference level. These references 
levels were the average of the net profit margins in the 
best two years out of the five years up to 30th April 1973.
A firm could have one reference level covering all its 
activities, up to three reference levels relating to its 
manufacturing, services or distribution activities, or 
separate reference levels in certain instances for 
individual constituent companies within the whole 
enterprise.
It is to be noted that the above applied only to 
manufacturers. Distributors were not subject to control 
in the price of individual products; however, the gross 
percentage margins on the individual distributors' overall 
turnovers were monitored. In addition, similar to the net
1 See the Review of the Price Code: A Consultative 
Document, London H.M.S.O. 19 74, p.13
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margin control, a historic level of gross margin was used 
for each firm to set the maximum allowed. Unlike the net 
margin control, the gross percentage margin was based on 
the last single trading year before 30th April 1973. No 
allowable costs were specified, so there were no 
productivity deductions. Distributors were also required 
to adjust prices so as to keep both'their current gross 
and net margins below their relevant reference levels, 
except where seasonal or other distorting factors were the 
primary cause.
Any proposed increase in prices had to be notified to 
the Commission at least 28 days before^implementation by 
firms. Initially only manufacturers and service firms 
with sales exceeding £50 million and £20 million 
respectively had to notify price increases. These firms 
as well as manufacturers and distributors with sales 
exceeding £5 million and £10 million respectively had to 
make quarterly reports on their profit margins. Pre­
notification of prices did not apply to distributors; they 
were controlled in terms of their current gross and net 
profit margins rather than corresponding reference levels. 
Manufacturers with sales over £1 million and distributors 
with sales over £250,000 were required to keep records 
which had to be submitted to the Price Commission on 
request.
The Code also provided safeguards whereby firms were 
protected from earning unreasonably low profits as a 
result of the Code - for instance, it set minimum profit
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levels and limited the rate at which profits could be 
reduced. For distributors, the safeguard was related to 
gross margins instead of allowable costs. The Price 
Code also permitted either allowable cost increases or 
profit margins to be modified to provide an adequate 
return on new investments. Furthermore, the Price Code 
stated specific conditions for the particular circumstances 
of various sectors (e.g. banks, finance houses) where the 
general provisions for industry and trade could not be 
applied as a whole.
The above had been the main features of the Price 
Code up to 19 76. However, the Price Commission Act 19 77 
made the Commission into a different body from its 
predecessor. The cause of change was explained to the 
House of Commons on 2 7th April 19 77 - by Mr Hattersley, 
the then Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer 
Protection;
"A general price code applied by cost 
control is unavoidably inflexible. It 
lays down rigid rules. The rules are 
inevitably arbitrary and 
indiscriminate. They attempt to relate 
a firm's pricing policy to its past 
performance; a straightjacket from 
which improving and expanding firms 
rightly wish to escape.
Thus, the 19 77 Act no more applied a rigid system of price 
control based on allowable costs; however, some features 
such as the notification and profit margin control (only 
for one year) were retained.
Quoted from Lofthouse, S., 19 76
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The new approach pursued was that of flexible and 
selected interventions where market forces, particularly 
competition, failed to restrain behaviour which was not 
in accordance with the policy objective. To achieve 
this purpose, the Price Commission Act 1977 permitted a 
newly-constituted Commission to carry out investigations 
into proposed price increases, prices and margins and to 
determine their reasonableness according to statutory 
criteria which are set out in Section 2.^ This would be 
conducted "so far as (it) appears to the Commission to be 
consistent with the making of adequate profits by 
efficient suppliers of goods and services." (Section 
2(1)(a)). In judging adequacy of profits the Commission 
were to take into consideration the resource allocation 
effects of prices and profits and allow a premium for 
risk and innovation. Profits were to be measured in real 
terms.
Large firms were to continue to give 28 days 
notification of their intention to increase prices.
During that period the Commission had to decide whether 
it would conduct an investigation which had to be 
completed in three months. Prices could be frozen during 
the investigation. If the Commission decided to make an 
investigation and found the increase not justified, it 
could recommend that prices be frozen for up to 12 months, 
Distributors' margins were not frozen during an
See Appendix A
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investigation but afterwords the Commission could decide 
that these were to be reduced. The Secretary of State 
could instruct the Commission to carry out an examination 
of prices, costs and margins in a sector of industry or 
commerce.
The impact of the Price Code on the firm's prices and 
profits in curbing inflation is a controversial topic.
Many argue that the interest of a nation may well be 
served if prices are left to find their own level, i.e. 
through the market demand and suppliers' normal responses; 
yet, others hold that the introduction of certain price 
controls can be justified in terms of their aims, 
achievements and costs in serving the nation's interest.^ 
As the Price Code 19 77 marked a different colour of rules 
and procedures, it seems appropriate to look separately at 
its impact on prices and profits, and those up until 1976.
Regarding the effect on prices of the 1973-1977 Code, 
there are those (Skinner 1976) who seem to imply that the 
Price Commission has encouraged rather than restrained 
prices increase. In the absence of the Price Code, the 
fear of competition may have hindered any contemplated 
increase in prices. Also the reluctance of competitors to 
respond to inflation might have delayed price reviews and 
kept prices down. The possibility of pricing one's firm 
out of the market might have reduced the level of increase
J Mitchell, 19 78, implies the same view.
—  2 3 “  ‘
proposed. Indeed, a few firms reported that the Price 
Code had actually speeded up price increases. This was 
due to the havoc caused by statutory notification coupled 
with the uncertainty involved in the future effect of the 
rules, which meant that firms applied for increases 
whenever cost or profit made it legitimate (J. Mitchell 
1978). Indeed, according to the Price Commission "the 
former Price Code tended to encourage many companies to 
apply for price increases at regular three-month intervals" 
(Price Commission Quarterly Report, Aug-Oct 19 77).
Contrary to this view are the findings of the survey 
reported by Evély 19 76).^ The results from this survey 
indicate that the market conditions are the dominant 
factors governing prices rather than the controls of the 
Price Code. This, however, does not necessarily mean 
that the Price Code did not limit the ability of
companies to pursue a high price policy. Indeed, the 
requirement for manufacturing and service industries to 
relate price increases solely to increases in those that 
are 'allowable' under the Code did set an upper limit for 
price increases. Nevertheless, the optimal might have 
been below the limit allowed under the Price Code. Firms 
also had to carefully examine their cost figures and 
pricing decisions were given more weight and taken at 
higher levels. Further, Prest (19 76) suggests that an 
indirect effect of the Price Code is the multiplication of
1 Evely's findings are discussed in Chapter 9.
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uncertainities where firms are unsure that they would be 
allowed to reap the commercial benefits of some risky , 
activity, and thus may be daunted from undertaking risky 
ventures. It is therefore possible, from what has been 
said, to realize the difficulties involved in appraising 
the effect of the Price Code on increases in prices.
Though it is apparent that there is no clear cut conclusion 
regarding what has taken place, yet an insight of the 
repercussions was possible, albeit briefly.
Regarding the effect of the 1973-77 Price Code on 
the firms' profits, it seems that it had led to a decrease 
in the profit margins of most companies. According to the 
Price Commission the reference levels were far above the 
profit margins when the Price Code was first introduced 
in 19 73 and as a result profit margins were in the range 
of 70%-80% of reference levels in 19 74. Thus, the Price 
Commission in its Six Quarterly Report (1974) asserted that 
no serious erosion of profits had taken place throughout 
the period of control. However, soon after that profit 
margins fell to just above 50% where they remained until 
the autumn of 1975 (see figure 2.1.)
The Seventh Quarterly Report (19 74) showed a 
significant reduction of profit margin of manufacturing and 
service industries as a percentage of reference levels.
Such a decline in profit margins was explained by the 
Price Commission as being attributed mainly to the increases 
in labour costs which took place during that period and
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and which was only partially absorbed in higher prices.
This seems obvious, especially when costs are increasing 
rapidly and there is a time lag between notifying the 
Price Commission, obtaining his permission to increase 
prices, and reaping the fruits of higher selling prices.
In addition, during that time production has started to 
fall and thus it was rather difficult to maintain profit 
margins.
These reasons could be valid on the assumption that 
the market was actually ready to absorb the increase had
it been secured. According to Evely (19 76) the market 
conditions had a big share in depressing profits far below 
reference levels. Therefore, it seems unlikely that prices 
could have been raised to maintain profit margins even if 
the price control allowed. Such a situation led many 
firms to experience liquidity problems whereby they had to 
reduce their output and employment so as to cut back their 
real investments in working capital. Research and 
development as well as stock holding had to be reduced too 
(J Sizer 1976). In 19 76 profit margins started to improve 
when the industry contrived, to accommodate the effect of 
the increase in the labour costs. This was supported by 
the increase in production and the safeguards provided by 
the Price Code.
Some of the repercussions of the effect of the Price 
Code on prices and profits are that many firms might have 
found it profitable to divert their resources to areas
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uncovered by the Code especially exports, where prices 
had increased more than domestic prices. Investments in 
U.K. too became less attractive to foreign parent companies 
(Evely 19 76) .
From the above, it can be seen that during the period 
1973-76 the Price Code appears to have had a significant 
effect on the reductions of profits earned by companies 
even though the market conditions had contributed a lot to 
the same. It is worth mentioning that in a survey
conducted by the Accountancy Age in 19 73, eleven out of 2 7
quoted public companies may have broken the profit margin 
rules set out in the Government's Pay and Price Code 
(Accountancy Age, 1973).
2.3.2. The 1977 - 79 Price Code
As said earlier, the 19 77 legislation abolished the
'cost control' element of the Price Code and to compensate 
introduced a more far reaching investigatory system. It is 
not surprising to realize that the Government justified 
such a change by saying that "they (cost control rules) 
have come to be regarded by some firms as an entitlement 
to price increases, and in some cases they can adversely 
affect efficiency and employment."^
The Notification and Information Order required 
manufacturing and service enterprises with annual turnover
See Consultative Document: A New Price Policy, 
22nd February 19 77, p.5
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greater than £12 and £9 million respectively to notify the 
Commission in advance of any increase in their prices. An 
i^ediate effect of the 19 77 Price Code had been the sharp 
reduction in the amount of price increases notified to the 
Price Commission. This was also coupled with a similar 
decrease in the number of notifications for price increases 
The later effect could be an incorrect indicator of shifts 
in the behaviour of firms since some firms may apply for 
more than one notification for a single price increase 
(one may be for increase in price and the other based on 
investment relief), or have the full increase once rather 
than in a number of times. However, the decrease in the 
amount notified should give a guide to the changes of 
prices (see Table 2.1.)
The Price Commission Index which was derived from the 
notifications of price increases, was broadly a reflection 
of price movements under the influence of changes in costs 
and domestic market conditions. The Index followed a 
downward trend which implied a decrease in the amount of 
price increase. During 1978 it stabilised at an annual 
rate of about 4 to 7 per cent. However, it started to 
increase in early 19 79 (see Figure 2.2) and according to 
the Financial Times (1979:1)
"the main reason for the rise 
appears to be the continued increase 
in oil prices after the disruption 
to supplies from Iran."
Nonetheless, it could be said that the 1977 Price Code has 
had a marked effect in confining firms* price increases.
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In any investigation or examination, the criteria set 
in Section 2 of the Act was the framework used in judging
I
whether proposed price increases, or the level of prices 
or margins, were in accordance with the policy objective 
of
"restraining prices of goods and 
charges for services so far as that 
appears to the Commission to be 
consistent with the making of 
adequate profits by efficient 
suppliers of goods and services".
(Section 2(1)(a)). Unlike the previous price control 
where the rules of the game were to a large extent specific 
and known to firms, the 1977 Price Code criteria seem to 
be very subjective. It required "an exercise in judgement 
where conflicting assessments between one criterion and 
another have to be weighted and reconciled" (Price 
Commission Quarterly Report, Aug-Oct 1977). Such a dim 
vista appears to have increased the uncertainty faced by 
firms. One therefore wonders if the ambiguity embodied in 
the 1977 price control contributed to the low level of 
notification mentioned above.
In selecting candidates for investigation, the 
Commission was mainly interested in sectors where 
competition and efficiency were limited. This is because 
it was believed that the lack of full competition might 
lead "to inefficiency in the use of resources to 
exploitation of market strength against the consumer or to 
an unreasonable level of profit" (Price Commission 
Quarterly Report Feb-April 1978) . It was up to the
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discretion of the Commission whether to make a detailed 
assessment or not; however, the criteria used in making such 
a decision were also subjective in the sense that firms did 
not know whether they would be subject to an investigation 
or not. By the time the Price Commission was abolished 44 
companies had been investigated.
For the firm an immediate effect of a decision to 
investigate was to freeze the price concerned. The 
Commission had only 6-7 weeks in which to identify and 
collect data. During that period firms could apply for 
interim price increases and the Commission might be 
obliged to agree under the safeguard provisions. These 
required the Commission to allow interim increases to the 
extent necessary to permit a certain minimum margin of 
profit on the products or services concerned. According 
to the Price Commission the Safeguard Regulations have 
had two general effects. First, the Commission was 
committed "to calculate an entitlement to a price increase 
against a set of mechanistic rules independent of the 
criteria". Second, "they have influenced the options open 
to us (the Commission) both in making a decision to 
investigate and in the conduct of an investigation and the 
framing of recommendations" (Price Commission Quarterly 
Report, Feb-April 1978).
In evaluating the impact of the Price Commission on 
profitability, it has been argued by the Confederation of 
British Industry (1979:14) that the Price Commission
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adversely affected profitability in at least seven ways;
1 Through the freeze on prices during investigation.
2 Through restrictions imposed after investigations.
3 Through the restraining effect these restrictions 
had on competitors' prices, which was particularly 
relevant since the Commission tended to focus on 
market leaders.
4 Through 'horsetrading' with companies which were 
prepared to agree to reduce the size of proposed 
price increases to avoid investigation.
5 Through the general deterrent effect that the 
Commission had on companies wanting to raise prices
6 Through the administrative costs which the 
Commission inquiries imposed on companies, in 
particular the opportunity cost of diverting senior 
management away from their proper function. 
Individual companies reckoned the total here at 
tens of thousands of pounds.
7 Through the adverse effect on investment caused by 
the existence of the Commission and the policy it 
administered which led to lower profitability in 
the medium term.
It is with these details in mind that attention can 
now be turned towards organisation theory concepts and the 
impact of the Price Codes in the organisation. This will 
be the theme of the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Organizational Affects of Price Control
3.1_____ Identification of Organizational affects of price
control
The pricing literature which was reviewed in the
previous chapter seems to have pursued a logico-deductive
theory approach to scientific inquiry which is to construct
theories in almost absolute isolation from events in the
world and, on the basis of that theory, deduce hypotheses
for testing against real-world data. The theory then
stands or falls until it is refutedby tests against such
facts. In discussing such an approach to research, Blumer
(1978:34) correctly argues that:
"It is no wonder that the broad arena 
of research inquiry in the social and 
psychological sciences has the 
character of a grand display and clash 
of social philosophies. Instead of 
going to the empirical social world in 
the first and last instances, resort 
is made instead to a priori theoretical 
schemes, to sets of unverified concepts, 
and to canonized protocols of research 
procedure. These come to be the 
governing agents in dealing with the 
empirical social world, forcing research 
to serve their character and bending the 
empirical world to their premises."
Hence, the alternative approach to scientific research 
which this thesis purports to adopt gives weight to the 
process by which a theory is developed and verified. This
type of research is coined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in
their well known work. The discovery of grounded theorv-
strategies for gualitative research. They argue that:
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"In contrasting grounded theory with 
logico-deductive theory and discussing 
and assessing their relative merits in 
ability to fit and work (predict, 
explain, and be relevant), we have ' 
taken the position that the adequacy 
of a theory for sociology (and it is 
argued here for accounting) today 
cannot be divorced from the process by 
which it is generated. Thus one canon 
for judging the usefulness of a theory 
is how it was generated— and we suggest 
that it is likely to be a better theory 
to the degree that it has been 
inductively developed from social 
research.... Generating a theory from 
data means that most hypotheses and 
concepts not only come from the data, 
but are systematically worked out in 
relation to the data during the course 
of the research. Generating a theory 
involves a process of research". Glaser 
and Strauss (1967:5-6; italices in the 
original).
Furthermore, Blumer (1978:35) describes what it means
to ground theory in the empirical world.
"I repeat once more that what is needed 
is to gain empirical validation of 
premises, the problems, the data, their 
lines of connection, concepts, and the 
interpretation involved in the act of 
scientific inquiry. The road to such 
empirical validation...lies in the 
examination of the empirical social 
world. It is not to be achieved by 
forming and elaborating catchy theories, 
by devising ingenius models, by seeking 
to emulate the advanced procedures of 
the physical sciences, by adopting the 
newest mathematical and statistical 
schemes, by coining new concepts, by 
developing more precise quantitative 
techniques, or by insisting on adherence 
to the canons of research design. Such 
preoccupations, without prejudice to 
their merit in other respects are just 
not headed in the direction that is 
called for here. What is needed is a 
return to the empirical social world 
(Blumer, 1978:35).
For Blumer, a return to the empirical social world 
involves the inductive process of naturalistic inquiry.
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"The empirical social world consists 
of on-going group like and one has 
to get close to this life to know what 
is going on in it.
The metaphor that .1 like is that of 
lifting the veils that obscure or hide 
what is going on. The task of 
scientific study is to lift the veils 
that cover the area of group life that 
one proposes to study. The veils are 
not lifted by substituting, in 
whatever degree, preformed images for 
first-hand knowledge. The veils are 
lifted by getting close to the area 
and by digging deep in it through 
careful study. Schemes of methodology 
that do not encourage or allow this 
betray the cardinal principle of 
respecting the nature of one's 
empirical world...(The) merit of 
naturalistic study is that it 
respects and stays close to the 
empirical domain (Blumer, 1978:38,43)."
Following the above line of argument, Buckley et.al
(1976:22) seems to have appreciated the modicum of such
an approach to scientific research in the accounting
literature and have remarked that
"There are abundant opportunities 
for inductive research in 
accounting, and the paucity to date 
can only be explained by an 
unawareness of the need or potential 
for this type of research (Buckley 
et.al., 1976:22)."
Therefore, based on what is adumbrated above, it is 
believed that if an unstructured interview is conducted 
with officials in one of the companies that was subject to 
the rules of the Price Commission, a genuine portrayal 
may be obtained of the salient changes that were engendered 
by the introduction of the Price Commission and which had 
an impact on pricing decisions. This stance is very 
similar to the phenomenological approach to interviewing which
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"is used when the researcher has 
no presuppositions about what of 
importance may be learned by 
talking to people in the program.
The phenomenological interviewer 
wants to maintain maximum 
flexibility to be able to pursue 
information in whatever direction 
appears to be appropriate, 
depending on the information that 
emerges from observing a particular 
setting or from talking to one or 
more individuals in that setting.
Most of the questions will flow 
from the immediate context....No 
predetermined set of questions is 
possible under such circumstances, 
because the evaluator does not know 
beforehand what is going to happen 
and what it will be important to 
ask questions about (Patton,
1980:198-9).
Accordingly, an unstructured interview was carried 
out with the finance director and management accountant 
of Hekmats Limited, one of Britain's leading companies in 
its field of production and which, has^expressed its 
willingness to help in this research. The information 
elicited during that interview revealed that the power 
over pricing decisions shifted from the marketing 
department to the accounting function with the introduction 
of the Price Commission. The interviewee also spelt out 
the difficulties which the company had undergone regarding 
its information processing system because of the extra 
information which was required by the Price Commission. In 
particular, the previous finance director stopped the 
product costing system to enable the accounting staff to 
generate the information demanded by the Commission.
The information emerging from that interview suggested 
that the shift of departmental influence over pricing
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decisions and pressures on information processing were the 
most significant organizational changes induced by the 
introduction of the Price Commission. However, although 
we could establish our hypotheses at that stage of the 
research, it seemed appropriate, first, to look at the 
literature on both intra-organizational power and 
information processing in order to ascertain what insight 
might be gained from it before pursuing research to 
consider whether similar circumstances as those created 
in Hekmats by the introduction of the Price Commission had 
been experienced elsewhere. This was then followed by the 
development of broad hypotheses which acted as a framework 
for further empirical work.
3.2. Organizational affects of price control : The issue
of power
3.2.1. The Concept of Power
Research in the social science has rigorously tackled
the issue of power in work organization in spite of the
pessimistic but succinct remarks of March (1966) which
tend to provide a prescient warning of the difficulties
that surround the issue. However, one could easily observe,
from a review of the literature, that the emphasis has been
on vertical - the influence of one person over another -
rather than on horizontal or departmental power. Such an
unjustified focus of attention has resulted in a modicum
of published work and has led Perrow (1970:84), who was
among the first to shed light on the neglected issue of
horizontal power and its importance, to state:
"Part of the problem, I suspect, 
stems from the persistent attempt
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to define power in terms of 
individuals and as a social- 
psychological phenomenon.
Organizations are viewed as a 
co-operative systems and 
power as a 'problem' of inter­
personal relations. Even 
sociological studies tend to 
measure power by asking about 
an individual....1 am not at 
all clear about the matter, 
but I think the term takes on 
different meanings when the 
unit, or powerholder is a 
formal group in an open system 
with multiple goals, and the 
system is assumed to reflect a 
political-domination model of 
organization rather than only 
a co-operative model. Some 
meanings of the term that come 
from an inter-personal view 
point are irrelevant in this 
case; others are magnified.
The fact that after a cursory 
search I can find only a 
single study that asks survey 
questions regarding the power 
of functional groups strikes 
me as odd. Have we con­
ceptualized power in such a 
way as to exclude this well- 
known phenomenon?".
Milburn (1972) shares Perrow's observation in a review of
behavioural science contribution to the literature on
conflict and power.
The various concepts of power that have been 
proposed (Cartwright 1959, Dahl 1957, Tannenbum 196 8) tend 
to define power within the context of the vertical 
superior-subordinate relationship. Power is thus 
perceived as the ability to control or influence the 
actions or behaviour of another person. However, following 
Perrow's remarks one would expect the concept of power to 
have a different meaning when discussed within the 
context of sub-units relationship. Salancik and Pfeffer
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(1974:453) define horizontal power as "the use of 
influence among co-acting peers to obtain benefits for 
themselves". In their strategic-contingency theory,
Hickson et.al (1971:217) borrow Emerson's (1963% 
definition which "takes power as a property of the social 
relationship, not of the actor."
Although these definitions of power may have served
their purpose in the particular relationships studied, it
appears that the sort of relationship which the Price
Commission may have caused to exist between the concerned
subunits require a specific definition of what the concept 
1means.
3.2.2. The Base of Power
A parallel flow in the literature as regards the 
definition provided for power is the base of power. French 
and Raven (1968) propose five bases of power. According to 
them, an individual may have power because of his ability 
to reward the compliant behaviour of others. He may have 
power because of his ability to punish the noncompliant 
behaviour of others. He may have power arising out of 
fromal position in the organizational hierarchy. He may 
have power because of some charisma he has. These bases 
seem to serve well the vertical superior-subordinate 
relationship.
The definition used in this study is stated in chapter 
6 which deals with the research methodology.
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With respect to sub-units' base of power, several 
suggestions have been noted in the literature. Crozier 
(1964) in his study in a cigarette factory observed that 
power accrued to maintenance engineers because they were 
the only group in the factory with the relevant knowledge 
to deal with the uncertainty hindering the factory's 
operation. Thus, he argued that the distribution of power 
across organizational sub-units is determined by "the kind 
of uncertainty upon which depends the life of the 
organization" (p.164). Thompson (1967) holds a similar 
view by arguing that power accrues to those sub-units that 
are able to cope with critical organizational uncertainties
Perrow (1970) in his study of 12 industrial firms 
found that the sales departments were thought to be the 
powerful departments. This, he explained, might be due to 
the sales departments' ability to reduce uncertainty in 
their activities or what March and Simon (195 8) call 
uncertainty absorption. Thus, he argued that "the most 
critical function tends to have the most power" (p.66).
This follows the argument of Cyert and March (1963) which 
suggests that those groups or sub-units capable of 
absorbing the organization's uncertainty would have 
influence in the organization.
According to the strategic-contingency theory put 
forward by Hickson et.al (1971), power is accrued by 
organizational sub-units that cope with critical 
organizational problems. However, they noted that coping
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with uncertainty itself was not enough to provide power to 
organizational sub-unit. Rather, it is 'provided by the 
ability of sub-units to cope with organizational uncertainty, 
by the ability of sub-units to cope with substitutability and 
by the ability of sub-units activities are integrated into the 
system). The empirical work conducted by Minings et al (1974) 
provides support to the strategic-contingency theory.
Salancik and Pfeffer (19 74) suggest that the distribution 
of power within the organization is sensitive to a sub-unit's 
ability to provide critical and important resources from the 
environment to the organization. They further propose that 
this power may be used to influence the criteria used in 
organizational decision making and to increase the share 
of internally allocated resources. Their study in an 
American university buttresses up their argument. Lawrence 
and Lorch (1967:127) hold the same view that securing 
important resources from the environment (in their study 
it was product innovation) affects the distribution of 
sub-units' power.
Elucidating on the above views, Pfeffer (1977:258) 
comments that
"to the extent that resources are a 
critical contingency for organizations, 
it could be argued that the focus on a 
sub-unit's ability to bring in critical 
resources is equivalent to the sub-unit's 
capability of coping with a critical 
organizational contingency. The 
principal difference, if there is one, 
concerns the ease of measurement of 
the concepts. The flow of resources
into an organization and responsibility for resource
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flows appear to be more precisely 
specified than the concept of 
uncertainty or contingency."
After examining the workflow in an insurance company, 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) realized that all other 
departments in the organization depended on the services
provided by the coding department. This dependence
created a source of power for the manager of the coding 
department. However, top management were not aware of this 
fact since they were not affected by the work of the coding 
department. This led Salancik and Pfeffer (1977:7) to 
argue that "the basis for power in an organization derives 
from the ability of a person or sub-unit to take or not
take action that are desired by others".
In his study of the introduction of computer systems 
into an organization, Pettigrew (1973) demonstrates how 
one of the consequences of such innovative decisions can 
be a redistribution of scarece resource, such as power and 
status, within the organization. Pettigrew's work 
emphasises the political aspects of decision-making and the 
extent to which the internal political environment is 
itself a major source of uncertainty when an important 
innovation is introduced.
In discussing the importance of informational systems 
as a means for influencing the distribution of 
intraorganizational power, Bariff and Galbraith (19 78:15) 
believe that
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"sources of intraorganizational power 
are generally represented by formal 
authority and influences associated 
with the capability of an individual's 
or group's comparative advantage for 
providing information, materials or 
other services to support other 
individual's or group's tasks".
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1977:10) developed an
organizational model in which they suggest that the nature
of organizational control is dependent on the type of
organizational structure which, in turn, is contingent on
certain contextual variables namely technology and
environment. Based on this model and elaborating on the
works of Crozier (1964), Thompson (1967), and Hickson
et al (1971), they argue that
"the distribution of power within an 
organization is contingent on the 
context of the organizational sub-unit 
to the extent that environmental 
uncertainties or non-routine 
technologies form the bases from which 
individuals may realize power".
It is now necessary to examine whether the above 
sources of power that are identified in the literature do 
suggest how the Price Commission may have had an impact 
on sub-units' power.
When the price control was established companies had 
to endure the painstaking task of pre-notifying reporting 
price increases and justifying these increases according 
to the formula of the 1973-1977 Price Code and, later on, 
the criteria laid down by the 19 77-79 Price Code. The 
responsibility of furnishing the Price Commission with the 
required information was incumbent on the accounting
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department since the information was mainly cost in nature. 
This seems to be absolutely true with the cost allowance 
formula of the 1973-77 Act and to a large extent with the
criteria introduced in the 1977 Act (Section 2(2) (a) which
relates to recovery of cost incurred).
The importance of the role of cost in pricing
decisions in a period of inflation should well be
appreciated. This importance stems mainly from the fact
that changes in costs should be accounted for in pricing
decisions. Hazledine (1979:19) elaborates on this issue
by remarking that
"a firm may expect to be able to 
raise its price after its costs 
have risen without losing sales, 
because its customers find 
reasonable such an excuse (and 
may take it as a signal that 
prices of alternatives are also 
likely to rise), but risk losing 
a significant proportion of its 
market to rival sellers (some 
possibly new entrants) should 
it attempt the same price 
increase with no justifying cost 
changes".
The requirements demanded by the Price Commission, 
especially the 1973-77 Price Code, appear to have 
augmented the significance of this role and supported the 
belief that all prices would tend to ensue from changes 
in costs and as such, prices, to a large extent, would 
follow the trend of cost. Such a situation seems to have 
led to a considerable "input from the financial as opposed 
to the marketing side of management" regarding pricing 
decisions as Evely pointed out (1976:58). Skinner 
(1976:106), too, opines that the Price Commission (1973-77)
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allowed the accountant to exercise more influence on price 
and to make the running. However, although the 1977-79 
Price Code used a different criteria in approving increases 
in prices, the pattern to increase prices in order to 
recover increases in costs, among other factors, seems 
to have followed the 1973-77 Price Code. Indeed, 31 out 
of 44 companies investigated cited Section 2(2)(a) of the 
criteria which refers to recovery of cost incurred. Yet, 
since the required information was not mainly within the 
scope of what the accountants could provide, it is expected 
that the accountants exercised less influence on pricing 
decisions than they would have done during the 1973-77 
Price Code.
It, therefore, appears from the above that the 
accounting department possessed most of the necessary 
information to cater for the onerous demands of the 
1973-77 Price Code. It also appears that having most of 
the relevant information to increase prices during that 
period enabled the accounting department to influence the 
pricing decisions, and as a consequence be more 
influential in generating external resources for the 
business and coping with environmental uncertainty in the 
form of being able to substantiate price increases.
Because the information required by the 1977-79 Price Code 
was not to a large extent possessed by the accounting
1 See Wilensky (1967) and Pettigrew (1972) for 
information as a source of power.
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department only, one expects that it's influence on 
pricing decisions was less than during the 1973-77 Price 
Code. On the other hand, the fact that the accounting 
department may have developed an expertise in dealing with
the work of the 1973-77 Price Code, may have enabled it to 
continue handling the requirements of the 1977-79 Price 
Code and thereby influence pricing decisions.
It could therefore be broadly hypothesized that:
The relative distribution of sub-units' power to influence 
decisions is contingent upon requirements enforced on the 
organization by environmental factors, and the relative 
abilities of sub-units to help satisfy those requirements. 
Power in this context may be broadly defined as the ability 
of sub-units to influence decisions.
The above hypothesis is based on the argument that 
before the price control was established the pricing 
decision was principally a marketing decision. However, 
after the introduction of the price control in 1973, which 
is here perceived as an environmental factor, the 
domination of the marketing department seems to have lost 
ground. This was mainly because the Price Commission 
required different recipes for increases in prices and 
whose ingredients were mainly supplied by the accounting 
department. Thus, it seems plausible to argue that the 
different requirements of the Price Commission and the 
ability of the accounting department to help satisfy those 
requirements had led to a relative shift of power in pricing 
decision making from the marketing to the accounting
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department. The hypothesis also implies that after the 
abolition of the Price Commission, the power to influence 
pricing decisions should have shifted back from the 
accounting to the marketing department if the degree of 
market competition had not shifted markedly in the 
meantime.
It has been demonstrated that the literature seems 
to have ignored the impact environmental factors may have 
on the distribution of horizontal power. This section has 
attempted to draw attention to this issue by arguing that 
the various requirements of the Price Commission and the 
abilities of sub-units to help satisfy those requirements, 
have led to relative distribution of sub-units' power to 
influence decisions.
3.3_____ The issue of designing accounting information
systems
The literature is replete with suggestions regarding 
the design of information systems to support organizational 
decision making. Accounting has its share in these 
suggestions since the accounting information system is 
intended to support organizational decision making. The 
Amercian Accounting Association (1974:79) opines the same 
by defining an internal accounting information system as 
"that portion of the total information system which is 
concerned with collecting, processing, storing and
retrieving...data for the purpose of providing information 
to decision makers within the organization".
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The design of information systems to support 
decision making could be seen as depending upon a number 
of variables. There are those who argue that attention 
should be given to satisfy the users perceived 
information needs (Cyert and March 1963, Tricker 1967, 
Child 1972, King and Cleland 1975). This view is based 
on the assertion that if information systems are to 
facilitate decision making then it should cater for the 
information which the user requires in making that 
decision.^ However, the problem with this approach is 
how a user's information needs are to be assessed. A 
difficulty with this task may be due to the fact that the 
decision maker sometimes not knowing what he needs but 
what is available.
The design of information systems is also claimed to
depend upon the decision making process (Simon et al 1954,
Caplan 196 6, Ijiri, Jaedicke & Knight 1966, Dopuch,
Birnberg & Demski 1967, Radford 19 74). In supporting this
view, Davidson & Trueblook (1961:20) state:
"Accounting for decision making 
involves designing systems that 
provide relevant information at 
each stage of the decision 
making process; problem 
formulation, enumeration of 
alternatives, and choice among 
alternatives."
Along a similar vein, Hopwood (1976:122) argues that:
Ackoff (1968) questions the assumptions that (a) the 
manager needs the information he wants and (b) if a 
manager has the information he needs, his decision 
making will improve.
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"If the basic purpose is to be 
taken seriously and accounting 
systems are to be seen as 
essential parts of a wider 
information and decision process 
within organisations, it is 
necessary to considerably expand 
our perspectives for viewing and 
appraising their design and 
operation. It is necessary to 
have a detailed appreciation of 
the whole decision process".
The value of information is another factor that has 
been given consideration in designing information systems. 
Two approaches can be identified with respect to 
information value measurement (King & Epstein 1976) . One 
approach focuses on changes in expectation about decision- 
related events. This approach attempts to assess changes 
in expectations about the outcome of an observable 
phenomenon based on a message which is received concerning 
the outcome. The main ideas of this approach stem from the 
work of Shannon and Weaver (1949). Ôthers, mostly those 
concerned with accounting information, have taken up the 
concept and applied it in value-oriented domains (Lev,
1968, 1969, Lee and Bedford 1969).
The second approach to information value measurement 
focuses on changes in behaviour as reflected in decision 
situations. The advocate of this approach argue that 
"information has value only if it leads to the selection 
of a qualitatively different alternative than would have 
otherwise been selected" (King & Epstein 1976:173). On 
attempting to apply this approach to accounting, Feltham 
1968, 1972 and Demski 1969, 1970, emphasise the ultimate 
payoff derived from the information as well as the way the
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decision maker will utilize the information.
The above are some of the factors which have been 
taken into consideration by researchers when making 
suggestions regarding the design of information systems to , 
support organizational decision making. These could be 
loosely called "internal" factors or classified under the 
managerial activities of management control and operational 
control as proposed by Anthony (1965).
The literature on strategic planning has also tackled 
the issue of designing information systems to support the 
strategic activities of planning and policy making. There 
are those who argue that there is need for a general 
schema for generating information for the different levels 
of managerial activities (strategic planning, management 
control and operational control) because there is no 
reason to assume that information needs of strategic 
decisions are homogeneous across all levels of decision 
making (Zani 1970, Gordon, Larcker & Tuggle 1978) .
However, whether information systems could support 
strategic decisions seems to be an issue of controversy. 
Wrapp (1967) sees hardly any point in trying to design 
information systems to support strategic decisions. This, 
he argues, is because strategic problems are unique. A 
counter view is held by others such as King & Cleland 
(1974, 1977) and Radford (1978) who have proposed general 
designs of strategic planning information systems and
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how they could help organizations in their strategic 
decisions.
As strategic decisions inherently involve external 
considerations, it appears that the bulk of the emphasis 
in the literature has been on how effectively and 
efficiently can information systems generate environmental 
information.
Recently, however, a number of writers have propogated
the belief that:
"in designing accounting systems 
for today's complex enterprises, 
better progress will be made if 
the previous technical and 
process understandings run in 
parallel with an awareness of 
the factors which both necessitate 
and constrain the control of the 
enterprises as a whole.
Accordingly, it requires an 
analysis and assessment of these 
organisational and environmental 
factors which influence the design 
and effectiveness of accounting 
systems"
(Hopwood, 1976:190; italices in the original).
In attempting to consider organizational factors, 
there are those who hold the opinion that information 
systems are typically associated with different kinds of 
organizational structure (Wilensky 1967). Unfortunately, 
it appears that, apart from the early study of Simon et al 
(1954) and the works of Galbraith (1972, 1973) and 
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1977), little has been done on the 
effect of organizational structure on the design of
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information systems.
Only relatively recently have accounting academics 
considered in any depth the way environmental factors 
need to be taken into consideration in designing accounting 
information systems. It could be observed from the above 
that the accounting literature has traditionally concerned 
itself with a "more parochial view" regarding what should 
be taken into consideration in designing accounting 
information systems for decision making. One wonders 
whether such a "narrow" view could not lead to 
dysfunctional decision making especially when organizations 
cannot neglect what is going on in ah environment which 
might directly affect their performance as well as their 
survival. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:78) made the remark 
that:
"organizations learn to attend to 
new sectors of their environments 
when these sectors begin to demand 
certain performance of the 
organization. Those that do not 
develop new, appropriate information 
systems are less likely to survive.
Either through adaptation or 
selection a similar result will 
emerge - as environments change, 
organizational information 
processing and attentional 
mechanisms will change".
The 1973-77 Price Code imposed certain informational 
requirements on organizations seeking increases in the 
prices of their products. Organizations had to make 
quarterly reports on their profit margins to the Price 
Commission and to notify as well as justify any price 
increases which they intended to implement. Even the
- 54 -
1977-79 Price Code, which used a different criteria, 
required the same information with the exception that the 
periodic reports on profit margins continued for one 
year. It appears that such perturbing demands must have 
had certain impact on the organizations and especially 
their accounting information systems. Indeed, if we 
accept the view that accounting information systems are 
designed to generate internal as well as external 
information to support organizational decision making, we 
will find that the informational requirements laid down 
by the Price Commission had put accounting information 
systems into a new perspective.
This different perspective is clear from the fact 
that the emphasis is on information requirements rather 
than information uses. The above brief review has 
demonstrated that the main focus has been dn "internal" 
factors like the value of information, the user perceived 
information needs, decision making process etc. On the 
other hand, the strategic planning literature has 
concentrated on how information systems should be designed 
to cater for the information needed for the stratégie 
managerial activities, mainly the collection and 
utilization of external information. Hence, whilst 
practitioners may have implicitly considered environmental 
demands when assessing their information needs, it seems 
that the accounting literature has tended almost to ignore 
these demands when discussing the design of accounting 
information systems. However, the works of Khandwalla
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(1972), Lowe and Mclnned (1971), Amigoni (1978), and 
Gordon and Miller (1976) can be considered as sanguine 
attempts towards filling this gap.
It should not be surprising to find organizations 
which shun from considering the requirements of 
environmental factors or even eschew giving them their 
right perspective, in designing their information systems, 
to make dysfunctional decisions. For example the enormous 
amount of information required by the Price Commission 
could lead to information processing overload if the 
accounting information system had not been moulded to 
cater for this demand. Information overload has been 
defined by Rosen & Schneck (1967:12) as "the amount of 
information input which is greater than that which the 
organization or its decision makers can adequately 
handle". However, in our case it is information 
processing overload. Miller (1960:697) has identified 
some of the possible dysfunctional repercussions that 
might result from information overload. These are:
(a) Omission, failing to process 
some of the information,
(b) Error, processing information 
incorrectly,
(c) Queuing, delaying during 
periods of peak load in hoping 
of catching during lulls,
(d) Filtering, neglecting to
process certain types of
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information according to 
some shceme of priorities,
(e) Approximation, or cutting 
categories of discrimination,
(f) Employing multiple channels, 
using parrallel channels; as 
in decentralization,
(g) Escaping from the task.
Similar problems may arise if the process system itself 
is overloaded. Hence, if the processing system has 
inadequate spare capacity or adaptability to supply new 
information needed to satisfy people external to the 
organization, the information produced for decision 
making may be squeezed and, as a result, dysfunctional 
decisions may occur.
It could therefore by broadly hypothesized that:
1 The design of accounting information systems
for decision making is influenced by reguirements 
enforced by environmental factors and so the 
Price Codes should have induced changes in the 
information systems.
2 Accounting information systems will lead to 
dysfunctional decision making if they cannot 
cater for reguirements of external agencies which 
have power to demand such information.
The first hypothesis is justified on the following 
grounds. During the life of the Price Commission it was
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mandatory upon organizations that fall within certain 
categories to notify as well as justify any contemplated 
increases in the prices of their products. In addition, 
organizations had to send regularly reports on their 
profit margins. The responsibility of furnishing the 
Price Commission with the required information was 
incumbent on the accounting department since the 
information required by the 1973-77 and to some extent by 
the 1977-79 Price Codes was mainly cost in nature. 
Accordingly, the accounting information system had to 
provide all the relevant information required whenever 
any pricing decision was sought. However, if these 
environmental requirements were to be fulfilled, then 
they should have been considered in the designing of 
accounting information systems. Thus, it appears that 
there is a relationship between the design of accounting 
information systems and the requirements of environmental 
factors. One can therefore argue that environmental 
requirements influence the design of accounting information 
systems.
The second hypothesis reflects the situation where 
organizations refrain from considering the requirements 
of environmental factors, or do not give them their right 
perspective in the design of their accounting information 
systems. The immense amount of information required by 
the Price Commission could prove a heavy burden on 
organizations if their accounting information systems 
were not designed to provide that type and amount of
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information. It is therefore possible that, in order to 
relieve themselves from such an overload, organizations 
ceased other important information which led to 
dysfunctional decision making. Thus, it seems plausible 
to argue that accounting information systems will lead to 
dysfunctional decisions if they cannot cater for the 
requirements of environmental factors.
This section has focussed on the limited amount of 
literature which considers environmental factors in 
designing accounting information systems. It has also 
argued that, if these considerations are not catered for 
properly, then it is expected that accounting information 
systems would lead to dysfunctional decisions.
3.4_____ The Need for a Case Study
The three broad hypotheses outlined in the previous
section will be considered as a framework for the next
stage of our empirical work which will be carried out in
order to generate more specific hypotheses. To achieve
this objective, it is believed that the case study approach
would be most appropriate. It has been claimed by Hagg and
Hedlund (1979:135) that
"accounting researchers appear to 
have been less interested in using 
case study approaches to research 
than researchers in other areas of 
social science inquiry",
and that
"one reason for this state of 
affairs might be that accounting
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researchers have not seriously 
considered the potential that 
case approaches can offer".
Such a depressing reflection of the state of the art
in the accounting literature seems not to be justified if
the existing use of this approach in other social sciences
is made apparent. For example, Ray (1976:63) argues:
1 that the research case, property conceived and 
used, can be an effective means of:
accurately observing things and events
- providing intimate and habitual familiarity 
with things
- providing diagnoses of situations which lead 
to concept and generalisation;
2 that, in fact, a very limited number of research 
cases based on individual situations often 
constitute the factual evidence on which the 
general theories of our current corpus of 
knowledge are based;
3 that the significant contribution of research case 
studies to the development of management studies 
in the past and its potential application in the 
future should be explicitly recognised in models 
of teaching and research strategy.
Focusing on the field of job satisfaction, Locke 
(1976:1339) believes that in addition to its other 
advantages,
"case studies can be very valuable 
as a source of hypotheses about the 
psycho-dynamics of job satisfaction.
Such hypotheses might never emerge 
from a questionnaire study because 




"case studies give one a much 
fuller and more integrated 
picture of the whole individual 
than is possible in largescale 
studies using pencil and paper 
measure".
In discussing the differences between case study and
sample survey strategies in the analysis of organizations,
McClintock et al. (1979:612) point out that the goals of
qualitative case study are:
"1. to capture the frame of reference 
and definition of the situation 
of a given informant or partici­
pant and thus to avoid instrumen­
tation artifacts of standardized 
measurement procedures,
2. to permit detailed examination of 
organizational process,
3. and to elucidate those factors 
peculiar to the case that may 
allow greater understanding of 
causality."
The above stated studies, in addition to many more 
(Lupton, 1980, Bennis, 1960; Campbell, 1975), seem to 
espouse the use of the case study approach when a closer 
knowledge of what is taking place in an organization is 
sought, and in grounding the development of research 
hypotheses. Indeed, this is the spirit of this research 
and the message that should have been sounded by others 
concerned with the primary impact of the Price Commission 
in particular and pricing literature in general. The next 
section sheds light on the research method that will be 
pursued in collecting the data for the case study.
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3.5 Case study research method
In their classical article, Maccoby and Maccoby
(1954:450) express the view that the interview
"may be employed during the early 
stages of a study to help identify 
the relevant dimensions, to suggest 
hypotheses, and to reveal the 
natural frames of reference 
existing in the minds of respondents".
Kerlinger (1977:480), too, believes that interviews
"can be an exploratory device to 
help identify variables and 
relations, to suggest hypotheses, 
and to guide other phases of the 
research".
Thus, it appears that the use of interviews would 
be ideal for our present purpose, especially the semi­
structured type, since it provides the researcher with 
a wide scope of manoeuvring that helps him to probe 
the issues under study in more depth. The interview 
guide (see appendix B)’ that will be used is designed 
to cater for the eras prior to the introduction of the 
Price Commission, the first and second prices code, and 
after the abolition of the Price Commission.
Pettigrew's (1973) model of decision making as a 
political process will be used as a framework for 
examining the issue of power in Hekmats Limited.
Pettigrew believes that decisions are taken via processes 
that are functions of properties of the unit or units in 
which the decision is to be made. He emphasises decision 
making as a social process and argues that, as part of 
such processes, power strategies are employed by various
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interested parties'through their demands. Owing to the 
heterogeneous nature of these demands, which results 
from differences in specialization, sub-units will attempt 
to generate support in order to satisfy their demands.
It is the involvement of sub-units in such demand - and 
support - generating processes within the decision making 
process of the organization that constitutes the political 
dimension of Pettigrew's theory. He further elaborates 
(1977:80) how the process of power strategy is formulated. 
This process, he suggests, "will include debate about 
which dilemmas should receive organizations' attention 
and the choice of which alternative courses of action 
should be adopted to resolve those dilemmas".
Thus, following Pettigrew, it will be attempted to 
look for shifts in sub-units' power to influence 
decisions by studying the pricing decision making process 
before, during and after the life of the Price Commission. 
It is believed that such a study requires the following:
(a) Identification of who proposed 
price changes (the bringing of 
a dilemma into the picture);
(b) the way changes in prices were 
worked out (the various courses 
of action suggested); and
(c) ' who decided and finally
approved the price to be charged 
(the choice of which course of 
action should be adopted).
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However, embodied in the decision making process is 
the issue of mobilizing power which will enable sub-units 
to influence the selection of certain course(s) of action. 
It has been argued that the requirements of the Price 
Commission, and the relative abilities of sub-units to 
help satisfy those requirements, will give sub-units the 
power to influence pricing decisions (the selection of 
courses of action). Thus, for example, it seems 
plausible to suggest that unless the requirements of the 
Price Commission increased the importance of accounting 
information, the accounting department would not increase 
its power to influence pricing decisions. It is believed 
that a comparison of the effect of the different 
requirements of the Price Commission on the importance of 
accounting information, non-accounting information and on 
the inducement of price changes, would give us an 
indication of possible relative power shifts, to and from 
the accounting department, with respect to its influence 
upon pricing decisions.
Bearing in mind the hypothesized changes that should 
ideally occur in the design of accounting information 
systems for decision making, as a direct result of the 
requirements of the Price Commission, we will attempt to 
trace the response of the company in meeting these 
requirements. It is assumed that, if changes can be 
identified in the following factors, it may be possible 
to find support for the thesis suggesting the influence 
of the Price Commission's requirements on the design
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of accounting information systems. These factors are:
(a) changes in the number of 
employees,
(b) reallocation of some 
responsibilities between 
functional groups,
(c) shifts towards data processing 
and/or computerization,
(d) collection of new basic data, and
(e) changes in the structure of the 
accounting department.
We shall focus on the capability of the company's 
accounting information system in order to examine the 
hypothesis that accounting information systems will lead 
to dysfunctional decision making if they cannot cater for 
the requirements of the Price Commission. In particular, 
we shall be interested in whether the accounting 
information system managed to maintain the previous 
management information as well as to satisfy the Price 
Commission's new requirements, and whether the management 
had to drop, delay, or filter out any specific aspect of 
information in order to satisfy these requirements. 
Evidence will also be sought on the question of whether 
extra work (carried out as a result of these requirements) 
ever led to poor management decisions.
It is believed that by covering the above main 
steps, a representative picture of the primary impact of
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the Price Commission on Hekmats Limited can be drawn, and 
thereby more specific arid grounded hypotheses can be 






Hekmats Limited is a leading British company in the 
manufacturing of certain edible products for which it is 
renowned. In addition to its major products, which con­
stitute 90% of its production, it also manufactures a range 
of speciality products. The whole range of products amount 
to more than 800. It employs about 6000 employees and its 
annual net home profits are approximately £8 - 10 millions.
The company has a number of factories spread all over 
the United Kingdom and its headquarters are based in 
London. Basically all major decisions, e.g. pricing 
decisions, are made at the headquarters.
Hekmats Limted is considered to be the biggest of 
Hekmats International Group of Companies (HIGC) since it 
was the first in the group to be established and its con­
tribution is more than one third of the group's net total 
profit. Indeed the trade name Hekmat came to be assoc­
iated with the products manufactured by Hekmats Limited.
The rest of the group deals in activities which are 
complementary to what Hekmats manufactures and this 
reflects the wide ranging diversification policy carried 
out by the group. Trading relations between Hekmats 
Limited and the rest of HIGC are based on arm's length 
terms.
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The organizational structure of Hekmats Limited is 
shown in Fig. 4.1. It demonstrates the four different 
departments of the company and the three regional 
offices. Each of these departments and regional offices 
has a director who represents it in the company's board 
of directors. However, the finance department did not 
have a director until 1975 and it was not represented 
until that time on the board. The management accountant, 
who was in charge of the department, was reporting to the 
Chief Executive. It is also to be noted that the market­
ing department was a sales department until 1974.
4.2. The Pre-Price Commission Era.
Prior to the introduction of the Price Commission in 
1973, Hekmats Limited was also controlled by the govern­
ment with respect to the prices it charged for its products 
This is because it manufactures essential products to the 
consumer and because there are few companies in the U.K. 
that are in this industry. There was an undertaking 
between Hekmats Limited and the government whereby the 
former cannot increase its prices beyond a certain margin 
which was negotiated between the two parties.
At that time, Hekmats Limited was a company that was
tonnage oriented in the sense that what really mattered
was the quantity of tonnage of raw material sold. This
seems to be because
"the company had been brought up to a 
situation where they procured a certain 
tonnage of raw material, converted it 
to final products, sold it into the
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market place and the exports were used 
as a buffer between the home trade 
requirements and the capacity i.e. 
they balanced their sales capacity 
against export".
The finance department would identify that a price 
increase may be required whenever an increase in basic 
costs took place, and the increase was carried out by 
applying the retail price index on basic costs. However, 
once the government agreed on the suggested price that 
could be charged, it was then up to the sales department 
"to decide how and when to implement that increase".
The price to be charged would finally be approved by the 
company•s secretary but this was only a matter of 
formality.
The sales department was the most influential 
department, in the company. According to one of the 
managers
"the sales department was the dominant 
department in the company. It sort of 
reflected the image of the company 
because it has been the link between 
the company and its customers. It 
was the department that was listened 
to".
Regarding pricing decisions, although costing 
information was used as the catalyst for it, the sales 
department used to give more attention to the competition 
in the market place. One of the marketing managers 
commented that "our policy in the marketing department 
has been for many years to try to fix a price that on 
the one hand was seen as fair to our customers and on the 
other hand would increase our market share". However,
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"the department was hardly interested in product costing 
or product profitability but in sales per tonnage". In 
addition, the finance department played more or less the 
role of a 'service' department in the sense that the 
costing information it provided to the sales department 
was concieved as information that was used as an input to 
a decision that wholly belonged to the sales department. 
Put another way, the finance department would not push 
for a price increase but would only acknowledge or inform 
the sales department of an increase in the basic costs. 
Such a situation hardly left any room for a corporate 
debate of differences in pricing philosophies between the 
sales and finance departments.
4.3. The 1973 - 77 Price Code.
The introduction of the Price Commission in 1973 meant 
a new era of government control for Hekmats Limited. 
However, the Price Commission's control was of a 
different flavour because it subjected price increases 
to a strict mathematical formula and it demanded an 
enormous amount of information to be presented to it on 
quarterly basis. It also meant considerable involvement 
from the finance department in pricing decisions because 
the work of the Price Commission was allocated to it since 
the information required was mainly about costs.
The finance department did hardly any preparation 
for that new piece of legislation since no company expected 
it. The immediate response of the department was to assign
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the work of the Commission to a number of the finance 
department staff. This included two senior and one 
junior managers who devoted most of their time estab­
lishing the necessary contacts with the Commission as 
well as checking the accuracy of the required information
The Commission's work required a certain level of 
understanding since it required staff with a legalistic 
attitute to help interpret the rules and others with an 
expertise in costing because although it was a mechanical 
process, it was a complex one.
As well as having to have personnel with certain 
backgrounds, the company had to collect new basic data in 
order to apply for a price increase and to satisfy the 
profit margin requirements.^ This essentially consisted
of having
"much more detail of at date costs which 
were arrived at by indexing up the 
reference date cost and we had to tie 
this up with the books of accounts in . 
order to make sure that they tie in with 
the net profit m a r g i n . 2 The net profit
1. Net profit margin is defined by the Price Commission 
as the margin of net profit expressed as a percentage 
of sales or turnover. See Review of the Price Code:
A Consulatative Document, London: H.M.S.O., 1974.
2. At date cost is the calculated cost per unit which 
may include the increases in raw material prices and 
other allowable cost increases up to the date of the 
price increase. This means that changes in the 
current costs of resources used by the firm can be 
used to justify price increase. Ibid., p. 16.
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margins were no great problem as we 
have established a regular profit 
review system."
However, the presentation of this data resulted in 
"a diversion of the efforts of the costing area since it 
has to produce specific costing information in a specific 
formatV.
Since the only way by which price increases could be 
achieved was by proving increases in at date costs against 
reference level, the finance department took the lead in 
identifying when a price increase could be required and 
justified.
"The principle under the first code 
was that the company had to apply the 
same level in pounds per ton increase 
across all products. This was a 
function of the first code and there­
fore the process was simply one of 
identifying whether the total cost 
of production had gone up to justify 
an increase. However, it was rather 
mechanical after that as to when that 
increase was applied".
Prices were increasedwhenever the finance department 
announced that such increases were needed and could be 
granted according to the Commission's rule. Further­
more, "the rules of the Code got us into the habit of 
three monthlyapplications and cost reviews". This seems 
to be because the profitability of the comp'otny was very 
low due to a number of environmental factors e.g. the 
entry of U.K. to E.E.C. which affected the company badly 
and a rationalization programme which the company was 
implementing. In addition, the market was always ready 
to absorb any increase. In fact, "it didn't matter what
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price the company charged because it didn't reach any 
price elasticity" and accordingly "it demanded the highest 
price that it could justify under the Code". This seems 
to have been due to the fact that there was an international 
severe shortage in the raw material which was used to 
produce Hekmats goods. Thus, it appears that the 
Commission's rules determined when prices could be 
increased but perhaps only because the market was in a 
state to accommodate almost all rises in prices and more­
over the profitability of the company was "extremely low".
The entitlement for and determination of a price 
increase according to the Price Commission, has led to 
a general appreciation in the company of the importance of 
accounting information in pricing decisions. . This was 
established because it was only accounting information that 
would identify increases in allowable costs, entitling the 
company to apply for price increases (in addition to other 
information required by the Price Commission). Indeed, 
the use of accounting information in pricing decisions has 
"regulated price increases on a uniform and more regular 
basis" and has made "cost increases become price increases 
every quarter".
As a result of the accounting information becoming 
of more significance in pricing decision, the role of the 
finance department has grown from just providing 
information to the marketing department to include using 
that information to influence pricing decisions. This
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shift came about as a consequence of the finance department 
gaining influence from the requirement of the Price 
Commission for certain information possessed by the 
department and which "affected the survival of the company"
The development in the role of the finance department
has evolved a pricing philosophy aimed at taking "the
utmost of what the Commission allowed". In other words,
"the whole emphasis changed from what the market could
bear to what we as a company can justify in terms of
allowable costing increases". According to the finance
department, "the profitability of the company had to come
first and that we [finance department) had to attempt to
push prices up". Indeed,
"because of the source of power which
the finance department had gained from
the Price Commission, it managed to 
influence the pricing decision and 
thereby has its views endorsed".
Furthermore, "the role of the finance area became 
much more sharply defined as embodying overall control over 
pricing policy" and as a result, once an increase in total 
cost was established by the finance department and could 
be granted under the Price Code, "the marketing department 
would then have to produce a reason why the prices should 
not be increased rather than why they should be increased".
In 1975 the company decided to establish the post of
finance director. Such a move reflected the expansion 
which the department was experiencing during that period 
and the increase in its responsibilities. However,
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"it wasn't wholly as a consequence of 
the Price Commission's work, but also 
due to the fact that the management
information was in a very bad state and
that we were merging two companies 
together at the same time. Nevertheless, 
the Price Commission's requirements were 
an important part of the job".
One of the events that took place during the first
code and after the appointment of the finance director was
the change in the organizational structure of the finance
department (see Fig. 4.2).
"When I (finance director), arrived, I 
changed a lot of responsibilities 
in the management accounting function 
and I devoted the whole time of the 
then planning co-ordinater to look 
after the Price Commission's 
requirements. He was specifically 
responsible for all our activities 
with the Commission so that we had 
proper control... and there was another 
person to check the work before it was 
sent to the Commission in order to have 
a double check".
Although this change in the organizational structure of
the department "wasn't wholly as a consequence of the
Price Commission, its existence was nevertheless born in
mind when designing it".
To the finance department the appointment meant that
it had somebody who could support its views in the board
of directors. It was hardly surprising to learn that
the finance director went on using the same source of
power to influence.pricing decisions as did the then
management accountant. This was particularly apparent
whenever the two departments took different stances
regarding price increase and where the decision would
then be submitted to the board. However,
"the finance director, being the gate­
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between the company and the Price 
Commission), was the person who looked 
after price decisions with the Price 
Commission, and had at his disposal 
the information required, was able to 
offer advice as necessary. He was 
the prime mover". Furthermore, "what 
came over at times, but not frequently, 
was that at the end of the day for 
reasons of self protection or survival, 
those who could negotiate an increase 
out of the market place i.e. those who 
would persuade the Price Commission to 
accept a particular position, had to 
have their views listened to as this 
meant literally the survival of the 
company. This certainly didn't use to 
happen before the introduction of the 
Price Commission".
Also involved in the pricing decision making process 
are the company's macro and micro marketing committees.
The members of the micro committee are entirely from the 
marketing department and its function is to lay down the 
broad lines of the pricing policy to the marketing 
director who would discuss them further at the macro 
committee. The macro committee (now called the 
operational committee and is under the supervision of the 
chief executive) has evolved quite a lot over the last 
few years. Originally it was wholly related to what the 
total sales were going to be, but then its work was 
focused towards discussing the company's pricing policy 
before its implementation. It consisted of the marketing 
director and 'a number of other managers in the company 
e.g. the production manager. However, none of the 
finance department staff was amongst its members.
After the introduction of the Price Commission, the 
macro committee found that it was indispensable to have 
the then management accountant as one of its members. The
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committee's reasons for inviting his membership were
apparent and justifiable. It couldn't discuss the
company's pricing policy without a member from the
finance department which dealt with the Price Commission
and possessed the information it required. According to
a member of that committee belonging to neither the
marketing nor the finance department,
"the then management accountant didn't 
hesitate to use his costing information 
and the Price Commission's rules to 
pressurise the committee into recommending 
price increases".
Following his appointment, the finance director took 
over the then management accountant ' s place in the macro 
committee. He also managed to have the new management 
accountant, whom he recruited, as a member of that 
committee. They did continue to influence pricing 
decisions with the power which their predecessor had 
established. Using their department's information and 
the rules of the Price Commission, "they didn't confine 
themselves only to prices and profitability, but started 
questioning what product should be made and where it 
should be made". They "even delved into the logistics of 
why we (the company) were doing things".
The marketing manager further commented that
"as a consequence of their detailed 
information and their knowledge of the 
Commission's rules, they were able to be 
much more specific in their questions to 
the marketing department regarding the 
strategy adopted by it in pricing".
It is not surprising therefore that "their views were 
listened to attentively.
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As mentioned above, the chairman and the name of the 
macro committee were changed and it now includes all the 
regional directors. Apparently "the finance department 
brought some influence to bear upon the decision to 
modify that committee".
It was the duty of the finance department to cater 
for the work of the Price Commission since that respon­
sibility was incumbent on it. In order to carry out its 
obligation, the department devoted the whole time of one 
of its staff to the Commission's work in addition to the 
considerable involvement of its senior staff in helping 
to satisfy these requirements. Furthermore, "the whole 
of the attention of the economics and planning areas, was 
turned to implementing and backing up this legislation" 
and, consequently, "it resulted in a dramatic diversion 
of resources which must have affected the quality of 
management decisions". This was particularly true since 
"most decisions had to be taken centrally and there was no 
way in which they could have been taken on a decentralized 
basis".
In attempting to fulfil the Commission's requirements, 
the finance department had to embark in an enormous amount 
of information processing work, especially since the Code 
demanded the collection of new basic information.
Apparently the company's accounting information system 
was not in a state to process the extra information and 
therefore it had to be adjusted at least in terms of
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increasing the numbers of employees and/or shifting to 
data processing and/or computerization.
However, it appears that "the company was very 
reluctant to take on more people because our profitability 
was very low". In addition, it seems that the company 
underestimated the amount of information required by the 
Commission and therefore was not keen to use computer 
facilities (although it was already in the pipeline) 
because it was thought that the way in which the Price 
Commission required the information to be presented was 
"both illogical and unhelpful". Later on, however, "many 
of the more complex reports were obtained by additional 
programming" and it became apparent that "it would have 
been impossible to satisfy the Commission's requirements 
without computer programming".
However, as a consequence of
"not having the right number of people 
to cope with the information required 
by the Price Commission as well as 
presenting the day-to-day manaaement 
information",
the then management accountant in 1974 found himself 
making the inevitable decision of "dropping a feature of 
(the department's) control system called product costing 
and profitability" with some severe consequences as 
described below. It appears that it was only by taking 
such an action that "the department's staff were made 
available to satisfy the Commission's work".
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The above decision was seen to be unavoidable, because 
the Commission's requirements were mandatary and there­
fore had to be done. In addition, the company's 
accounting information system was not designed to cater 
for such environmental demands and the department was 
hesitant to adjust it. Thus, with the available staff, a 
certain amount of information was prepared whilst others 
were dropped. However, "in retrospection it would have 
been better if more people were employed thereby keeping 
the information" (i.e. the product costing data).
It is worth mentioning that because of dropping the
product costing information the marketing director
subsequently invested two million pounds in promoting and
advertising five products before he found out
"that on three specific products 
produced at (factory X) once the 
products costing exercise had been 
carried out, as required later on by 
the Price Commission, I discovered that 
three important retail products were 
showing a loss ex (factory X) without 
taking into account any of the marketing/ 
sales/distribution and central overheads 
which obviously the products would have 
to bear. Two further very important 
retail products for... showed a loss, 
not at the (factory X) gates, but when 
they received their proportion of costs 
assigned to sales/marketing/distribution 
and central overheads".
An additional repercussion of such a decision was
that
"in the second code when we needed to 
justify our price increases, we had 
no bases on which to calculate it and 
there was no clue to the profitability 
of any product".
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Since the company wouldn't employ extra people, and
as the finance department badly needed more staff to help
in satisfying the Commission's work as well as its day-to-
day activities, the department found it imperative to
transfer a number of employees from the costing function
in the regional officies. However, one of the directors
who has joined the company recently stated that
"it is true that our accounting infor­
mation system was not moulded to cater 
for such an environmental factor, and 
even if it was, it still would have 
needed people with certain qualities 
to think of the policies and strategies 
which are needed in dealing with the 
various government bodies".
Commenting on the décision of dropping the product 
costing information, a top marketing staff member pointed 
out that
"although the finance department 
stopped producing that vital 
information, which was one of the 
factors that consolidated their source 
of power, they still managed to 
influence pricing decisions".
This was "because of their new power base which was 
their ability to persuade the Price Commission of price 
increases", which could be done without reference to 
product costs in the first phase of the Price Code.
4.4. The 1977-79 Price Code
In 1977 the Price Commission announced the new 
criteria by which prices could be increased and it 
consisted of a very vague set of rules. The finance 
department continued to watch over the Commission's 
requirements, this being the responsibility of the
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management accountant.
As a result of applying for a price increase, the
Price Commission decided to investigate Hekmats. The
company was required to establish a product costing
system. Indeed, the finance department also felt a need
for the reinstatment of the system to ascertain the
profitability of products in order
"to charge the highest possible 
price that (those) products 
could command and accordingly 
achieve the company's objective 
which.was to increase its low 
level of profitability".
Indeed, once that information was established, the finance
department was confronted with the situation where the
company had to either discontinue producing certain
products that were making losses or to increase their
prices. However, since the finance department favoured
the latter alternative, it was met "with strong resistance
from the marketing department" which argued that "the
increase would kill our products".
On the other hand, the marketing director admitted that
"they (finance department) are a 
bigger nuisance than they ever 
had been in the past, because 
now they have better information 
at their finger tips and therefore 
it is part of their responsibility 
to ensure that we are obtaining as 
much revenue as possible, and also 
to make sure that we are not 
selling products at a loss or not 
covering their overheads. So, 
where in the past this information 
wasn't readily available to the 
finance department, and now that 
it is, they can ask more questions
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at the marketing committee by 
saying 'look Mr. Marketing 
Director would you please 
explain why you are doing this'.
Yes, it is my decision but it 
is their right to question it 
and since they have the 
information, and because of the 
Price Commission, they are in a 
much better position to raise 
questions".
The emphasis on the need for the product costing
information reflects the pricing philosopy of the finance
deparment during that era and which was to "relate price 
increases to the cost structure of specific products 
rather than to increase the prices of all products with a 
flat rate".
It seems that the department's policy was based on
the view that
"since under the second code the 
rules didn't constrain the 
company to apply the same price 
increase to all products, as was 
the case under the first code, the
department had to attempt to widen
the margin between bulk products and 
package products".
In addition,
"cost increases directly associated 
with individual products were 
identified, and as a result, a very 
substantial increase in the products 
that were making losses took place 
to the point that they are now 
breaking even or making profits".
However,
"despite the fact that there was a 
large element of cost justification 
in our product pricing, it was very 
much based on how much the market 
could bear, from imports, our 
domestic competitors and the 
differentials between our products"
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Nevertheless,
"most of that non-accounting 
information was derived from 
our finance area".
Although the finance department continued to identify
when a price change may be required, the decision would
always be referred to the executive committee. This was
"because in making a price 
application, one was opening 
oneself to the possibility 
of being investigated and 
the Code didn't say what 
could take place under the 
investigation".
However,
"under the second code it was 
impossible not to attract the 
attention of the Price 
Commission because if the 
company ptit in an application 
it would run the risk of being 
investigated* In fact, we 
were investigated as a result 
of putting in a price 
application and the decision to 
put that application was taken 
primarly by myself (finance 
director) and was endorsed by 
the executive committee"
On the other hand, it should be remembered that
"because the Commission's rules 
were vague, one perhaps had to 
listen to the advice of those 
who were able to understand and 
interpret them. They (finance 
department) were able to do 
that because of the expertise 
they developed in dealing with 
the Commission and they did use 
that knowledge to influence 
pricing decisions".
As a consequence of putting in a price application, 
the Price Commission decided to investigate Hekmats 
Limited. It is believed that the
"main reason that led the Price
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Commission to investigate our 
company was a political one
which no one could prove. This '
is probably because in the past
when we took over one of the
companies that manufactured
some of our products, the case
was not referred to the Monopoly
Commission. This must have
upset the department of Consumer
Protection and so the government
retaliated by deciding to hold
the investigation. One other
reason is that we were one of the
early consumer supplier companies
to come forward with an
application and in the eyes of
the Price Commission it saw us as
a major supplier to the market,
and therefore we attracted its
attention".
A senior staff member remarked that "the fact that the 
investigation had a political risk involved in it, must 
have meant that somebody with real power took the 
decision".
The company decided to develop a strategy to deal 
with the investigation which the Price Commission was 
going to conduct. The finance department evolved a 
strategy and it was endorsed by the executive committee. 
It also monitored the investigation and a team was 
entirely devoted to that activity. In addition, the then 
planning and co-ordination manager was appointed as 
secretary to the investigation and all the documents
which were given to the investigating team were filtered 
through one central source. Furthermore, "everything was 
meticulously recorded and that a second person was always 
present at any of the interviews which took place". It 
was also felt necessary for the finance director
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"to spend the majority of his 
time monitoring and considering 
the questions that were being 
asked and to try to ensure a 
compatable answer within all the 
areas of marketing, production 
and finance"•
The investigating team "looked at all aspects of the 
company irrespective of whether it had relevance to price 
or not, and this meant that we had to provide any 
information that was asked for". It seems that some of 
the information which was provided to the Price Commission 
during the investigation was found to be useful for the 
company's purpose. It proved "the inprofitability of 
most of our products much to the surprise of the 
investigating team". Furthermore, it had "the effect of 
making people in the company more concerned with the 
profitability of each product or range of products".
The investigation
"dominated the life of the 
company for a long time and as 
a result many planned activities 
stopped or went very slowly and 
consequently the company was 
badly affected".
Hence,
"the attention of senior 
management staff was focused 
on the investigation by helping 
and advising rather than getting 
on with their own work".
The company was accorded that increase in price 
which it had applied for and accordingly " it came out 
of the investigation with a clean report". Apparently 
the finance director believed that
"if the company was not allowed
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to increase its price after the 
investigation, my job would 
have been at stake. Yes, if 
things went wrong it would have 
been a personal risk, and it 
would have also opened the 
finance department to criticism 
from the marketing department".
However,
"as a result of our success in 
the investigation, we (finance 
director and management 
accountant) have been seen to 
have confidence, credibility 
and determination to do things".
It could therefore be stated that the second code "had a
beneficial effect on the department as it provided
deliberate and clear motivation and gave the finance area
a significant power base".
As with regard to the accounting information system,
it is worth noting that
"the whole system was thrown 
out at the beginning of 1978 
and was replaced by a new 
information system which met 
both the needs of Hekmats 
Limited and the Price Commission".
However, "the experience that was gained from the old
system was borne in mind when designing the new one as
well as the existence of the Price Commission". In that
way it is believed that "the system managed to meet the
requirements of both the management and the Price
Commission for information".
During the second code, there was no transfer of 
employees to the costing function or to any other 
function. However, there was a reallocation of
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responsibilities in the sense that "the economics manager 
had to spend more time on the Price Commission's work and 
therefore somebody had to look after his work".
Several months after the investigation, there was 
another change in the organizational structure of the 
finance department (see Fig. 4.3). The management 
accountant headed the new planning and economics function. 
It is believed that it was he who initiated the idea in a 
working paper presented to the executive committee. In 
that new function, the planning and economic manager 
was to have under his control most of the key managers in 
the company, namely the economics, costing and 
investigation, marketing economics, and operations
managers. Apparently, the transfer of the marketing 
economics manager was seen to be a big blow to the 
marketing department as his role had been that of a 
buffer against the finance department.
Such a move enabled the finance department to 
control and evaluate almost all the relevant information 
for pricing decisions i.e. they already had the costing 
information but to control the marketing economics manager 
meant that even the non-accounting information required 
for pricing decisions was at their finger tips. The 
organizational repercussions of that change were that 
"the finance department maintained their supremacy and 
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4.5_____ The Post Price Commission Era
In 1979 the Conservative Party assumed power and 
one of their immediate decisions was to abolish the Price 
Commission. As one of the managers commented "it became 
essential to rid industry of the tiger on its back".
After the abolition of the Price Commission, the 
difference in pricing philosophies between the finance 
and marketing departments can be envisaged in terms of 
attitude. While the marketing department is interested 
in regaining and maximizing volume and is very reluctant 
to increase prices, the finance department is keen to 
increase price in order to maintain profitability. 
However,
"it is now the market place, more 
than ever before, that determines 
the price that can be charged.
This is particularly true since 
our European competitors are 
becoming very close to our prices 
and our competitors at home have 
over the past three years 
increased their productivity by 
some 40%".
It is believed that "this has reduced the influence which 
the finance department used to have over pricing 
decisions".
On the other hand,
"the finance department has 
attempted to continue its 
system of price review but 
without the legal background, 
there has been little success 
in convincing the marketing 
department of rises required 
for cost increases".
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This appears to be due to the fact that
"during the life of the 
Commission a strict 
relationship between cost 
increases and price increases 
was maintained by the 
influence of the finance 
department. However, after 
the Commission, costings have 
been prepared on a forecast 
i.e. more relevant but less 
trustworthy basis and less 
frequently and, although we 
(finance department) have 
striven to maintain profit 
margins according to some 
rules e.g. a set return on 
capital employed, we have 
only had limited success 
because the ultimate decision 
is being left to a subjective 
view of the marketing people 
on how much the market could 
bear".
Thus, it is hardly surprising to learn that sometime after
the Commission was abolished, "the finance department has
argued for a price increase but the marketing people
blocked it because the market conditions wouldn't bear
it". This reflects the influence the marketing department
is regaining to the extent that
"if it says that the company 
should not increase its prices 
then it will not. In the past 
during the Price Commission, 
the finance department had a 
big say in pricing decisions".
Price changes are still identified by the finance 
department by a new process called 'products profits and 
economics' where each year plans are prepared in advance. 
The finance department discusses and agrees with the 
marketing department the likely price changes that may 
take place during the year. The finance department 
provides the information regarding the changes in costs
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and the preditced level of profit or loss for each 
product. The executive committee approves the price to 
be charged. However, whereas in the past the finance 
director used to put forward the proposal, now it is done 
by the marketing director.
The role of the finance department has also been
affected in the sense that
"the abolition of the Price 
Commission has strengthened 
the position of the marketing 
department in the company as 
they started to see themselves 
capable of doing things more 
independently from the finance 
department",.
However, it is believed that "they (marketing department) 
have lost an automatic mechanism by which price changes 
were encouraged".
Accounting information is now largely used in pricing
decisions and "cost analysis have become the order of the
day as well as individual product profitability". Indeed,
the marketing director commented that
"now, I would say that the 
information which is obtained 
from the finance department 
on product costing influences 
considerably our pricing 
decision. It is a decision 
which must take into account 
the information we (the 
marketing department) receive 
from the finance department 
and also the market situation".
This seems to be because "the accountants have built the
bridge of information which the marketing department will
need in pricing their products". This is "actually
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taking place even though the balance of power has shifted 
since the abolition of the Price Commission".
Certain employees at the finance department were
released to do other works after the abolition of the
Price Commission, and the size of the department was
accordingly reduced. The present structure of the
finance department (see Fig. 4.4) includes the financial
and management accounting functions only because the
planning and economics function was developed into a
separate department and its manager was appointed as the
director of this new department. It is believed that
"the power he gained from the 
existence of the Price 
Commission has greatly helped 
him to establish his position 
in the company and his recent 
appointment is a good example 
of this".
The above changes in
"the finance department 
coincided with the change 
that took place in the 
company's structure which 
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Chapter Five
Case Study Analysis and 
Development of Research Hypotheses
Having described pricing methods and organizational 
events at Hekmats in the previous chapter, it is now time 
to analyse the events, particularly with regard to 
pricing practices, in order to develop the hypotheses to 
be tested in this research.
In order to accomplish this, the salient points 
relating to pre- Price Code, the two separate Price Code 
phases and the post - Price Code era will be identified 
in the next section of this chapter. ‘The final section 
of the chapter then brings the hypotheses together into an 
an integrated framework to be used as the basis of the 
further empirical work to be pursued in the remainder of 
the thesis.
5.1 Case Studv Analysis; The Salient Points of Each
Phase
5.1.1 Before the Price Commission
During the period prior to the introduction of the 
Price Commission, the company was controlled by the 
government with respect to the prices it charged for its 
products. However, it had a lot of scope as to how to 
apply the total increase required among its different 
products. It appears that the criteria by which these 
increases were implemented, was to a large extent what
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the market would bear. Although, product costing 
information was prepared, it seems that it hardly 
played any significant role in pricing decisions.
The company was also interested in the profitability 
per tonnage rather than the profitability per product.
This might have been because the company didn't find that 
it required product costing information for its pricing 
decisions and that it was satisfied with its pricing 
practices. It is also probable that it was not aware of 
the usefulness of this information for pricing decisions. 
Thus, prior to the introduction of the Price Commission, 
pricing decisions were largely influenced by the 
competition in the market and accounting information 
hardly played any significant role in these decisions.
It also appears that during that period, the 
marketing department was the dominant department in the 
company because the increase in the company's 
profitability seems to have depended upon its efforts.
This seems to be supported by the emphasis given by the 
department to increase the company's share of the market 
while charging their customers a 'fair' price. In 
addition,.the marketing department was the link between 
the company and its outside world and accordingly it 
reflected the image of the company.
Thus, it may be possible to hypothesize that prior 
to the introduction of the Price Commission, the marketing
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department derived its power base from its critical 
function which affected the company's profitability due 
to the overall price control.
Apparently, prior to the introduction of the Price 
Commission, there was a relationship between the mechanism 
by which prices were settled and the power possessed by 
the marketing department. It seems that the marketing 
department used its power to influence the selection of 
the criterion by which prices were increased in order to 
increase its market share and accordingly increase the 
company's profitability. Indeed, it is suggested in the 
case study that it was up to the marketing department to 
decide how to implement price increases. However, since 
it gave more attention to the competition in the market, 
it seems that individual product price increases were to 
a very large extent influenced by what the market would 
bear.
Thus, during the era prior to the introduction of the 
Price Commission, the marketing department also derived 
power and influence from its more intimate knowledge of 
the market which was needed to assess the market bearing 
prices.
5.1.2 The 1973-77 Price Code
The rules established by the Price Commission during 
the first phase, subjected price increases to the
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mathematical formula of allowable costs. This appears to 
have encouraged price increases whenever the formula could 
be justified. Apparently, in this phase the market was 
always ready to absorb any increase and the company's 
profitability was very low; so prices were increased 
whenever accounting information identified an increase in 
total cost that could be justified under the Code. This 
seems to indicate that in increasing prices, emphasis was 
not only given to what the market would bear but also to 
increases in costs that could be identified by accounting 
information. Indeed, increases in prices seem to have 
followed the trend of cost increases. We could therefore 
hypothesize that during the first code, the rules of the 
Price Commission led to much greater use of accounting 
information in the influencing of pricing decisions.
It is known that the information required by the 
Price Commission during the first phase was mainly cost 
in nature. This may have meant that it was only by the 
use of accounting information that the specifications laid 
down by the Commission during that period regarding price 
increases could be satisfied. Hence, it appears that since 
accounting information was the only information that would 
identify and enable the justification of price increases, 
it became more important for pricing decisions. This 
seems to have been supported by the low level of 
profitability which the company was attempting to raise by 
increasing its prices whenever the rules of the Commission 
permitted. Apparently, the finance department gained a
— 10 0 —
power base since it possessed that information which became 
important for the survival of the company. Thus, it may 
be possible to hypothesize that the finance department 
gained further power because of the accounting information 
which the Price Commission reguired during the first phase 
for price increases.
As a result of the presumed power base which the 
finance department gained from the information required 
by the Price Commission during the first phase, it appears 
that its role grew from just providing accounting 
information to developing a wider use of that information 
to influence pricing decisions. While the Price Code made 
it necessary to use accounting data to justify price 
increases, there was a growing emphasis on the use of 
accounting data to decide when to increase prices and a 
de-emphasis on the market perspective. This seems to 
have been due partly to the influence the finance 
department gained in the marketing committee where it 
used accounting information and the backing of the 
legislation to push prices up. Furthermore, the 
appointment of the finance director appears to have • 
enabled the department to influence pricing decisions at 
the board of directors.
Thus, the effectiveness of the influence of the 
finance department in increasing prices by the use of 
accounting information could be indicated by the pattern 
of price increases during that period. The information
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in the case study tends to demonstrate that prices were 
increased almost every quarter i.e. whenever the 
Commission's rules allowed. This was helped further by 
the low level of profitability and the ready state of the 
market to absorb any increase.
We could therefore hypothesize that during the first 
phase of the Price Commission, the power which the 
finance department derived from the reguirements of the 
Price Commission, enabled it to use accounting information 
to influence pricing decisions. However, it is possible 
that with the decrease in market competitiveness in the 
first phase of the code (compared to before the code) 
that there may have been a swing to a cost plus basis of 
pricing anyway. Hence, a further hypothesis may be 
formulated: that cost plus methods of pricing became the 
dominant price fixing mechanisim where markets are not 
competitive. Moreover, one might additionally hypothesize 
that accountants become more involved in the pricing 
decision when markets are imperfect due to their expertise 
in providing cost data.
5.1.3 The 1977-79 Price Code
The changing of the Price Commission's rules during 
the second phase meant that it was not only by the use of 
accounting information that prices could be increased.
This may imply that the power gained by the finance 
department during the period of the first code may have
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been reduced. However, this did not seem to be the case 
since the rules of the second code were very vague and 
required knowledge of the previous code to help interpret 
them. The finance department, with the expertise it 
developed in dealing with the first code, appears to have 
been able to continue to watch over the requirements of 
the second code.
On the other hand, it seems that in interpreting the 
rules and putting in a price application, the company was 
opening itself to the risk of being investigated. However, 
should an investigation have taken place and the outcome 
was negative, it may have affected the performance 
evaluation of the staff of the department initiating the 
investigation. It therefore appears that, for reasons of 
self protection, the other departments had to listen to 
the finance department which was able to interpret the 
rules and run the risk of subjecting the company to an 
investigation which could have been a negative one. Thus, 
it may be possible to hypothesize that during the second 
code, the finance department derived its power base from 
the vaguness of the rules and its ability to interpret 
them as well as being more knowledgeable about the risks 
involved in subjecting the company to an investigation as 
a result of applying for a price increase.
During the second code the Price Commission relaxed 
the strict mathematical formula of allowable costs and so 
the company was relieved of thinking in terms of total
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costs. Thus, the finance department seems to have used 
its power to influence pricing decisions by the product 
costing information. It also appears that the 
reinstatement of the product costing system provided the 
finance department with more detailed information of each 
product's profitability and, since the information 
revealed that some products were not making profit, that 
department used its power to increase the prices of those 
products whenever the competition in the market allowed.
It is important to note that market conditions had become 
quite competitive again in the second phase of the code.
Thus, it appears that pricing decisions became more 
product oriented. Indeed, the ability of the finance 
department to influence pricing decisions by the product 
costing information, seems to have led to a better 
appreciation of the value of this information in pricing 
decisions.
It may therefore be possible to hypothesize that 
during the second phase of the Price Commission, the power 
derived bv the finance department enabled it to influence 
pricing decisions by the use of product costing information 
whenever the market competition allowed.
Both the first and second phases of the Price 
Commission tend to reveal a relationship between the 
power which the finance department derived during these 
two periods and the increase in its responsibilities. The
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increase in the department's responsibility seems to be 
implied by a number of events which took place mainly 
during the first code and continued during the second code, 
These include the invitation of the then management 
accountant to join the macro marketing committee and the 
subsequent membership of the finance director and his then 
management accountant. The appointment of the finance 
director is another good example which reflects the 
additional responsibility which the finance department 
gained at the level of the board of directors. The 
monitoring of the investigation is another event. It 
seems that the responsibility of the department was to 
make sure that the investigation ended in favour of the 
company. What is interesting here is that in attempting 
to achieve this objective, the other departments had to 
follow the strategy which was administered by the finance
department. This appears to imply an indirect form of 
control by the finance dpeartment over the other 
departments. Furthermore, the establishment of the 
planning and economics function and the transfer of the 
marketing economics group to this function is another 
indication of the expansion of the finance department in 
terms of its responsibilities. What is suggested here is 
that by gaining these responsibilities, the finance 
department seems to have been able to moblize its power 
base which is derived during the life of the Price 
Commission.
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5.1.4 The Post-Code Era
After the abolition of the Price Commission, the 
company was no more subjected to any kind of price control 
by the government. Therefore, it appears that the market 
place now played a significant role in pricing decisions. 
This may be implied by the attention which the company 
now gives to its European and home competitors when 
pricing its products.
It also appears that whilst during the period of the 
Price Commission the price review system would to a large 
extent influence when prices could be increased, this is 
now contingent upon the market conditions. In addition, 
it could also be realized that although product costing 
information seems to influence pricing decisions, the 
ultimate outcome appears to be determined by the market 
conditions. This may be implied by the proposed price 
increase which was not implemented because the market 
conditions wouldn't bear it.
Thus, it may be possible to hypothesize that after 
the abolition of the Price Commission, although product 
costing information influences pricing decisions, the 
ultimate decision is determined by the competition in the 
market place.
The abolition of the Price Commission meant that the 
finance department lost the legal background from which it
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derived its power base. This implies that while in the 
past the marketing department depended upon the finance 
department in the interpretation of the Commission's rules 
and in what could or could not be done, it seems that the 
abolition of the Price Commission has removed this 
dependency. Consequently the marketing department started 
to see itself as capable of coping with pricing decisions 
more independently since it appears that it is now the 
market competition that matters with respect to pricing 
decisions. In other words, the gatekeeper role which the 
finance department played during the period of the Price 
Commission, is now played by the marketing department between the 
company and the market plsfce. Thus, it appears that the 
marketing department has regained its power base because 
of its ability to generate information about the market 
competition which now plays a very significant role in 
pricing decisions once again.
This dominance is suggested by several events. A 
price increase was proposed by the finance department but 
blocked by the marketing department which argued that the 
market conditions wouldn't bear it. Another indication 
of this shift of emphasis is that since it is now the 
marketing director who puts forward the proposal for price 
increases to the executive committee, it appears that the 
marketing department now influences when and by how much 
prices should be increased. Therefore, it seems that 
product costing information is now used in pricing 
decisions but that the marketing department gives more
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emphasis to what the market would bear.
5.2 A Framework Of Hypotheses To Be Pursued
Figure 5.1 provides a broad framework showing the - 
different pricing environments erected by the Prices Code, 
the company department with dominating power in each stage 
and the main emphasis of the pricing mechanism used in 
each stage. Looking at all phases together in figure 5.1, 
it seems that the impact of the environment on pricing 
practices is achieved through changing the dominance of 
different departments within the corporation. It appears 
that phases two and three in Hekmats Ltd. were dominated 
by the accounting group while the first and fourth phases 
were dominated by the marketing group. This also has 
implications for organization theory in general as it 
suggests that sub-unit's power is not necessarly constant 
over time but related to environmental pressures.
It can also be seen that in the second and third 
phases, accounting information was used as a prime 
influence on pricing decisions when the accounting group 
was powerful. In the first and fourth phases where the 
marketing department was more dominant in Hekmats, market 
competition was used as a more important criterion for 
price increases. However, we must leave open the 
possibility that companies in less competitive markets 
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In addition, it should not automatically be assumed 
that market forces lost their impact on pricing decisions 
during the Price Code even if accountants became more 
influential. In the second phase of the Price Code 
pricing practices in Hekmats Limited were influenced to 
some extent by the degree of competition in the market 
place. It appears that when the market was competitive, 
the pricing practices were influenced by the competition 
in the market. This seems to be reflected during the 
periods before the introduction of the Price Commission, 
the second code and after the abolition of the Price 
Commission. On the other hand, it also seems that when 
the market was not competitive, pricing practices were 
influenced by accounting information This appears to 
have been reflected during the first code of the Price 
Commission. This change of competitiveness occuring at 
the time the Prices Code was introduced makes it 
impossible to see from Hekmats alone whether it was the 
change in market conditions or the Prices Code which 
gave accountants their power.
It would seem more useful, therefore, to elaborate 
figure 5.1 and this is illustrated for Hekmats in figure
5.2 which explicitly shows the changing degree of market 
competition. From figure 5.2 it becomes clear that a set 
of related hypotheses may be derived for testing across 
a sample of U.K. companies. Fundamentally one wishes to 
discover whether market competition was the main 
influence on pricing throughout the four periods of 
investigation or whether it gave way to the Prices Code
- 110 -
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influence in phases II and III. Hence, we may specify 
the following hypotheses; ,
Hyp. 1
That prices were fixed predominantly 
according to what the market would 
bear in phases (i) and (iv)? and bv 
reference to accounting data in
phases (ii) and (iii)______irrespective
of the state of market competition.
Alternative Hyp. 1
That it is the state of market 
competition which mainly determines 
when prices can be increased even 
under price controlled environments.
However, we are not just interested in the factors
influencing pricing but the process by which pricing




departments dominated pricing 
decisions in phase (i) and (iv) ; 
and Accounting/Finance departments 
in phase (ii)and (iii) irrespective 
of market competition.
However, the alternate hypothesis is that even if Hyp. 1
holds there was no change in influence of organizational
sub-units over the four phases.
Additionally we shall want to examine those phases 
where the dominant external factor is the state of market 
competition and test the hypothesis:
Hyp. 3
That where market states are less- 
competitive, accountants become 
more dominant through the company's 
greater reliance on accounting 
data to signal price increases 
irrespective of whether prices are 
controlled or not.
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Finally, it is possible that pricing policy is 
dominated by organizational sub-units which do not derive 
their power from either the state of market competition 
or the existence of the Prices Code but from some other 
factors; nevertheless they use that power to improve their 
own approach to pricing. Hence^
Hyp. 4
That the dominant department 
. will tend to enforce its own 
pricing practice philosophy 
on the company irrespective 
of the state of market 
competition or the existence 
of prices control.
However, this hypothesis can only be tested in this
research if sub-units' dominance do not change with changes
in the state of either market competition and or the
existence or otherwise of the Prices Code.
5.3 Additional Hypotheses On Other Matters
Finally there is one other important feature 
emerging from the case which leads to another key 
hypothesis. During the first code the company experienced 
a problem of information process overload. Although the 
company reallocated the responsibilities of some of its 
staff to help in satisfying the Price Commission's 
requirements, it failed to appreciate the need for more 
manpower or the use pf data processing or computerization 
to carry out the extra information processing work that 
was needed. Thus, it seems that the company had to utilize 
its resources in processing the Commission's requirements 
and, as a result, it had to reduce part of the day-to-day
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management information; namely the dropping of the product 
costing system. This appears to imply that the company 
did not have spare capacity in its processing system to 
accommodate that extra work nor was the system sufficiently 
adapted in terms of more employees or processing facilities 
to meet the requirements of both the management and the 
Price Commission for information.
The lack of the product costing system appears to 
have led the marketing director to assume that the two 
million pounds which were invested in the five products 
he was promoting were making profit. However, after the 
system was reinstated, he ascertained that three products 
were showing a loss before taking into account their share 
of overhead costs. The other two products showed a loss 
when they received their proportion of overhead costs. 
Another repercussion of dropping that information was the 
difficulty the company encountered during the second code 
in justifying its price increase. Hence, the decision to 
drop the product costing system was dysfunctional.
It may therefore be possible to hypothesize that in 
supplying the information required by the Price Commission 
during the first code, the inadequate spare capacity and 
the inadaptability of the processing system led to the 
squeezing of the information produced for decision making 
and as a result dysfunctional decisions took place.
In addition, it was noticeable in the second phase 
of the Price Code that Hekmats reintroduced more detailed
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product costing data and discovered non-profitable product 
lines. It is therefore hypothesized that during the 
second code, companies were encouraged to develop improved 
product costing schemes than would have otherwise existed 
and that this led to wider corporate benefits.
The rest of this study is devoted to testing these 
seven hypotheses as well as to provide a description of 
general corporate experiences with regard to the Prices 
Code. It is hoped that insight will be gained which is 
relevant for discovering:
1 The way to introduce Prices Control (if it has to 
be introduced).
2 What impact it may have on companies.
3 What style of Code is best.
4 The influence of different professional groups on 
pricing practices.
5 What influences professional group dominance in 
companies.
6 Deeper knowledge of the way in which economics and 
accounting models of pricing interact in real world 
business conditions.
The next chapter considers what methodology is best 
for testing these hypotheses. At least at this stage it is 
clear that a sample of companies must be selected such that 
one can:
(i) Describe and compare how each company changed 
practices over four time phases (time series 
analysis) .
(ii) Describe and compare practices of companies
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facing different degrees of competition over 
each separate time phase (cross section 
analysis).
(iii) Describe and compare experiences of companies 






This chapter addresses itself to the issue of 
designing the methodology that will be used in testing 
the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. In the 
case of Hekmats Limited, interviews were used as a means 
to elicit information so that more specific hypotheses 
could be developed within the framework of the broader 
hypotheses already deduced from the literature. However, 
in this next stage of research, interviewing will be used 
slightly differently, namely as a tool for testing 
hypotheses. Kerlinger (1979 p.480) seems to emphasize 
the dual purposes interviews can serve by stating that 
"the most important use of interviews should be to study 
relations and to test hypotheses". Maccoby and Maccoby 
(1954 p.449) also point out that "using an interview for 
research purposes implies that the interview is intended 
to yield some sort of measurement, however rudimentrary, 
along some dimension or variable". Although the word 
measurement usually connotes "the assignment of numerals 
to objects or events according to rules" (Steven 1951 p.l), 
it is not meant to be the case with respect to this
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research since a qualitative form of analysis is
advocated.^ Following Patton (1980 p.22),
"Qualitative measurement has 
to do with the kinds of data 
or information that are 
collected. Qualitative data 
consist of detailed descriptions 
of situations, events, people, 
interactions, and observed 
behaviors ; direct quotations 
from people about their 
experiences, attitudes, 
beliefs, and thoughts; and 
excerpts or entire passages 
from documents, correspondence, 
records, and case histories.
The detailed descriptions, 
direct quotations, and case 
documentation of qualitative 
. measurement are raw data from 
the empirical world."
Although interviewing is a time consuming technique
for gathering information, the depth that can be
achieved by its use may provide information that can
hardly be procured by any other tool. This seems to be
especially true with respect to the issue of power and
its hypothesized effect on pricing decisions because it
helps the researcher to build the necessary rapport
needed to penetrate the veil of formal position in order
to determine, as far as possible, who had the power and
2for what reasons.
1 The Administrative Science Quarterly (Vol.24, 19 79) 
and the Sociological Review (Vol.27,1979) devoted 
these two issues to the discussion of the use of 
qualitative analysis as an alternative methodology.
2 Of course, a better method would have been the 
participant observation (Pettigrew,1973), however, 
its use would have reduced our sample considerably. 
Moreover, even participant observation often needs to 
be supplemented by interviews in order to obtain the 
participants' perceptions of what is happening.
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Semi-structured interviews will be employed for 
this stage of the research for the flexibility they offer. 
They allow the researcher "to specify exactly a series of 
main questions which are to be asked to everyone but lists 
a series of optional subquestions or probes which the 
interviewer is free to use or omit, depending on the 
respondent's answers to the main question" (Maccoby & 
Maccoby 1954 p.454). The advantage of having main 
questions is that they can be geared towards measuring 
the research hypotheses. Moreover, since few restrictions 
are imposed on the responses of the interviewees, it is 
expected that a considerable degree of reliability can be 
achieved.
6.2. Question Formulation.
The interview guide (see appendix C) is divided into 
five sections. Section A deals with the general background 
of the firm's market structure for the current period. 
Section B covers the period prior to the introduction of • 
the Price Commission. Section C and D tackle the events 
of the first and second Codes of the Price Commission and 
section E reflects the period after the abolition of the 
Price Commission i.e. the current situation. The ordering 
of the interview guide in such a sequence allows for some 
general discussion about the company under section A 
during which it is hoped to establish rapport with the 
interviewee before probing details relating to each time 
phase studies. Then an attempt is made to pursue the
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changes that may have taken place in a chronological 
order. It is hoped that the latter will make it easier to 
distinguish descriptions and compare whether companies 
changed practices over four time phases.
The questions in section A are meant to generate 
information regarding the firm's industry, its market 
share as well as its major competitors and its position in 
that market structure. Put another way, these questions 
are supposed to provide an indication of the degree of 
competition for the major products as perceived by the 
organization and they will be repeated to the interviewee 
at the beginning of sections B# C, and D to ascertain 
whether there had been any changes or not in each phase.
6.2.1 The Concept Of Competition
In discussing the concept of competition, economists
seem to appreciate the fact that
"there is probably no concept 
in all of economics that is 
at once more fundamental and 
pervasive, yet less satis­
factorily developed, than 
the concept of competition
(McNulty 1968, p.639). In the literature of micro economic
theory (Scherer 1970) two approaches have been identified
with respect to the meaning of the concept of
competition. On the one hand, the concept conceived of by
Adam Smith and other classical economists, emphasised the
conduct of sellers and buyers. In particular "competition
was viewed as a price-determining force operating in, but
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not itself identified as, a market" (McNulty 1968, p.644). 
However, in modern micro-economic theory, the concept of 
competition is discussed in relation to the various market 
structures that are suggested in the literature (Baumol 
1972, Koutsoyiannis 1977) namely, pure competition, 
monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. This 
implies that competition (and therefore pricing) is 
determined according to certain factors (mainly market 
forces) that are exogenous to the firm, and is not subject 
to the individual seller's conscious control.
The difference between the two approaches, as
clarified by McNulty, is that neoclassical economists view
the idea of competition as itself a market structure while
their classical peers do not. Hence,
"that competition has been 
conceived of in these two 
quite different ways is of 
no small importance in 
explaining the ambiguity 
and confusion which has 
surrounded the concept"
(McNulty 1968, p.643). Since the current economics
literature has adopted the concept of competition advocated
by neoclassical economists, our discussion will be confined
to their views alone.
In its analysis, modern economic theory seems to be 
built on the implicit assumption that the dividing lines 
between the different market structures can be exactly 
drawn and are in no way arbitrary. Unfortunately, this 
does not appear to be the case in practice as reflected
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by most empirical studies of industrial concentration 
which seek to identify those industries most likely to be 
competitive and those most likely to be oligopolistic.
For example, Evely and Little (1960), in their famous 
study into the level of concentration in British 
manufacturing industry, had to use their own judgement as 
to the level of concentration that forms the dividing 
point. They made the initial threefold distinction 
between industries of high concentration where the largest 
three firms account for 67 per cent or more of total 
output or employment; industries of medium concentration 
where the largest three firms account for between 34 and 
66 per cent of output or employment, and industries of low 
concentration in which the largest three firms account for 
up to 33 per cent of output or employment (Evely and 
Little, 1960 p.51).
A further difficulty that may render the borderlines
between industries to be rather arbitrary is when
attempting to identify an industry in terms of a group of
principal products. This is because
"although it is quite possible 
that in some cases the outputs 
of (firms) using, say, the same 
raw materials may manufacture 
products which have a high 
cross-elasticity of demand it 
is equally likely that the 
products are far from being 
close substitutes and therefore 
strictly speaking do not belong 
to the same industry. To 
include in the same industry, 
for example, all establishments 
whose main activity is 
manufacturing rubber products
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would mean that the industry's 
output may include such 
diverse items as rubber tyres 
and tubes, rubber footwear and 
rubber for furnishings. To 
limit this difficulty it may 
be possible to use a finer 
classification by breaking 
down rubber tyres and tubes 
and rubber footwear into 
separate industries. However, 
in the case of rubber footwear 
this only serves to highlight 
another difficulty. It is 
quite evident that rubber 
footwear is a close substitute 
for footwear made of other 
materials but this output will 
have been classified as 
belonging to another industry"
(Ütton, 1970 pp.36-37). Thus, it appears that by
concentrating on market structures, economic theory has
developed a concept of competition that is built on
unrealistic assumptions.
The above argument suggests that micro-economic 
theory downplays the role of the firm in determining 
competition since it concentrates merely on the 
importance of market forces and neglects the decision 
making realities. Friedman (1953) made the point that 
since firms are forced to behave as if they are maximizing 
profit because of competition, the assumptions of profit 
maximization will lead to correct predictions in 
equilibruim, regardless of the process by which such 
equilibrium states are reached.
In reviewing the literature of the sociology of 
organizations, Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) have noted the 
analogy between the relationship of the firm and its
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market, as depicted by economic theory, and that of the 
organization and its environment as reflected in 
organization theory. The advocates of the ecological 
model (Campbell 1969) and the structural contingency 
theories who focused on environment (Dill 1958, Lawrence 
and Lorch 1967, Thompson 1967) argue that the organizational 
structure depends on the particular environment the 
organization is facing. Thus, just like the theory of the 
firm, the above theories of organization assert that the 
environment selects the best fit or optimal organizations 
(and implicitly assume that the individual social unit is 
itself unable to influence the selection process).
Child (1972) was amongst the first to raise the 
argument that structural contingency models underestimate 
the significance of choice in the structuring of 
organizations. In particular, he believes that;
1 organizational decision makers may have 
opportunities to select the types of environment 
in which they will operate;
2 the directors of at least large organizations may 
command sufficient power to influence the 
conditions prevailing within environments where 
they are already operating;
3 the argument from the environment has frequently 
blurred the distinction between characteristics of 
the environment as such and their perception and 
evaluation by those within an organization.
Thus, as Wood (19 79, p.350) puts it. Child "is arguing
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theoretically for the inclusion of managerial ideology as 
an intervening variable between the environment and the 
organizational design".
Child's emphasis on the decision maker's choice is
compatible with the views of Dill (1958), Weick (1969),
and Duncan (1972) who treat the organization's environment
as the flow of information perceived by its members. From
this perspective
"perception of information is 
assumed to be an intervening 
link between the organization's 
environment and any resulting 
organizational activities"
(Aldrich and Mindlin, 1976 p.151). Accordingly, the
concentration is on
"the active role played by 
an organization in selecting 
structure, rather than the 




(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976 p.92). Furthermore, consistent
with their theoretical views, these studies (Dill 1958,
Duncan 1972) have attempted to collect their data by means
of their respondents' perception of what constituted
environment.
Unlike
"the symbolic interactionist 
position in sociology, (as 
advocated by the above theorists) 
which asserts that the study of 
interaction should be made from 
the position of the actor 
himself, rather than from the a 
priori assumption that
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decision-makers share a 
system of culturally 
established symbols and 
agreed-upon meanings"
(Aldrich and Mindlin 1976 p.152), micro-economic theory
discusses the concept of competition from the market
structure perspective although in making pricing decisions
it seems that what really matters is the decision maker's
perception of what constitutes competition. Piore (1979),
in defending qualitative research, gives a good account
of why economic theory appears to have ascribed a view of
the world very different from that perceived by individuals
He argues that
"it (economic theory) attributes 
to the economic actors a prior 
knowledge about how the world is
structured and what the values
of the relevant variables in 
that structure actually are.
When one examines the issue, 
however, it is not at all clear 
how the actors acquire the 
knowledge that economists 
attribute to them; if that 
knowledge could in fact be 
abstracted from their own 
experience and, if not, how their 
experience would in fact lead 
them to conceptualize the 
decision-making problems which 
they face"
(Piore 1979 p.566). Therefore, in this study, rather
than emphasizing the market or industry as our unit of
analysis, decision makers' perception of competition will
be investigated. Blumer (1966 p.542) calls for a similar
attention by stating that
"since action is forged by the 
actor out of what he perceives, 
interprets, and judges, one 
would have to see the operating 
situation as the actor sees it, 
perceive objects' as the actor
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perceives them, ascertain their 
meaning in terms of the meaning 
they have for the actor, and 
follow the actor's line of 
conduct as the actor organizes 
it - in short, one would have 
to take the role of the actor 
and see the world from his 
standpoint"
Thus, by focusing on the decision makers' perception 
of their environment, it would be possible to appreciate 
the impact of the interaction process that takes place 
between the firm and the market, and in which the 
former affects as well as being affected by the latter, on 
managers' perception regarding what constitute competition 
(see fig. 6.1); Hence, according to this framwork,
Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976 p.92) would be wrong to state-tka-L" 
"if the organization is severly constrained by the 
environment, as in a very competitive market, then 
perception is not important"; because it depends on the 
decision makers' perception to determine what is a very 
competitive market.
It is on the bases of the above framework that it will 
be endeavoured to identify the degree of competition in 
each time phase. This will mainly take the form of what 
managers' perceive to be the effect on the firm's market 
share if it attempted an increase in prices and why. A 
competitive situation would be considered to exist if 
managers are reported to perceive that an increase in
























prices would lead to a significant reduction in the firm's 
market share. On the other hand, if they perceive that 
price increases would not substantially affect their 
market share then this would be interpreted to mean that 
the firm is operating in a less competitive market. 
Furthermore, perception of different degrees of market 
share reduction and their reasons will be probed. Later 
on, the information to be elicited on what constitutes 
competition according to managers' perception will be 
compared with those identified by the concentration ratios 
which will be used as a measure of market concentration in 
selecting our sample and which are often used by economists 
as surrogates of the state of competition. In that way it 
will be possible as a side issue in this thesis to give 
some insight as to what extent economists need to take 
into account the differences between decision makers' 
perceptions and structural aspects of competition when 
discussing their theories.
Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) attempted to examine the 
effect of competition on the organizational structure of 
38 firms by using a questionnaire filled out by the chief 
executives. Their measure of competition was dealt with 
by the question 'What is the extent of competition in your 
industry? Very high; Moderate; Low; or Very Little 
Competition.' Although they have realized the importance 
of perceptual data, their measure of competitiveness was 
rather vague. Aldrich and Mindlin (1976) correctly argue 
that there could be several interpretations to the answer
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of the above question used by Pfeffer and Leblebici. Does 
it mean the competition faced by the firm in selling its 
products, competition in general in industry, competition 
for technological advantage, or competition for the 
procurement of resources. This vagueness must be 
avoided in this study.
The establishment of the degree of competition in
each of the four phases is necessary since there are two
hypotheses developed to reflect the impact of the state
of market competition on pricing practices. These are;
Alternative Hyp. 1
that it is the state of market 
competition which mainly 
determines when prices can be 
increased even under price 
controlled environment;
Hyp. 3
that where market states are less 
competitive, accountants become 
more dominant through the 
company's greater reliance on 
accounting data to signal price 
increases irrespective of 
whether prices are controlled or 
not.
Regarding the period prior to the introduction of the 
Price Commission, the above hypothesized relationships are 
dealt with mainly by two questions. Questions 7 and 8 of . 
section B attempt to demonstrate whether price increases 
were considered or implemented whenever accounting data 
identified an increase in cost. Positive answers would 
require knowing the extent to which managers perceived the 
market was ready to absorb the suggested increase. The 
subquestions to these main questions cover this aspect of
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the market. If the firm was operating in a competitive 
market and prices were increased by reference to accounting 
data then this would suggest that the state of market 
competition did not mainly influence pricing practices. 
Alternatively, a negative answer would tend to support the 
first hypothesis.
On the other hand, if the firm was experiencing a 
less competitive market situation and prices were reported 
to have been increased by reference to accounting data, 
then the subquestions probing into why that practice was 
followed, together with the information to be procured on 
the pricing decision making process, should help in testing 
the second hypothesis. It is expected that this information 
would also shed light on the first hypothesis. Needless to 
say the same questions can also cater for the circumstance 
where prices were not increased by reference to accounting 
data in a less competitive market state.
As with respect to the first phase of the Price 
Commission, the measurement of the above hypotheses will 
be attempted mainly by questions 11 (which is a duplicate 
of question 7 above) and 12 of section C. It is believed 
that question 12 will bring to light if prices were 
increased whenever the rules of the Price Commission 
allowed it. Again, if the market state was competitive, a 
positive answer would imply that the market conditions 
were not the dominant factors in governing price increases. 
In addition, this information may favour part of the
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hypothesis which advocates the view that prices were fixed 
predominantly by reference to accounting data in phase one 
of the Price Commission. However, if the information
indicates that prices were not increased because the 
traffic in the market wouldn't bear it even if the Price 
Commission ratified it, then this can be considered as 
evidence supporting the control of pricing practices by 
market conditions.
There is also the possibility that firms were 
confronting a less competitive market situation and prices 
were increased whenever the consent of the Price Commission 
was granted. in this case it is believed that the 
subquestions of questions 11 and 12, in addition to the 
information on the pricing decision making process, should 
help in establishing whether price increases were due to 
the market conditions or as a result of the impact of the 
Price Commission's mathematical formula.
Similar questions to those used above are repeated 
in the sections covering the second code of the Price 
Commission and the era after its abolition. They are 
also meant to identify whether the market state 
experienced by firms during these two periods was the 
influential factor in determining pricing practices.
It is to be pointed out that the eight main questions 
concerning the impact of the market state during the four 
phases should not be considered in isolation from the
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rest of the questions that deal with the pricing decision 
making process. This is simply because they constitute 
part of that decision making process itself. Hence our 
attempt to describe and compare practices of companies 
facing different degrees of competition over each 
separate time phase.
In the previous chapter, three hypotheses were 
developed to reflect the suggested impact of the Price 
Code on pricing practices as well as that of the 
professional background of the dominant departments.
These are:
Hyp. 1
that prices were fixed pre­
dominantly according to what 
the market would bear in 
phases (I) and (IV) and by 
reference to accounting data 
in phases (II) and (III) 





departments dominated pricing 
decisions in phase (I) and (IV), 
and accounting/finance 
departments in phase (II) and 
(III) irrespective of market 
competition;
that the dominant department will 
tend to enforce its own pricing 
practice philosophy on the 
company irrespective of the state 
of market competition or the 
existence of price control.
The relationships claimed in the above hypotheses 
connote that pricing decisions are determined by the
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dominant department. However, while in the former two 
hypotheses it is suggested that the dominance of the 
departments was due to the impact of the Price Code, 
Hypothesis 4 caters for the possibility that such 
dominance may have been due to other reasons. The latter 
situation therefore necessitates the identification of 
these reasons which, it is believed, will emerge when going 
over the decision making process described below. 
Furthermore, in order to establish the validity of 
Hypothesis 4 in this research, departments' power would 
have to remain constant and not to vary with changes in 
the pricing environment. Future research might be able 
to overcome that limitation if the results of this research 
indicate that this is a hypothesis worth pursuing furhter 
than was possible in this work.
For the purpose of this study, the concepts of power 
and dominance will be used interchangeably and they will 
be taken to mean the ability of the accounting/non­
accounting department to use its own information to 
influence the decision of price increases. This includes 
the amount of the increase as well as its time.
The testing of the above hypotheses requires pointing 
out how the power derived by the concerned departments is 
to be identified. In chapter three it was advocated that 
following Pettigrew (1973) horizontal power can best be 
measured by studying the decision making process. It is 
therefore suggested that by concentrating on the pricing 
mechanisms, and how they changed in each of the four phases.
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sufficients information may be elicited for the measurement 
of our hypotheses. Accordingly, the questions are designed 
to cover the main steps in the decision making process 
starting by how the pressure for a price change arose until 
the final decision was made. These questions are repeated 
in each time phase section. However, the sections of the 
first and second codes include certain questions to cater 
for their particular events.
Initially, we shall endeavour to ascertain how the 
pressure for a price change arose. This would give us an 
indication of the major factors, which may vary in each 
time phase, that induced the department(s) concerned to 
consider the need for an increase in price. Then the issue 
of identifying the department that triggered the need for 
a price change is tackled. Here we are also interested to 
know what information was used to point out the claim for 
a price increase. Moreover, we shall examine how the 
suggestion for a price change was considered. Pettigrew 
(1977) calls this the bringing of a dilema into the picture 
This includes who considered the change and if there were 
formal as well as informal meetings held for this purpose.
It is necessary to delineate the above identification 
and suggestion steps in the decision making process since 
they generate the information input (usually accounting 
data) for the processing and implementation steps. Hence, 
what should be of significance to our hypotheses is the 
dominant department's pricing view that influenced the use
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made of the information input in determining the price to 
be charged. This is examined by the question that considers 
the possibility of having differences in views between the 
marketing and accounting departments regarding the suggested 
increase in price. In the case of each department 
advocating a separate pricing view, insight may be gained 
concerning the influence of the dominant department if we 
come to learn which view was pursued in setting prices and 
why it was adopted. However, if there was a single view 
shared by both departments then that view and the 
department which developed it will be identified and will 
be considered as an indication of that department's 
dominance over pricing decisions even if there was a 
genuine agreement between the two departments.  ̂ The 
scanning of the pricing views in each time phase is also 
supported by the questions that investigate the role 
played by accounting data in determining the price to be 
charged as outlined in the above section relating to the 
impact of the market competition.
In the section designated for the first code of the 
Price Commission this vista of the department's dominance 
is broadened further in order to find out whether the 
Price Commission bolstered up the importance of accounting 
information for the purpose of pricing decisions. The underlying
This is what Wrong (1968) distinguishes as enacted 
power. In our case if department B i s  complying with 
the expressed views of department A, we can assume 
that A is exercising power over B. See also Proven 
et al (1980).
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assumption here is that since the information required by 
the Price Commission was mainly relating to costing, it 
may have led to an increase in the demand for and 
importance of accounting information thereby establishing 
a source of power which the accounting department may have 
used in influencing pricing decisions.
A comparision of this presumed effect is also sought
in the second code of the Price Commission in order to
check any changes that may have occured with respect to 
the dominant department. Embraced in such a process is 
the studying of the experience of those firms that were 
investigated. Particularly interesting would be the 
impact of the risk of being investigated on the firm's 
pricing policy and the impact of the outcome of the 
investigation on the power of the concerned departments. 
Furthermore, if the impact of the investigation had given 
the department concerned more influence over other 
decisions and whether that was desirable.
Also included in both phases of the Price Commission
is an attempt to detect the changes in the role of the 
accounting department and its relationship with other 
departments that may have taken place as a consequence of 
the claimed increase in the importance of accounting 
information. This may take the form of additional 
responsibilities (including more influence over other 
decisions) and resources which help in mobilizing the
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power that may have been gained.^
Our last step deals with the final stage of the 
decision making process. It includes specifying the person 
and department that were responsible for approving the price 
to be charged. In addition, the possibility of referring 
the decision to top management will be explored. It is 
believed that the main steps of the decision making 
process prescribed above could elicit adequate information 
for the testing of the hypothesized dominance of the 
concerned departments over pricing decisions and the 
claimed practices of fixing prices in each of the four 
environment time phases.
One of the hypotheses that was also developed suggests 
that in supplying the information required by the Price 
Commission during the first code, the inadequate spare 
capacity and the unadaptability of the processing system 
led to the squeezing of the information produced for 
decision making and as a result dysfunctional decisions 
took place. Here we shall first concentrate on whether 
the accounting information system managed to provide the 
previous management information as well as to satisfy the 
information required by the Price Commission. In the event 
of both requirements for information were met, it will be
The additional responsibilities may take the form of 
departments' representation on key and important 
committies. Salancik & Pfeffer (1974) and Hills and 
Mahoney (1978) consider this as a measure of power.
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attempted to find out whether there was spare capacity 
that was utilized to accommodate the extra work of the 
Commission, or the processing system was adapted to these 
requirements by increasing the number of employees, use of 
data processing or/and computer facilities, or any other 
means.
In case the processing system was not capable to 
fulfil both requirements, consideration shall be given to 
the possibility that firms may have dropped certain specific 
aspect of the management information in order to supply the 
information required by the Price Commission since it was 
mandatory. This requires the identification of the reasons 
that may have led to such a decision as well as the sort of 
information that was affected. Furthermore, the possible 
consequences of squeezing that information and its 
importance to the management shall be probed. It is also 
felt necessary to enquire about the length of the period 
during which that information was dropped and the efforts 
which the company had exerted to overcome that problem.
It is belived that by pursuing the steps pointed above, 
we would be able to shed light on the course(s) of action 
which firms may have followed when their processing systems 
were confronted with the additional burden of the Price 
Commission and whether those practices had led to better 
results i.e. more profits.
It was also hypothesized that during the second code, 
companies were encouraged to develop improved product 
costing schemes than would have otherwise existed and that
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this led to wider corporate benefits. This view reflects 
the repercussions of the changes that were introduced 
during the second code and which relazed the increases of 
prices in terms of total cost thereby giving firms a wider 
spectrum of freedom in the use of costing information to 
demonstrate the need to recover costs when applying for a 
price increase. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to 
examine the impact which the changes in the code may have 
had on the use of product costing information when 
considering price increases. It will then be attempted to 
point out the improvements that may have been introduced 
in the product costing system as a result of the above 
changes. We shall further consider the benefits that may 
have been gained from these improvements.
6.3 Selection of Industries for Study
The hypothesized impact of the market state on pricing 
decisions necessitates that in selecting the type of 
industry attention be given to the market structure in 
which the firms to be interviewed operate, namely 
competitive and less competitive markets. We are therefore 
interested in market concentration. This refers "to 
concentration within individual markets or industries, in 
particular the proportion of total industry output produced 
by the largest three or four firms" (Utton 1970:34)^.
The literature on the measures of industrial 
concentration is summarized from Utton, 1970, 
Industrial Concentration, Penguin.
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Although it is perception of competition which is relevant
to this study, it cannot be determined in advance and so(
companies can only be selected on economic measures of 
competition. After the interviews perception of competition 
will be compared with economic measures.
One of the most extensively used measures of market 
concentration in U.K. and U.S.A. is the concentration ratio 
It is simply "a ratio of the proportion of total industry 
output accounted for by the largest three or four firms".
It "is derived from the industry concentration curve which 
is plotted on a graph with horizontal scale marked off from 
left to right in terms of the largest firms and the 
vertical scale showing the cumulative percentage of 
industry output (or other measure of size) produced by the 
number of firms indicated on the horizontal scale" (Utton 
1970 p.43). A steeply rising curve which rapidly 
approaches the top of the vertical scale indicates a 
highly concentrated industry in which a small number of 
firms share between them a large proportion of the 
industry's output or assets. On the other hand, an 
industry of low concentration will be indicated by a 
concentration curve whose slope rises only gently from 
left to right.
It is worth mentioning that the concentration ratio 
is simply one point on the concentration curve and 
accordingly one of the criticisms levelled against it is 
that the changes that may take place in the concentration
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curve would not affect the value of the ratio. This means 
that the ratio would not give a summary measure calculated 
on the entire size distribution of firms in the industry nor 
would it even reflect the relative sizes of the largest 
three firms.
An alternative measure that has often been used in 
the study of industrial concentration is the measure of 
inequality which is derived from a Lorenz curve. However, 
whereas in the concentration curve the horizontal axis 
depict the cumulative number fo firms in the industry 
beginning with the largest firm, the Lorenz curve would 
show the cumulative percentage of firms in the industry 
from the smallest to the largest. A Lorenz curve 
demonstrates the concentration of firms by its distance 
from the diagonal line of equal distribution which 
connects the points 0,0 and 100,100 in a diagram. The 
wider the gap between the Lorenz curve and the line of 
equal distribution, the greater is the concentration of 
firms in the industry. This area between the Lorenz curve 
and the line of equal distribution can be measured by the 
Gini coefficient which also reflects the extent to which 
firms in the industry are unequal in size. It has been 
suggested that since the Lorenz curve and the Gini 
coefficient are both based on the entire distribution on 
firms, they would indicate changes at any point in the 
distribution.
One of the criticisms advocated against the Lorenz
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curve is that since it may be affected by the number of 
firms in the industry, many of the changes it may show in 
the size of distribution are irrelevant from the point of 
view of a study of market structure. The other limitation 
regarding its use is the lack of data on individual sizes 
and number of firms in the small and medium categories.
The issue of which concept of concentration is more 
relevant to the study of market behaviour and for drawing 
inferences about industry behaviour is a contraversial one. 
In supporting the concentration ratio it is emphasized 
that the 'fewness' of sellers in an industry is important 
for this purpose. As with respect to the inequality 
measure, although its inappropriateness is appreciated 
when the number of sellers in an industry is very small, 
it is argued that the complete structure of an industry 
cannot be described without knowledge of all firms in the 
industry. It is further suggested that the inequality 
measures are preferred when the structure of industries ; 
are to be compared over time or between countries.
As far as this thesis is concerned, it is believed 
that the use of the concentration ratio will be more 
appropriate for the purpose of identifying the various 
market structures from which our sample of companies will 
be selected (however, perception of the degree of 
competition will be probed more in interviews). The 
grounds on which the measure of concentration ratio is 
favoured can be summarized as follows. The inequality
- 143 -
measures are preferred when it is desired to describe 
the complete structure of an industry and when the 
objective is to compare the structure of an industry over 
time and between countries. Both these advantages are 
hardly applicable in our case. Furthermore, the data 
required for the calculation of the Gini coefficient is 
rarely available.
In the U.K., the Census of Production is the 
publication that provides the industrial groupings most 
commonly used in the compilation of market concentration 
measures. It classifies industries according to the 
concept of a group of 'principle -products' and it uses the 
establishment (which is tantamount to a single production 
unit) as the basic unit for the collection of data. The 
company, including all of its subsidiaries, is called 
enterprise or business unit. There are, however, a number 
of possible limitations that have been put on the use of 
Census material for measuring concentration in industrial 
markets.^
The ratios calculated from the Annual Census of 
Production use employment as the size of the enterprise 
for ranking purposes. However, since we are interested in 
selecting our sample of companies on the bases of their 
degree of competitivenes, it is believed that it would be
For a detailed account of these limitations, please 
see Utton op cit pp.36-40.
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more appropriate if our size criterion is based on sales. 
This sort of data is found in the Statistics of Product 
Concentration in the U.K. manufacturers. Accordingly,
Table 1 in this publication will be used in selecting our 
sample's concentration ratios because it provides "the 
sales of the product group by the five largest 
manufacturing enterprises as a percentage of the total 
sales of the product group by all contributors" (Business 
Monitor P1006, 1980).
6.4_____ Sample of Companies
Owing to the enormous time usually consumed in 
preparing, conducting, writing and analysing interviews, 
it is felt that a large number of companies can hardly be 
interviewed within the time planned for this thesis. It 
is therefore believed that if a sample of eighteen 
companies could be interviewed, sufficient information may 
be elicited for the testing of our hypotheses.
In order to cater for the different market states on
pricing practices, our sample will be selected from highly
competitive, not highly competitive and less competitive 
industries. These three categories will be respectively 
identified by the following ranges of concentration ratios; 
0 - 5 5 ,  5 6 - 8 0 ,  81 - 100. Each of the three groups will 
consist of six firms and each category will include three 
firms that were investigated by the Price Commission so that 
it would be possible to trace the impact of the second code 
on the pricing practices of those companies that were
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investigated as well as those that were not (see Figure 
6.2).
It is hoped that in each firm, at least one 
representative from each of the accounting and marketing 
departments will be interviewed. He/she will hopefully 
be a top management employee who is well conversant with 
the work of the Price Commission.
6.5_____ The Companies that Participated in the Research
In approaching companies, 70 letters signed by my 
supervisor were' sent, over a period of time, to firms that 
trade in various manufacturing industries. The sample of 
companies was selected to represent the three different 
degrees of competition as well as those companies that 
were investigated and not investigated. Unfortunately, to 
get access to eighteen companies, as was the objective, 
proved not to be possible during the current period of 
severe recession which the U.K. is experiencing. For 
example, several companies indicated that they have 
received cut backs in staffing in the finance function and 
did not wish to be seen to be devoting time to outside 
activities not directly related to their task. This was 
clearly reflected in the tone of the responses that were 
received. Of course, some companies didn't even bother to 
reply. In addition, being an overseas student may have put 
off a lot of companies especially since the topic of 
discussion is a highly sensitive one like pricing.
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Nine companies agreed to participate in this research. 
In three companies interviews were conducted with a 
representative from each of the accounting and marketing 
departments; in each of the remaining five companies only 
one executive was interviewed. Apparently, in the latter 
case, companies had no more than one official who was 
familiar with the work of the Price Commission and who had 
been employed at least since the introduction of the price 
code. All interviews were tape recorded except in two 
companies where the interviewees deprecated the idea but 
allowed notes to be taken verbatim where necessary.
It is to be mentioned at the outset that due to the 
short time allocated by the companies for the interviews 
and because of the lengthy interview guide that was used, 
no adequate information was collected to enable us to 
discuss the impact of the Price Commission on those 
companies that were investigated and not investigated in 
terms of their pricing policies and how they may have 
changed because of the risk of investigation, as well as 
the different organizational repercussions which each 
category may have experienced. This section of the 
research had to be dropped.
The classification of the companies according to the 
degree of competition as indicated by concentration ratios 
is shown in Fig. 6.3. Although the sample consisted of 
nine companies, eleven major products were considered, as 
two companies both manufactured two products which came
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under different categories of competition. It goes 
without saying that each major product was considered 
separately in the interviews, particularly in section A of 




Analysis of Interview Data;
Part I; Companies' Background and Market Competition
This chapter looks at the general background of the 
companies that participated in the research in terms of 
their markets structure according to the decision makers' 
perceptions. The information elicited is then analysed 
to establish the degree of competition which each firm's 
decision makers believe to confront. This is then 
compared with the classification suggested by the economic 
measures of concentration ratios to highlight the 
differences and similarities between the two measures.
7.1_____ General Background of the Companies^
7.1.1. The Less Competitive Group;
Rank and Blue Nile. These two companies trade in the same 
industry and, although each one is known for its own 
brand, it is believed that the consumer has no great 
loyalty to the product. The market structure of this 
industry is an oligopoly in which there are five companies 
that compete with each other. The industry accounts for 
a significant proportion of the U.K. consumer expenditure 
amounting nearly to 4000 million in 19 79. Its importance 
is illustrated by the high weight it commands in the
All the names of companies mentioned in this thesis 
are pseudonyms-
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construction of the Retail Price Index.
Rank is the market leader and has a market share of 
around 56 per cent and its annual average sales amount to 
£220 million. Blue Nile has 15 per cent of the market 
share and they consider themselves as a price follower.
Previously the duty levied by the government on the 
products of this industry was based on the weight of the 
material used in manufacturing them so that the bulk of 
the tax was in relation to the size of the product.
Hence, when a company didn't want to increase its prices 
for one reason or another, it was tempted to reduce the 
quantity of the raw material in a product and thereby 
accommodate part of the costs.
However, the new indirect tax proposed by the 
government engendered a fundamental change to the system 
of taxing the products of this industry. The new 
indirect tax structure, which was to be implemented during 
the second code, considered the costs of various sized 
of the product as similar i.e. the indirect tax was 
charged on the end-product. This caused the price 
differentials to narrow considerably between the range of 
sizes and consequently the large size products became more 
attractive in terms of value for money.
Before the implementation of the new indirect tax 
system. Blue Nile together with Zenith (another company
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that has a large share of the market), dominated the large 
size product sector which occupied a very small segment 
of the total industry market. It was therefore clear to 
Rank that if it was to maintain its market leadership, it 
would have to improve its position in the large size 
product market. Rank contrived to increase its share 
in the large size product sector by launching new large 
size products and vigorous promotional campaign.
Regarding the threat of entry of new firms to this 
industry, it appears that both companies give it very 
meagre considerations when contemplating their pricing 
decisions. Rank believes that the heavy financial 
requirements coupled with the needed high technology of 
the machines act as a significant barrier to any new 
entrant. "A case in point is Roget, the recent company 
that joined the industry and which is still making heavy 
losses". Rank emphasized that "our present competitors, 
rather than the new entrants that attract our attention 
and considerations when we are about to change our prices". 
Blue Nile shares Rank's view and it is of the opinion that 
"threat of entry receives marginal consideration when 
fixing our prices".
Given the current market situation. Rank believes that 
a 5 per cent increase in the prices of its products "would 
definitely have a drastic damage on our market shares".
It seems that before embarking on such an increase, the 
company tends to evaluate the extent to which its
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competitors will wait before they follow as well as their 
need for the same increase. The fact that the costs 
incurred by the companies in this industry are very 
similar, helps Rank "to examine carefully the liklihood 
of our competitors' cost position and try to be as 
confident as possible that others would follow". For 
example, knowing that Roget is still making a loss, "we 
will attempt to assess the extent to which it would be 
able to reduce this loss if it abstains to follow us". 
However, it is interesting to point out that of late Rank 
has increased the prices of two of its products but was 
forced to adjust this movement very soon since its 
competitors, including Blue Nile and Zenith, didn't follow. 
A 10 per cent increase or more seons to be "just impossible".
According to Blue Nile a 5 per cent increase in prices
"would surely affect'our market share"; and a 10 per cent
"would have a very much effect too". It appears that this
company tends to follow either Rank or Zenith depending
on whose brand is strong in a particular segment of the
market. Although
"we would be hesitant about 
increasing our prices in the 
absence of price increase 
from one of these two 
companies, we tend sometimes 
to increase the price of one 
or two brands above their 
corresponding brands for a 
period of time".
However, "we wouldn"t expect that to be a permanent
situation".
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Both companies believe that a 5 per cent decrease in 
prices would affect their share of the market depending 
on the response of the competitors. However, the stance of 
Blue Nile seems to differ in the sense that if its 
competitors follow, it "would lose profits since our market 
share might increase slightly but not sufficient to offset 
the impact of the reduction in prices".
Apparentely, the main reason behind the price 
increases of each of the two companies is to maintain a 
given profit margin which also reflects other corporate 
objectives like adequate cash flow and generation of 
funds for investment.
Newbirdae Ltd. This company is the holding company of 16 
trading subsidiaries. It produces about 18 per cent of its 
industry annual total production capacity and its market 
share since the mid 60s has been around 14 per cent.
The demand for the products of this industry reached its 
peak in the early 70s and thereafter has been slightly 
declining.
There are six companies manufacturing and marketing 
the products of this industry and they are all members of 
the Independent Association which was established to decide 
common price and marketing arrangements for all its 
members. Hence, each member of the Association "will 
individually specify as the current price for its products 
the price contained in the current price schedules issued
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by the Association". Although price competition is absent
in this industry, it is believed that
"the overall price .of the 
product under the common 
pricing agreement is kept 
down to a level substantially 
lower than it would have 
been under condition of free 
market forces".
As a result of such a situation the two major factors that
tended to affect companies' share of the market are: 1)
the quality of the product and 2) the standard of delivery
service.
In order to execute its duties, the Association keeps 
costs and profits of the industry under regular review and 
for this purpose receives from each company quarterly data 
on costs of manufacturing, production, etc. When the 
members believe that a price increase should be considered, 
they supply the Association with extra information regarding 
their expected cost increases and investment outlays for 
one year ahead. On the bases of this information the 
Association arrives at a delivered price to be charged by 
averaging the costs of all the companies in the industry 
and which include the costs of transport since customers 
are not allowed to collect the product.
It appears that when attempting to increase their 
prices, this company, as well as the other companies in 
the industry, do not heed any threat of entry of outside 
firms since it is believed that any new entrant would 
have to charge a price considerably in excess of the
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common price if that company was to earn an equal return 
on capital as the members of the Association. However, 
imports of similar products seem to constitute some threat 
to the home manufacturers particularly since "there is a 
considerable surplus in capacity in (product) manufacturing 
in most of Europe and which can be sold in the U.K. at very 
competitive prices". But this is only relevant to that 
segment of the market, about 15 per cent, in which this 
product is sold in small portable quantities as the big 
customers are interested in considerable quantities 
delivered in bulks to their own works.
Apparently, since there is hardly any other material
that can actually substitute the products of this industry,
and due to its importance as a basic ingredient to other
industries, it is not surprising to learn that a 5 or 10
per cent increase in prices "would have no effect upon the
demand for (product)". On the other hand, it seems that
a decrease of 5 per cent or more
"would not be attempted because 
it would not lead to an 
increase in the over-all demand; 
certainly not to the extent that 
would make up the losing of the 
5 per cent or more revenue".
Therefore, one can easily claim that "this is a clear
monopoly situation".
Tecno Ltd, Product X.
This company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
multinational company Tecno International. It is one of the
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early founded companies in its industry and by acquiring 
other companies in the 30s, it managed to become the 
leader in the manufacturing of its products. Tecno's 
annual average sales of branded products amount to 130 
millions which represent about 12 per cent of the world­
wide business of Tecno International. Tecno believes that 
its "share of the market (for product X) is a little bit 
over 50 per cent and we would see ourself as a price 
setter". There are three major companies in this industry 
and a few very small companies that supply the needs of 
the rest of the market. The major manufacturers devote 
substantial R & D resources to developing new formulations 
to meet the changes in materials and types of their 
products. This appears to fit with Tecno's strategy which 
aims at developing a quality product and then establish a 
brand image for it, through advertising and other means, 
in the hope of securing a sizable share of the market 
with a reasonable profit.
It seems that
"at the moment considerable 
attention is given to the 
threat of entry to the 
(product) industry, 
particularly as penetration 
is expected from the oil 
companies. We are aware of 
the recent movements that 
have taken place; for 
example, Howard International 
has set up an international 
(product) division and in the 
past few years it bought two 
companies, one quite large 
in Belguim and a small one 




"in the Price Commission report 
we tried to get across to all 
those who are contemplating to 
enter this industry, the 
message that the concept of an 
entry barrier is not what they 
can put up in capital. Rather, 
it is the return on capital 
they can get against us. So, 
we see the barriers being more 
about our competitors advantage 
than the size of what they put 
down".
In addition, a different type of threat that has recently 
started to grow in this market is the emergence of the 
own brand products of major retailers.
The market of this product is divided into two
substantially different sectors. Tecno believes that in
the growing sector it is dominant and on the other sector
it is at parity with its competitors. Accordingly, it
seems that in both sectors an increase in prices by 5 per
cent "would immediately cause us to lose quite heavily".
However, a decrease of 5 or 10 per cent in the growing
sector where it is dominant
"would not increase our market 
share significantly and we 
would not make a lot of money.
Indeed, our competitors would 
almost certainly follow us in 
that situation".
Apparently, the company's pricing strategy in this market
is "to pick up those sectors that are growing and operate
in them at very low margings of profit deliberately", and
in this situation "we put market growth above share growth"
On the other hand, the same decrease in the sector where it
is at parity with its competitors and its margins of profit
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are higher, "would increase our market share substantially 
and our profitability".
In changing prices in this market, the company 
appears to be attempting "to maximize our market share in 
the growth market" which it considers a very important 
long term priority that would lead to "maximizing our 
profits"•
Uni ted Ltd.
This company is one of the major two companies in 
this industry that produce similar range of products 
throughout the whole of the U.K. The other major 
competitor is slightly bigger than United and its share of 
the market is something like 40 per cent while that of 
United is around 30 per cent. The remaining share of the 
market
"is covered by a very great 
number of much smaller 
companies who also have 
considerable ranges, but 
they are very regional and 
don't attempt to deal on a 
national bases".
Accordingly, ::it was claimed that
"since there are some of these 
manufacturers in all sorts of 
different regions, and who 
may have quite a lot of 
advantages over us, together 
with our major competitor, we 
really got quite a lot of 
competition in each part".
Both major companies in this industry are looked 
upon as a price setters. It is believed that
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"on one occasion we would go 
up in prices first and our 
major competitor might follow 
a month later. On another 
occasion, they may go up 
first and we would tend to 
follow a month later".
This seems to be due to the fact that both companies are largely
dealing with the same ingredients, in the same geographical
area i.e. throughout the U.K., and they are highly subject
to the same cost constraints. Therefore,
"there is no huge amount of 
advantage that one may o 
obtain over the other, and, 
since our cost profiles are 
similar to each other, it 
is hardly surprising that 
our pricing intensions are 
fairly similar because our 
costs of manufacturing are 
not hugely different".
United believes that although it may look as though
there is a big profit margin in this industry, it is a
very risky business as it greatly depends on the weather
for its seasonal huge sales. The company seems to rest
assured that "there would be no new entrant who would come
and compete with (the major two companies) on a national
level i.e. throughout the U.K.". However, "new entrants
are always expected to come in and progress regionally".
The main reason behind the barrier to entry on national
terms appears to be the thousands of equipments which
both major companies between than had to provide to the
retail shops for the purpose of restoring the products
since they perish very soon.
"If we didn't provide them 
we would have been out of 
business".
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Accordingly, it seems that such a heavy investment
"would not make any new 
entrant compete on that 
particular level".
The market of this industry is divided into two
sectors; the in-hand and the take home. The latter is
mainly found in the supermarkets and is purchased in a way
that gives the customer the benefit to buy in quantity.
As for the in-hand product,
"the price competitiveness 
is not all that severe 
because it is very much an 
impulse like i.e. when it 
is wanted the customer can 
get it from the shops and 
therefore the price you pay 
is for your convenience".
However, it appears that the take-home product, which
occupies about 80% of tlie production, "is very much a price
sensitive business". Therfore, a 5 per cent increase in
the in-hand product "would not affect our share of the
market too much"; and a 10 per cent increase "would
probably have a significant effect". Since the take-home
product is a very competitive business, a 5 per cent
increase "would have a very severe effect on our share of
the-inarket"; a 10 per cent "would be even more". A 5 per
cent reduction in the prices of the in-hand product "would
have an insignificant effect on our market share and so
would a 10 per cent". However, the same reductions in the
take home products "would definitely have a boost in our
market share of the market".
In pursuing its pricing policies. United seems to be
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aiming at "maximizing our profitability.
7.1.2 The Not Highly Competitive Group;
Beta Ltd.
Following a series of acquisitions during the 60s, Beta
is considered the largest manufacturer in its industry,
making over 90 branded products. It has a number of
divisions which for management accounting and control
purposes are treated as profit centres. Each division
has recently been formed into separate non-trading
subsidiary. The total U.K. market for this industry
"has been static in tonnage 
terms over the last twelve 
years which meant that an 
individual supplier could 
only increase sales volume
by increasing share market".
There are no more than 12 companies in this industry 
and Beta is regarded as "the market leader since we have
about 40 per cent share of the market". It also "produces
13 of the top 20 (products) sold in this industry and 
which constitute about two thirds of the total (product) 
sales". Beta also manufactures own label products for 
retailers whose share of the market has grown considerably 
over the.last ten years.
It is admitted that "entry into this industry is 
possible and Brown Ltd is a case in point", and 
accordingly it tends to "give attention to the thread of 
firms that may want to enter this industry". Although
- 163 -
the recent entrant has launched a successful product which 
has gained about 4 per cent share of the market, this has 
been limited to certain sectors of the market. Apparently, 
the static nature of this market has acted as a 
significant barrier to new entrants, in addition to high 
degree of consumer loyality to the well established brands.
Beta believes that if it increases its prices by 5 per 
cent, "we would certainly lose part of our market share"; 
and a 10 per cent increase "would have a damaging effect".
A reduction of 5 per cent "would make our products very 
attractive if compared with our competitors prices and 
consequently we would increase our market share 
considerably". A 10 per cent reduction "would allow us 
to gain a greater share of the market".
In carrying on its pricing changes. Beta believes that 
"our objective is to maximize our profitability over the 
long run".
Tecno Product Z.
It seems that this market has hardly grown in recent 
years. The number of competitors in this market "is quite 
considerable but there are only five major manufacturers". 
Tecno's share "is about 20 per cent and that of Bristol 
Contek (the market leader) is about 33 per cent".
Although Tecno is not the market leader, "we have been 
reducing prices in real terms in this market", and "we 
have been one of the companies which has been making for
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lower prices". Another company has "expanded its share 
by pricing more at a lower level and the market leader
was forced to reduce its prices in real terms".
Apparently, "in this market most manufacturers can lead 
the prices down".
Tecno seems to be "well aware that entry into this
industry is relatively easy at the bottom, but is not a
problem to us". However,
"the entry of a major company
like Candy (which operates in
a similar industry) is an 
important thing for us because 
if it succeeds then that would 
be a substantial blow to all 
the major competitors".
Tecno also appears to be "interested in the developments
that take place among the major competitors" as well as
"the growth of the retailers' own brand products which
tend to have been increasing". It is "carefully wasting
such movements in the industry".
An increase of 5 or 10 per cent in prices "would 
very much affect our market share". Equally, "we would 
make some gains" if it reduced prices by 5 per cent and 
"substantial gains" if prices were reduced by 10 per cent
Unlike its objectives in the market of product X, 
Tecno, doesn't seem to be "keen to maximize our profits 
in this market". This appears to be due to the fact that 
"this market is not growing", and in addition, it is 
"satisfied with the present profit contribution we are
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getting out of it". Moreover, Tecno holds the view that 
"we do not wish this market to be extremely profitable 
even if we have our share of that profit because that 
would give the market leader the muscles of war". Thus, 
"we see one of the roles of our brands is to keep some 
control over the profits in this market".
Ascot Product S.
Ascot is the U.K. subsidiary of Simson Ltd., a 
multinational company which is well known for its 
products. It is considered as one of the few companies 
in the world that has pioneered this industry. There are 
"about 60 companies in the U.K. that manufacture similar 
products to ours, but obviously our product is the 
dominant one". In addition, "we have a very high share 
of the market, approximately 70 per cent". It also seems 
that Ascot "sets the pattern for the rest of the market", 
and because of its well established brand, it "charges a 
price premium well over the other brands".
Ascot believes that "entry in this industry is very
easy". Indeed,
"own label products have 
recently managed to enter 
the market but they represent 
a very small proportion of 
the (product) market at the 
moment. Perhaps their entry 
is a potential threat, not 
one that seems to have 
materialized though because 
of the strong brand of our 
product".
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This market is divided into two segments, the home 
market and the on-trade. The latter "is not very much 
affected by price changes" but in the former, "it is a 
much more aggressive pricing situation". Yet, a 5 per 
cent increase in prices in both markets "would have a 
fairly insignificant impact on our market share"; and a 
10 per cent increase "would have little effect but only 
in the on-trade market". However, it seems that because 
of its porduct brand. Ascot believes that even with such 
increases it "may still maintain our market share". As 
with regard to the effect of 5 or 10 per cent reductions 
in prices. Ascot does "expect to gain extra market share 
though not an enormous one" in the on-trade market.
"Maintaining our market share and increasing 
profitability" seems to be Ascot's main objective behind 
changes in their prices.
7.1.3 The Highly Competitive Group;
South Pacific Ltd.
This company is a subsidiary of Parkinson & Sons, a 
public company based in the U.K. South Pacific accounted 
last year for 17 per cent of its parent company's sales 
and 24 per cent of the trading profit. It produces about 
70 branded products which are divided into two categories, 
A and B.
"There are about a dozen of 
companies that compete with 
us in the same industry, and 
we have a large share of the
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market and no other company 
is comparable with us. We 
have around 32 per cent of 
(category A) market share 
and more than 60 per cent of 
(category B)."
Therefore, it is claimed that "we are considered as a price 
setter and the other companies tend to follow us".
It seems that there are two major factors that affect
the revenue of the products of this industry. The demand\
by the general public and the demand of business
organizations. Apparently, there is a very high correlation
between the demand of both markets i.e. if the demand by
the general public is high, it is very likely that the
demand by the business organizations to be high too.
However, the demand by the business organizations seems
also to be susceptable to changes in the economy. Such
a situation tended to have benefited
"those companies that, have 
dominant positions in the 
market of (the general 
public) since they could 
afford to charge (business 
organizations) higher 
prices"
Although, "it requires a lot of money to get into 
this industry!', it is believed that "there is a number 
of new products that have recently been launched, 
though some.of them tend to have limited life expectance". 
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that "the entry of new 
companies to this industry could make competitions tough". 
South Pacific believes that "from experience, if a company
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is already well established in a particular sector of the 
market, it would npt be greatly damaged by new entrants".
South Pacific is of the view that increasing prices 
5 or 10 per cent "may not have an effect on our market by 
share or sales volume provided that such increases are in 
line with the general level of inflation". But, "if we 
move prices faster than inflation, we will be running a 
risk". It also seems that "in times of rapid inflation, 
we tend to increase our prices more rapidly than our 
competitors". Nevertheless, such increases "hardly 
cause us to lose part of our market share, and we would 
rather lose a bit of market share than erode our profit 
margins". A decrease of 5 or 10 per cent "doesn't differ 
a lot in terms of capturing more of our share of the 
market". The main reasons behind such a situation appears 
to be "the distinguished brand of each company's product" 
in addition to "the high level of loyalty which each 
product has established".
In changing its prices. South’ Pacific endeavours to 
"maintain (its profit margins".
Ascot Product R.
By taking over Popco Ltd in 1970, Ascot was able to 
expand its range of products and enter the industry of 
product R. There are "quite a considerable number of 
companies, well over 90, "that compete in this industry 
and Ascot has "about 13 per cent share of the markets".
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The market leader has "something around 40 per cent".
Ascot recognizes that "there are no entry barriers" 
in this industry and as in the case of product S, "the own 
brands products have successfully penetrated this market". 
However, "the big threat seems to be coming from the 
companies in the (product) industry as they have gradually 
started to move into this industry".
Product R is also sold in the home and on-trade 
markets mentioned in product S. According to Ascot, a 
5 or 10 per cent increase "would certainly cause a huge 
loss in our market share, but it may not have an 
appreciable impact in the on-trade market". Similarly, a 
5 or 10 per cent reduction in prices "would hardly.damage 
our share in the on-trade"; however, in the home market 
"it is likely that we get extra business".
By changing prices in the market of product R, Ascot 
seems to be attempting to increase its market share.
S.D.R. Ltd.
S.D.R. is considered the largest subsidiary of its 
parent company in terms of revenue and number of 
employees. In the U.K., the products of S.D.R. are well 
known but because the nature of this industry, the 
company hardly depends on consumer loyalty. S.D.R.'s 
share of the market is about 25 per cent and there are 18 
other manufacturers that compete with it in this market.
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However, "the main competitors to us in this market are 
the imported (product) that come from the neighbouring 
European countries". S.D.R. therefore believes that in 
terms of the U.K. manufacturers, it is the market leader 
but this does not appear to apply to the imported products 
since their prices are very much affected by the exchange 
rate. Another factor that tends to have an impact on the 
prices of this product, is the general price pattern of 
other similar products in the same industry.
S.D.R. is of the opinion that entry of other firms 
into this market "is no major threat and we can't think 
of any example where a new major company has come into 
(product) in recent years".
Apparently, if S.D.R. attempts to "increase our prices
by 5 per cent or more and the other manufacturers are
standing still, it will have a major impact on our market
share". Equally, it seems that a decrease of 5 per cent
"would get us quite a lot" share of the market. However,
S.D.R. points out that the gains it may be able to achieve
by decreasing or increasing its prices would be limited to
the very short run. This is because, as mentioned above,
there seems to be a correlation between the prices of
this product and the other similar products in the industry.
Thus, if it tries to increase its prices,
"the prices of (the other 
products), which have tended 
for a good number of years 
to set the scene for (industry) 
prices in general, would be 
very attractive".
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In changing its prices, S.D.R. attempts to increase 
its "margin of profits, which are far below where we want 
them, in order to generate the necessary funds for our 
investments ".
7.2_____ Market Competition
The concept of competition that was developed in the 
previous chapter and which has been used in the collection 
of the data, stresses the role of the perception of the 
decision maker in the study of the interaction process 
that takes place between the firm and the market. So, 
having adumbrated the market conditions in which each 
company in our sample seems to have been operating, it will 
be attempted to ascertain the degree of competition each 
company is facing during the current phase. Figure 7.1 
gives a summary of some of the salient factors that 
affect each company's degree of competition.
7.2.1 The Less Competitive Group;
Rank and Blue Nile
In the case of Rank and Blue Nile, there are three 
companies competing with them in the same market and yet 
Rank, the market leader, believes that it is unable to 
increase its prices by 5 per cent without suffering a 
considerable loss in its share of the market if its 
competitors didn't follow. Indeed, Rank's adjustment 
of its prices because Blue Nile and Zenith didn't follow, 
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this market. Hence, the impact of such an interaction 
between Rank and the rest of the market on the former's 
future pricing decisions and what may constitute a 
competitive period.
Furthermore, the information relating to Blue Nile 
appears to establish the same competitive view of the 
market. Apparently, because both companies perceive the 
market to be very competitive, an endeavour to reduce 
prices by 5 per cent may not be feasible by Blue Nile 
because of the low returns such a reduction may yield.
Rank also appears to be in the same position as any 
assessment of what it could get would depend on its 
competitors response.
Thus, the fact that a market leader and a follower 
in the same industry seem to perceive similar repercussions 
on their market share if each attempts to increase its 
prices unilaterally, tends to suggest the competitiveness 
of their market.
Newbridge Ltd.
Owing to the absence of any price competition in the 
industry of this company, and in additiin to the lack of 
any threat of entry from other firms, this industry 
reflects a "clear monopoly situation". It is therefore not 
surprising that an increase or decrease of 5 and 10 per 
cent wouldn't have any effect on the company's market 
share. Accordingly, one could easily claim that the market
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of Newbridge is an uncompetitive one.
Tecno Product X.
Being the market leader, the case of Tecno product X 
does not seem to differ greatly from the situation of Rank. 
Even though this company has more than 50 per cent of the 
market share, it seems that the consequences of increasing 
its prices by 5 per cent, without the same movement by its 
competitors would lead to a substantial losses in its 
market share. However, unlike Rank and Blue Nile, a 
decrease of 5 or 10 per cent could have a significant rise 
in its market share especially in the market where it is 
at parity with its competitors. Furthermore, the 
considerable attention given by Tecno to the threat of 
entry into this market, tends to add to its competitiveness; 
and although Rank and Blue Nile do not face similar threat, 
the three companies still consider their markets 
competitive.
United Ltd.
United has 30 per cent share of the market and is 
also a price setter. However, the existence of a major 
competitor and many small regional companies, seem to have 
led to a price sensitive situation in the take-home market. 
As a result. United believes that an increase of 5 per cent 
could have a severe impact on its market share while a 
reduction of the same percentage could lead to a boost in 
its business. Moreover, even the in-hand market seems to
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be susceptable to price increases beyond 5 per cent 
increase. It. therefore appears that like the other two 
market leaders in this category. United is also operating 
in a competitive market despite the fact that all three 
companies appear to be facing a different order of 
competition.
Thus, unlike the indications provided by concentration 
ratios, the measurement of market competition using 
perceptual data tends to demonstrate that four out of the 
five companies in the less competitive category see 
themselves confronting competitive market situations. 
However, even the uncompetitive market of the fifth 
company is due to the absence of price competition in that 
industry because of the existing common price agreement; 
and this is not reflected by the concentration ratios. 
Moreover, it can also be recognized that three of the five 
companies are market leaders (United also considers itself 
a price setter) and yet, it seems that none of them would 
attempt a price increase without making sure that its 
competitors would follow. If they failed to do so, it is 
highly likely that they would lose part of their market 
share because of the perceived high degree of competition 
prevailing in their markets.
7.2.2 The Not Highly Competitive Group;
Beta Ltd.
Beta competes in its industry with eleven other
- 176 -
companies and, in spite of the fact that it is the market 
leader, the possible reaction of the market changes in its 
prices seems similar to the competitive companies in the 
less competitive category. This appears to be evident 
from the likely impact on its market share if it tries to 
increase its prices and its competitors decided not to 
follow. Indeed, Beta believes that an increase up to 
10 per cent could have a damaging effect on its market 
share. Furthermore, the static nature of this industry 
and the considerations given to the threat of entry 
appear to have added to the competitiveness of this 
market. Therefore, it could also be argued that Beta is 
trading in a competitive market.
Tecno Product Z.
Although there are five major and many small companies 
in the market of Tecno product Z, it is still considered by 
Tecno as a price sensitive market. Apparently, should it 
endeavour an increase of 5 or 10 per cent in prices, Tecno 
believes that this may have a very great effect on its 
market share. On the other hand, a decrease of similar 
percentages is likely to enable the company to gain extra 
business.
Compared to Beta's market conditions, Tecno product 
Z seems to be demonstrating similar degree of 
competitiveness regardless of the fact that the former is 
a price leader and has a higher share of the market.
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Ascot Product S,
The market conditions of Ascot product S seem to 
differ from the other two companies in this category, 
although both Ascot and Beta are market leaders. There 
are about 60 companies competing in this market, yet 
Ascot is of the view that an increase in its prices by 
5 or 10 per cent may have an insignificant or at most 
little effect on its share of the market. This is 
possibly due to its 70 per cent share of the market and 
the Veil known name of its product brand. Indeed, such 
an uncompetitiveness appears to have made it easier for 
Ascot to charge a price premium over the other brands. 
Compared with Beta and Tecno product Z, Ascot competes 
with a greater number of companies and gives only meagre 
attention to thread of entry to its market. However, 
unlike the other two companies in this group, its 
product brand seems to give it a considerable freedom to 
increase its prices.
In comparing the less competitive and not highly 
competitive groups, it appears that the markets of six 
out of the eight major products are believed to be 
competitive irrespective of the differences between them 
with respect to the number of firms in a particular 
•market, their market shares, their position in the market 
or their consideration to threat of entry. As for the 
uncompetitive markets of the two remaining major products, 
they seem to have specific factors, not considered by the 
concentration ratios, that made it possible for each of
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them to accommodate increases in prices up to. a certain 
limit without significant negative repercussions on their 
market shares. Thus, it can be realized, from what has 
been said so far, that by emphasizing the importance of 
the role of decision makers' perception of what constitute 
a competitive or uncompetitive market, a better picture 
tends to emerge of the degree of competition that exists 
in a particular market than that suggested by statistical 
economic measures.
7.2.3 The Highly Competitive Group;
South Pacific Ltd.
This company seems to confront no real competition 
from the other companies in its industry. Being the 
market leader and depending on the product loyalty of its 
customers, it believes that increases or decreases of 5 
and 10 per cent in its prices, as far as they are within 
the general level of inflation, would not have a great 
impact on its 60 and 30 per cent market shares. This 
seems to be even more evident from the company's attitude 
of indifference towards the many new entrants into the 
industry. It can therefore, be realized that, unlike the 
indications of the concentration ratios, such a situation 
seems to clearly suggest the uncompetitive market in 
which South Pacific is trading.
The consumer loyalty to the products of both South 
Pacific and Ascot product S, which is in the not highly
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competitive group, seems to be the main factor that has 
contributed towards the uncompetitiveness of their 
markets. Moreover, the fact that the former has less 
companies competing with it in the same industry than the 
latter, does not appear to influence their markets' degree 
of competition. Hence, the concentration ratio does not 
reflect differences in the order of competition in various 
industries.
Ascot Product R.
In product R's market. Ascot does not seem to have 
the dominant situation as in the market of product S.
Being a price follower and with the existence of over 90 
companies in this market. Ascot believes that it is unable 
to increase or decrease its prices without affecting its 
share of the market particularly the home-trade one. An 
increase of 5 per cent could lead to huge losses in its 
market share and the company expects to gain extra business 
if it decreased its prices. Thus, unlike South Pacific, 
it could be argued that the market of Ascot product R is 
a competitive one.
S.D.R. Ltd.
The other 18 companies competing with S.D.R. in this 
market together with the imported products, seem to make 
this market a competitive one despite the 25 per cent of 
S.D.R. share of themarket. This competitive situation 
appears to be reflected in S.D.R. attitude towards
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changes in prices. It believes that a 5 per cent or more 
increases in prices would have a significant reduction on 
its share of the market. On the other hand, a 5 per cent 
decrease in prices would tend to have an appreciable 
increase in its share of the market. Furthermore, since 
the general price behaviour of this industry is likely to 
affect S.D.R.'s market, it tends to impose an additional 
constrain on the flexibility of the company to change its 
prices. Thus, it could be argued that S.D.R. is operating 
in a competitive market.
Compared with the other companies in this category, 
it does not seem that S.D.R. and Ascot product R have the 
same flexibility as South Pacific in pricing their products 
although in terms of the concentration ratios, the 
percentages of the three companies are extremely close to 
each other.
7.3. Concluding Remarks.
In comparing the companies in our sample who tend to 
perceive their market as competitive, it can be recognized 
that all of them are market leaders except Blue Nile and 
Ascot product R are price followers. It therefore seems 
plausible to state that if a company that has a dominant 
share of the market perceives its market to be a 
competitive one, it is highly likely that the price 
followers in the same market will also perceive that 
market as competitive; Rank and Blue Nile are a good case 
in point. However, this does not necessarly mean that if
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a price follower perceives its market to be a competitive 
one, the market leader of that market would also perceive 
it as competitive. For example, the price leader of 
Ascot product R's market may have a dominant situation 
similar to that of Ascot product S and thus find the same 
market an uncompetitive one. Accordingly, the case of 
Ascot product R appears to suggest that the same market 
could be competitive or uncompetitive depending, first, on 
the perception of the firm's decision makers and, secondly, 
on the firm's position in the market whether that be a 
price leader or a price follower.
Figure 7.2. gives a reclassification of the companies 
in our sample according to the perception of the decision 
makers regarding what is or is not a competitive market.
It can be realized that six out of the eight major products 
that were classified in Figure 7.1 under the less 
competitive and not highly competitive groups, are now 
under the competitive category in Figure 7.2. South 
Pacific was under the highly competitive group and is now 
classified under the not competitive group. Ascot product 
R and S.D.R. remained in the competitive category while 
Ascot product S is no more under the not highly competitive 
group. Newbridge is still considered in the not : 
competitive group.
Looking back at what is suggested in the economics 
literature, it seems that the majority of the empirical 
studies which were conducted (Evely and Little 1960,
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Figure 7.2 Reclassification of Companies' Degree 




Blue Nile Ltd. (LC)
Tecno Product X (LC)
United Ltd. (LC)
Beta Ltd. (NHC)
Tecno Product z (NHC)






Ascot Product S (HC)
Letters in parentheses show the classification 
according to the measures of concentration ratios
HC : Highly Competitive.
NHC : Not Highly Competitive.
LC : Less Competitive
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Hannah and Kay 1977, Hart and Clark 1980), have attempted 
to use concentration ratios as a principal tool of 
analysis so that it could be possible to identify the 
change that has taken place over a period of time in 
industrial concentration. However, it is being admitted 
that such a tool of analysis is nothing "more than a 
preliminary screening device to indicate industries where 
competition is likely to be more or less intensive" (Hart 
and Clark 1980, p.105). Hannah and Kay (1977, p.18) also 
realized that "the kind of measures of concentration which 
empirical economists are normally forced to use (most 
commonly 3-, 4-, or 5-, firms concentration ratios) are 
rather poor approximation in several respects to the 
measures which our theory requires". Thus, these 
researchers seem to have recognized that "detailed case 
studies .... are needed to ascertain whether the high 
degree of monopoly indicated by a high level of 
(concentration ratio) for a particular industry is 
misleading or not" (Hart and Clark, 1980 p.l05).-
The notion of perceptual data and the findings that 
have emerged from our above analysis should therefore be 
appealing to all those who attempt to remedy many of the 
shortcomings of concentration ratios by using case studies 
so that a better evaluation of the state of competition in 
a particular industry could be achieved. This means that 
more attention should be given to the decision making 
realities in organizations and not to downplay their 
role in what is or is not a competitive industry.
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Hence, the implication of our findings to what is 
propagated in the economics literature is to illuminate 
the danger of research in economics that rely on
concentration measures to identify the degree of
competition and then try to relate that to corporate 
behaviour. Indeed, it is on the established state of 
competition that the analysis and explanation of corporate 
pricing decisions are based. For example, although Hague 
(1971) does not use concentration measures to establish 
the degree of competition when he studied the pricing 
practices of thirteen companies to show firms' objectives 
and. how theyifix their prices, his use of the concept of
competition is similar to that of economists. He defines
the concept of competition as "a situation where large 
numbers of firms compete in a market" (Hague, 19 71 p.20). 
His results must therefore be interpreted with this 
definition of competition very clearly in mind.
This chapter has attempted to determine the degree of 
competition in the various markets of the companies in our 
sample using perceptual data. It goes without saying that 
this pertains only to the current phase i.e. after the 
abolition of the Price Commission. In the following 
chapters it will be endeavoured to ascertain whether there 
had been any changes during the other three phases in the 
degrees of competition already established in this chapter; 
and what determined pricing practices.
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Chapter Eight
Analysis of Interview Data;
Part II; Prior to The Introduction of The Price Commission
8.1. Introduction.
In this chapter an endeavour will be made to compare 
and describe companies pricing practices during the era 
prior to the introduction of the Price Commission. It will 
be recalled that the hypotheses developed in chapter five 
from Hekmat's case study cater for the following 
possibilities that are pertinent to this phase.
Hypothesis 1 leads us to seek information in this 
phase as to whether prices are determined mainly by 
market forces and if so Hyp.2 and Hyp.3 in combination 
suggest that if the market was highly competitive, the 
marketing department was dominant in setting prices 
whereas if the state of market competition was less 
competitive, accountants became more dominant through the 
company's greater reliance on accounting data to signal 
price increases.
It is woth mentioning at this stage that although Hyp 4, 
which asserts that subunit power may be derived from factors 
other than the state of market competition or the existence 
of price control, is relevant to all four phases, it will 
be discussed in the conclusion chapter (Chapter 12) to 
avoid repitition.
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8.2. The Less Competitive Group bv Concentration
Ratios
Rank and Blue Nile.
As stated in the previous chapter these two companies 
trade in the same industry and accordingly their pricing 
practices will be examined together.
These two companies suggest that this era was a
stable one. The rate of inflation was relatively low and
therefore price increases were very much less frequent and
smaller in amount. It is believed that there were few
changes in the, structure and size of the market though
Rank's share of the market was a bit more than its current
56 per cent. The degree of competition seems to have been
the same and according to Blue Nile
"whenever a company wanted to 
increase prices and couldn't, 
it had the opportunity of 
adjusting the weight of raw 
material and thereby accommodate 
the extra increase in cost".
In the two companies, cost increases tended to be the 
major factor that triggered the pressure for price increase, 
In Rank, it was a standard procedure whereby the accounting 
department identified the expected increase in costs which 
was then presented in the annual budget review to the board 
which is fully responsible for pricing decisions. The 
various suggestions would be discussed at length by the 
directors of the company who are all members of the board 
including the finance director. The suggested cost
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increases are very carefully viewed with regard to its impact 
on the company's profitability and whether such increases 
would be accommodated by the market place. Pricing was, and 
still is, a corporate board decision. "It is highly 
centralized and even the chairman would have at least to 
inform our parent company of the expected price increase".
Price changes in Blue Nile are considered by the managing 
director together with the marketing and finance directors. 
According to the present financial planning director.
"they had ad hoc discussions held for 
this purpsoe. Accounting information 
reflecting profit performance was used 
to identify price increases and at that 
time the company's attitude was to take 
price increases when we had the 
opportunity to do so i.e. when (Rank 
and Zenith) took price increases".
However, if due to increases in costs, the company felt that 
it needed to correct its profit situation and
"it didn't seem feasible to increase 
prices, we sought our own means to 
achieve savings in product costs or 
more likely to reduce the cost of raw 
material by altering the amount of 
(raw material) in (product). So we 
could, to some extent, compensate 
for price increases by those sort 
of savings and adjustments which 
did help until such times a price 
increase was available".
Thus, it seems that because of its market leadership. Rank 
was able to initiate price increases and thereby managed to 
include such increases in its annual budget as part of its 
standard procedures. Being a price follower, it appears that 
Blue Nile was not in a position to plan price increases as Rank 
did and therefore it had to wait for the other two major 
companies to make a move before it could follow. Hence, the 
ad hoc rather than standard meetings that were held in order
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to respond to price increases by other companies.
The marketing director claims that because Rank 
manufactures "a consumer product which is very sensitive 
to price increases", it had to pursue during that period 
"the marketing policies of our (marketing) department". 
Accordingly, "what really mattered to the board was what 
we though the market place would accommodate". Such a 
situation seems to have enabled the marketing department 
in Rank to play "a rather influential part in setting 
prices". It is not therefore surprising that there were 
no differences in views between the marketing and accounting 
departments regarding pricing decisions.
Being very much market oriented during that period.
Rank appears to have considered price increases when accounting 
information identified an increase in costs only through 
the budget which was reviewed from time to time by the 
board. However, prices were not increased whenever accounting 
data identified an increase in cost since "this had to be 
carefully thought out by the marketing department". Indeed,
"we wouldn't endorse any price 
increase directly as a result of 
cost increase unless there was a 
major increase in cost; for example, 
devaluation because it would lead us 
to consider price increases".
With respect to Blue Nile, the financial planning 
director makes the remark that
"I wouldn't have thought that the 
accounting and marketing departments 
had differences of opinion regarding 
the suggested price increases in our 
circumstances. I don't think that the finance
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department would have taken 
a particular view on what 
our price increases should 
be. They may have identified 
the need for a price increase 
but decisions on which brands 
to increase and by what amounts, 
bearing in mind that we tend 
to follow other companies' 
lead in terms of price 
adjustments, I think they 
were the responsiblity of 
the marketing department".
Indeed, "the marketing department designed our policies
so that the company could maintain a competitive position".
It therefore follows that when accounting information 
identified an increase in costs, "the marketing department 
would come and say whether price increases or the 
opportunity of cost savings should be implemented".
However, since "we are a market oriented company and as 
we wouldn't increase our prices in advance of competition", 
it seems that "market consideration would have more weight" 
As such
"any increases that we (the 
accounting department) 
identified, but were considered 
not to match our rivals, 
would have been by 
adjustments in cost 
reductions i.e. by decreasing 
the amount of (raw material)".
Thus, "at the end of the day, it was the ideas from the
marketing department that highly shaped our pricing
decisions".
It can be realized that the control of the 
marketing departments in both companies over pricing
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V
policies, presumably because of their abilities to 
handle the market place, seems to have resulted in both 
companies increasing their prices according to what their 
marketing departments perceived the market conditions 
would stand. This is reflected by the response of the 
marketing departments to increases in costs suggested 
by the accounting departments. In addition, it seems 
possible to state that the accounting departments in each 
company-were not particularly keen to challenge the 
marketing departments' views especially as there was no 
apparent source of power pertinent to pricing decisions 
which they could use.
Newbridge Ltd.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the common 
pricing agreement which is governing the price of the 
products sold by the companies in this industry has been 
implemented for a long time. Accordingly the measures 
that were used to identify the uncompetitive nature of 
this market are equally applicable to this period since 
no changes had occured.
Price changes during this time were carried out on 
annual bases. It was the responsibility of the 
Independent Associatioh to collect details of costs and 
revenues in order to determine the level of price that 
would give the sort of level of return on capital. 
However, it seems that the companies themselves were 
suggesting price increases to the association. Indeed,
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it was noted that
"price increases would sometimes 
come from any company. In 
our case, the accounting 
department would point out 
that a price increase was 
needed so that they could 
maintain their margin".
Apparently, there were not any differences in views
between the two departments
"because British (product) 
was cheaper than foreign 
(product) and it was a 
cheap commodotity. No one 
thought in terms of if you 
went above a certain level 
of price you might run 
into some other constraints.
It was just a question of 
was it justifiable under 
the common price agreement".
Nevertheless, it is believed that
"the finance department was
influential because the
marketing department didn't
look at it (pricing decision)
in terms of if the price was f-
increased, they would loose
market share because the
price of everybody else goes
up so there was no question
of loosing market share to
anybody else".
It seems that, it was not a situation where one 
might think that given a fixed price for all companies, 
then the increase or decrease of profitability would 
depend on the company's marketing abilities; because the 
way these companies win or loose customers is related to 
the level of their delivery service and "it is a matter of 
efficiency". It is further believed that the influence of
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the finance department was due to the fact that
"as far as the marketing 
department was concerned 
it would not be a price 
sensitive situation at 
all, and the finance 
department was always 
conscious about the 
decline of the returns 
on profit on ton of 
(product)".
Hence, it was not market competition that prevented prices
to be considered or implemented whenever accounting data
identified an increase in costs. Rather,
"it was the customers, 
particularly one set of 
them who do not favour 
little and often price 
increases. So, we were 
in the habit of increasing 
our prices twice a year".
It therefore appears from the above that the 
uncompetitive market of this industry has contributed 
greatly to the reliance of this company, as well as the 
other companies under the common price agreement, on 
accounting information regarding price increases. Such a 
situation tended to have helped the accounting department 
to dominate pricing decisions particularly since the 
companies' market shares could be increased by their 
efficiency in delivering the goods and not as a result of 
marketing policies.
Tecno Products X and Z
Since it was felt that it would not be feasible to look 
at the decision making process of each product separately.
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both these products will be considered under this 
category because in terms of revenue, product X is more 
important to the company. More than 50 per cent of the 
company's revenue is attributed to product X while that 
of product Z is approximately 23 per cent.
Before the introduction of the Price Commission, Tecno 
was not the leader in the market of product X. In 1968, 
their major competitors launched a new brand which soon 
dominated the market and that "year was the nadir of 
(their) fortune". Indded, that product proved to be very 
successful to the extent that their competitors "charged 
a premium for quality brand and it worked". Apparently, 
the competition was very fierce between the three major 
competitors since this is considered a growing market and 
every company was attempting to have a larger share of the 
market.
As with regard to the market conditions of product Z, 
Tecno believes that its competitor "was also more ahead 
than it is now". Some smaller companies that have entered 
the industry recently did not exist then and the market 
shares of those companies that were operating at that time 
were higher than now. Thus, it seems that, compared to 
the present situation, the major change at that time was 
that Tecno was a price follower in the market of product X.
The pressure for a price change "would come from our 
need to make our profit target; basically by increases
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in costs". Specially as "1969 was very unprofitable
period for the company and we were hardly making any money".
The accounting department identified the need for a price
change and according to the finance director,
"it ( accounting department) 
would be pointing for that 
need whenever its information 
reflected low margins of 
profits or higher costs 7 
it would then be left for 
the marketing department 
to see whether the 
increase is feasible and 
how it should be done".
The suggested price increases
"would be considered by 
the marketing department 
where there are three 
marketing groups which 
are responsible for the 
volume of profit 
contribution of their 
business".
In each marketing group there is an accountant who would 
communicate to the group the increases in costs and the 
relative costs with which their competitors will try to 
judge Te cno's reacti on.
Since it is the practice of this company to promote 
its products it tends "to make a decision about price 
every cycle i.e. every four weeks". This procedure was 
felt necessary in order to follow the pattern of the 
products behaviour in the market particularly the response 
of the market to the prices indicated on the package, for 
example, 4 pence off.
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Apparently, there were no appreciable differences in views
between the marketing and accounting departments because
"the accounting department saw 
its duty as providing the 
marketing department with the 
necessary information that 
would help it in arriving at 
a pricing decision".
On the other hand, the finance director realizes that
"the marketing department was 
very strong and the base of 
their strength was their 
perceived knowledge of the 
results of price changes; 
who in the end is reading 
that magical graph that 
reflects the trade off 
between margin and profit.
We would say the marketing 
department".
Furthermore, it is believed that
"the marketing director 
was a very strong man and 
in a way he was contesting 
with the previous finance 
director as to who was 
going to stir the company.
The marketing director was 
ultimately successful and 
he is now the chairman of 
the company".
As mentioned above, in Tecno, price increases would 
be considered at least every four weeks whenever 
accounting data identified an increase in cost; however, 
they "would not be increased when an increase in costs is 
shown by the accounting information". It seems that the 
costs of both product X and Z "go up differentially" and 
since
"their elasticities are different 
the company doesn't put an 
average percentage increase on 
each of them. We don't even 
keep the margins the same
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for the two products".
The prices to be charged would finally be approved by the 
marketing director.
It could therefore be argued that the marketing 
department in Tecno was influential in setting prices 
during the period before the introduction of the Price 
Commission. This seems to have been due to their 
ability to cater for the required expertise that was 
needed in order that Tecno could gain more share of the 
market especially with respect to product X since it was 
a growing market which each of the major competitors 
wanted to dominate. In addition, it seems'that prices 
were increased with reference to what the marketing 
department perceived the market would bear as is clear 
in the attitude towards price increases when the accounting 
department identified an increase in costs.
United Ltd.
During that period, the take-home market hardly 
existed because the electrical appliances that contributed 
greatly to its development later on were not invented; and 
therefore, the companies in this industry were competing 
mainly in the in-hand market. It is believed that since 
the facilities of the take-home market tended to very 
much help the two major companies to compete nationally, 
its absence at that time seems to have meant that both 
major companies were competing on equal footing with the
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regional competitors. Thus, "the degree of competition 
was not very much different from now". Indeed, United 
is of the view that "an increase in prices by certain 
percentages during that time would have surely affected 
our market share".
Pricing decision at United
"is a corporate decision made 
by the executive committee 
which meets regularly on 
weekly bases and it is kept 
in tune with the changes that 
occur to the business in 
input costs through the 
finance department. It 
(finance department) also 
infonrB us (marketing 
department) of the likely 
future cost profiles of the 
business in terms of its 
impact on the profit 
margins".
The finance director believes that there was no 
difference in views between the two departments since it 
seems that
"there was a general consensus 
that the accounting department 
to be responsible for making 
the assessment of what is 
going to be the inflation in 
costs for the coming twelve 
months and would indicate 
to the marketing department 
the sort of money that each 
product would have to recover".
He further adds that
"ultimately, there were two 
parts who influenced prices.
The first was the executive 
committee which influences 
the price increases by the 
clarity of the decision on 
the total amount required.
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The second part, perhaps 
the important one, was 
the marketing department 
which would recommend to 
the committee the best 
set of products to move 
and when to move them".
Both the marketing and accounting directors agree
that price increases were not considered everytime the
finance department identified an increase in cost; nor
were prices increased when the accounting information
indicated increases in costs. Rather, it appears that
"the practice was that in 
the budgeting process, the 
finance department attempted 
to find out by how much each 
item within our business was 
likely to increase. In those 
days we didn't wait for costs 
to go up and then put our 
prices up, except if any of 
our basic materials suddenly 
jumped up by 10 per cent 
over and above that we were 
expecting it to increase, 
then we would virtually 
have no way out but to 
consider an extra price 
charge".
On the other hand, the finance director admits that
"in the end the 
responsibility of pricing 
the products rests with 
marketing the product i.e. 
it is the marketing 
department responsibility, 
the actual recommendation 
of where the product fits 
into the pricing spectrum 
in the shops".
Accordingly, "the marketing department would give the
market place a lot of consideration" since it is believed
that "it is the provider of all funds and if we ignored
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it, we would be at peril".
It therefore appears that although in this company 
the marekting department depended on the forecast of the 
finance department to indicate the expected increases in 
costs, pricing decisions were ultimately based on what the 
marketing department perceived the market place would bear 
This is because the dominance of the marketing department 
seems evident from the comments of the finance director 
who believes that it was the marketing department to look 
after pricing decisions.
In comparing the companies in the less competitive 
group, it can be realized that, except for Newbridge which 
was facing an uncompetitive market situation, all the 
companies believed that their markets were competitive and 
acted as though they were. Pricing decisions in these 
competitive companies were therefore mainly based on what 
the marketing department perceived the traffic in the 
market would stand because of their dominant role in those 
decisions. It is also possible to note that the function 
of the accounting departments was limited to the extent of 
providing the relevant costing information and not to use 
that information to press for a price increase except in 
the case of Newbridge. Moreover, it seems that due to 
their position as market leaders, both Rank and United 
were able to initiate price increases and therefore could 
plan for it in their budgets. This seems not to have been 
the case with the price followers especially in Blue Nile
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where ad hoc meetings were held for the purpose of 
responding to price increases by the market leader rather 
than planning for them. As with respect to Tecno, every 
four weeks pricing decisions were reviewed in order to 
initiate or respond to price increases.
8.3. The Not Highly Competitive Group.
Beta Ltd.
Beta claims that because of the static nature of its 
market there were barely any significant changes during 
the era before the introduction of the Price Commission 
in the degree of competition that was discussed in the 
previous chapter. It will therefore be considered that 
it was a competitive market.
As in the less competitive group, the main factor
that led to the pressure for a price increase in the
company was increases in costs which were identified by
the finance department using its costing information. It
seems that budgeted increases were discussed at regular
board meetings where all relevant factors were considered,
"There was a price list with 
80 items on it and there was 
no single price increases 
because all prices were 
relative to the market place 
and relative to each other on 
the list. It was a matter of 
increase of group of products".
Apparently, the marketing and accounting departments 
had different pricing views during that time. Each of
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them attempted to maintain the profitability of the
business; the marketing concentrated on the marketing
side of the.product mainly the consumer behaviour and the
respond of the market, and the accounting department on the
other side emphasized the financial side mainly the
increase of prices so as to increase investment and to
maintain the margin of profit. However, according to the
finance director,
"the marketing department 
was always reluctant to 
increase prices because 
they believed that if we 
wanted to sell our products 
we shouldn't increase our 
prices very often. It was 
their philosophy that if • 
we didn't increase our 
prices very frequently 
then we would be able to 
maintain and increase our 
market share. They were 
always looking for ways 
to avoid putting the 
prices up".
Hence, the marketing manager commented that "the marketing
department was very strong, and pricing philosophy was
developed in that department". It seems that the influence
of the marketing department was due to the fact that
"since the marketing function 
was starting to develop during 
that time, it had a significant 
impact on the firm's operations.
They had the responsibility of 
producing the profit which 
granted them the influence 
they had, 'we sell the 
product'" .
1. Pettigrew (1973) has demonstrated in his case study 
that certain professions like computer programmers 
and system analysts seem to gain power because of the 
recognized demand for their jobs which were emerging 
at specific periods of time.
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Furthermore,
"whenever they were 
confronted with a high 
inevitable increase in 
costs, they would always 
attempt to fiddle with 
the product in order to 
minimize the increase".
During that period, price increases were considered 
by the marketing department when "the accounting 
information identified increases in costs that led to the 
margin being erroded". However, prices were not increased 
whenever increases in costs were identified because it 
seems that "it was our marketing department that decided 
when price should be increased after taking the market 
response into consideration".
Thus, it could be argued that, like the other 
companies operating in competitive markets. Beta's pricing 
decisions were based on what the conditions in the market 
would bear because of the dominance of the marketing 
department over pricirig decisions.
Ascot Product S and R .
Ascot's products S and R will also be considered 
together under this category since product S is more 
important to the company, in terms of revenue, than 
product R. About 81 per cent of the company's revenue 
is attributed to product S while that of product R is less 
than 10 per cent.
It is suggested that during that period the market
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share of product S was very much the same and Ascot was 
also the market leader and therefore its market is still 
considered uncompetitive. As for product R, its share of 
the market was a bit less than the present period and the 
company's position in the market didn't differ as a price 
follower.
The pressure for a price increase arose primarily
from increases in costs and it was the finance department
that identified these increases which needed to be
recovered. Since the price increases in this industry
tended to be seasonal at that time they
"were pre-planned when 
doing the budget and 
would normally be put 
for implementation before 
the two main peak seasons
i.e. summer and Christmas.
Any other increase was only 
when the board decided that 
we needed one".
However, while the company took the initiative in
increasing the price of product S, the implementation of
product R's increases" were held pending the assessment
of our competitors' move by the marketing department".
According to the marketing director, "there was a
tendency from the marketing department to resist price
increases as long as possible", and in addition,
"given the difficulty of 
actually measuring price 
elasticity in practice, 
you got a feeling that 
tells you the longer 
you can put off price
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increases, may be the 
more you can maintain, 
grow your market share 
and keep your volume 
sales going up".
This seems to have been the orientation of the marketing
department towards both products. Moreover, the chief
accountant pointed out that
"although the initiative 
would come from the 
finance department, it 
was the marketing 
department that evaluated 
our position in the 
market and the current 
trend of our products.
It was an assessment 
of what would be 
possible and how 
competition would move".
Indeed,
"in relation to (product R), 
it would be very much an 
assessment of whether our 
competitors would move; 
that was absolutely 
critical since we were not 
the market leader".
There didn't seem to be differences between the two
departments concerning pricing decisions during that time
This tended to be due to that
"the role of the finance 
department was seen to 
measure increases in costs 
of producing the products 
and to advise us (the 
marketing department) of 
cost increases so that 
we are in a position to 
know what kind of price 
increases were required 
to recover those costs".
However, "whether such price increases could be
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instituted without harming our market position, was
really the marketing department decision". Furthermore,
the chief accountant made the remarks that "certainly
the marketing department was influential in setting the
details and final prices and by how much". Their
influence seems to have been due to
"their knowledge of product 
performan ce wi thin the 
market and also what our 
competitors were doing and 
what other influences came 
to bear on the market at 
that time".
As with regard to product S, it appears that price 
increases were considered when the accounting information 
identified an increase in prices, but not necessarily 
increased as this depended on the marketing department and 
its evaluation of the market. On the other hand, increases 
in product R's prices were very much related to the 
marketing department expectation of the market leader 
initiative to increase prices. This meant that prices 
were not increased whenever the accounting department 
identified increases in costs. It is worth mentioning 
that Ascot pointed out that prices were not increased 
during that period with the same frequency as was the case 
during the Price Commission.
It could therefore be realized that the marketing 
department in this company was very powerful in setting 
the pricing decisions during the era prior to the 
introduction of the Price Commission. In addition, the 
role of the accounting department was limited to advising
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the marketing department of increases in costs and the 
amounts needed to maintain the margin of profit. However, 
it was then up to the marketing department to decide by 
how much and when the market place was ready to absorb the 
increase. Thus, it appears that, like Beta and the other 
companies in.the previous group operating in a competitive 
market, Ascot's pricing practice was based on what the 
dominant departments perceived the market would bear. 
Furthermore, similar to the other market leaders, both 
Beta and Ascot product S were able to plan for their 
price increases, apparently due to their abilities as 
market leader to initiate price increases for the rest of 
the market.
8.4. The Highly Competitive Group.
South Pacific Ltd.
During that period. South Pacific believes that there 
were no significant changes in the degree of competition 
that affected their pricing policy. Indeed, South Pacific 
seems to have taken the view that"the market was not that 
sensitive to price changes". The share of the market of 
category B products was higher than the present 60 per 
cent, yet approximately the same number of competitors 
were also existing at that time.
According to the previous finance director,
"price changes have always 
come through the general 
planning system of the 
company. Once a year, we
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sit down and do our plan for 
the coming year and in doing 
that one forecasts cost 
increases and sets the sort 
of prices so that we get to 
our profit objective, 
bearing in mind that at 
certain times of the year 
where we increase prices 
more than others".
Similar to other companies, increases in costs where the
major factor in increasing prices which were produced by
the finance department whose "role was to keep the records
and produce the forecasts".
It seems that because of the nature of its products,
the organizational structure of South Pacific is different
from the other companies in our sample. The marketing and
finance departments are considered as service departments
where each product category has a business manager who is
in charge of their profitability. The business managers
of category A and B together with the director of the
general management department decide the pricing policies
which would then be presented to the board of directors
for approval. It seems that
"the accounting department 
didn't have a big role to 
play with regard to 
pricing. They had no 
input in the actual pricing 
decisions because that was 
the responsibility of the 
business manager who was 
in charge of the profits".
Therefore, what tended to happen was that
"the business manager would 
look at the costs and all 
the forecasts provided by 
the accounting department
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and then would draw upon 
the information from the 
marketing department as 
to the possible reaction 
of the market to the 
suggested price increases.
He would then come up with 
suggestions for prices 
which would then be 
reviewed in the (general 
management) and then 
through the management 
structure".
Apparently, price increases would be considered if
the accounting department identified increases in costs
or if the general management department found out that the
company was falling short of its planned profit targets
because cost increases were higher than anticipated.
"Mostly, the market was ready to absorb the increase".
It appears that
"It was the practice of 
this company not to 
increase prices very often 
during that time and so 
a certain amount of cost 
increases would be 
absorbed and prices 
wouldn't be increased 
as soon as our costs 
have gone up".
However,
"as we work from historic 
and forecast information 
so we reach a point where 
we say, well, actual cost 
increases incurred and 
cost increases which we 
forecasted is going to 
be incurred, as such we 
think that we ought to 
put up our prices at this 
point".
Although it appears from the above that the finance 
department didn't play a significant role in pricing
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decisions, the company tended to depend heavily on 
accounting information in order to plan and set its prices 
It is highly likely that being a price leader and 
operating in an uncompetitive market. South Pacific could 
afford to plan for its price increases as forecasted by
the accounting information. Thus, it could be argued that
although pricing decisions were the responsibility of the 
general management department, it tended to rely greatly 
on the information provided by the finance department.
This situation seems to be similar to the case of
Newbridge Ltd. where because of the perceived
ûncompetitiveness of the market, both companies tended 
to base their pricing decisions on accounting information, 
although in Newbridge the finance department was the 
dominant one. South Pacific also appears to have had the 
same attitude of the other market leaders in that it 
could afford to plan for its price increases and take the 
initiative to implement them.
S.D.R. Ltd.
During that era, S.D.R. believes that competition was 
"more severe than it is now". Apparently, if a 5 per cent 
increase was attempted, "we would have lost a very high 
share of our market because at that time (product) market 
was more controlled by imported (product)". Its market 
share was a bit less than now but it was still the market 
leader for the U.K. manufacturers. Thus, it will be 
considered that before the introduction of the Price 
Commission, S.D.R. was trading in a competitive market.
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It is believed that increases in costs, mainly raw 
material, was the main factor that triggered the pressure 
for a price increase. These costs "were identified by 
the management accountant by using individual product 
costing information". As with respect to how the 
suggestions for price changes were considered, it seems 
that
"movements in prime costs 
presented by the management 
accountant were presented 
to the marketing department 
‘ to evaluate what the
competition in the market 
place would stand and the 
impact on our volume share".
According to the managing director and the previous
marketing director, the accounting and marketing
departments
"had no major difference of 
views because with a normal 
margin we had an opportunity 
to say although the prices 
of raw material have moved 
up by 2 or 3 per cent on a 
particular product, it 
needn't necessarily take 
2 or 3 per cent increase 
on that product. You may 
spread it around a bit 
according to what 
competition was doing or to 
what imported prices were".
However,
"when both departments didn't 
mutually agree, it was the 
managing director who would 
decide, but I think the 
marketing department was 
more influential because 
with our very low profit 
margins we had to carefully 
base our prices on marketing 
policies".
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It is believed that price increases were considered
whenever accounting data identified an increase in cost
"only if it was a real 
genuine long term 
increase in the trend 
of what the rate of raw 
material prices were 
going. We are in a
business which is highly
seasonal and the raw 
material is also 
fluctuating over the 
year, so you have to 
recognize what is a 
normal seasonal short 
term increase and what 
is a genuine underlining 
increase in costs".
Furthermore, it appears that prices were not increased
when the accounting department identified increases in
costs because "a lot of consideration were given to the
market place at that time.
It therefore seems from the above that the competitive 
market conditions in which S.D.R. was operating during that 
period, particularly the imported products which had a high 
share of the market, had led to the influential role of the 
marketing department in setting pricing decisions. The 
considerable attention given to the market place is also 
reflected by the hesitant attitude of the marketing 
department to increase prices unless the increases in costs 
were of long term nature. Moreover, unlike the other market 
leaders in our sample, it appears that S.D.R. was unable to 
plan for its prices. This is implied by the practice of 
the company which is to consider price increases only when 
the accounting information identified increases in costs
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which were likely to prevail in the market over the long 
run. A further reason may be the unpredictable import 
prices.
8.5. Concluding Remarks .
Figure 8.1. summarises the main findings of this 
section. It indicates that out of the eleven major 
products manufactured by the nine companies in our sample, 
the degree of competition perceived by the decision makers 
of eight major products was competitive and the other three 
uncompetitive. It can also be realized that in all the 
companies whose major products were confronting competitive 
market conditions, including the uncompetitive market of 
Ascot product S, the marketing departments were dominant 
and accordingly pricing decisions were fixed with reference 
to what they perceived the market place would bear. On the 
other hand, it seems that the role of the accounting 
department in these companies was similar to a service 
department that provides the necessary information that is 
relevant to pricing decisions but not to press for it. 
However, in the remaining two uncompetitive markets of 
Newbridge and South Pacific, although both appear to have 
fixed their pricing decisions with reference to accounting 
information; the accounting department was only dominant in 
the former company.
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On the other hand, using the concentration ratios' 
classification, Fig. 8.2. demonstrates the degree of 
competition each firm was confronting and the department 
which had prime influence over pricing decisions. It 
suggests that with the exception of Newbridge and South 
Pacific, which fall under the categories of less 
competitive and highly competitive respectively, the 
marketing departments dominated pricing decisions. This 
seems to have taken place under the various degrees of 
competition faced by the companies and, in addition, 
prices were fixed by reference to what the market would 
stand. It is very interesting to note, therefore, that 
if the study had been.conducted on the basis of the 
concentration ratio measure of competition alone, the 
results would have yielded rather confusing indications 
about the impact of market competition. However, the 
perceptions of market competition have a much clearer 
correlation with pricing practices and seem to enable 
the researcher to make much more sense of his data.
It seems plausible to state that the findings 
summarized by both figures bear out the dominance of the 
market state of competition in governing prices during 
this phase. The findings generally tend to support the 
parts of the general hypotheses 1 and 2 pertaining to this 
phase and which claim that the marketing department 
dominated pricing decisions and as such prices were fixed 
according to what was perceived the market would bear.
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There is also weak evidence that tends to give support to 
Hyp 3 which advocates the dominance of the accountants 
when market state is less competitive. In the case of 
Newbridge, the accounting department clearly dominated 
pricing decisions. At first sight the pricing practices 
of South Pacific and Ascot product S, which are both 
facing uncompetitive markets and yet their accounting 
departments did not have prime influence over pricing 
decisions, tend to throw doubt on this support. However, 
in South Pacific costing information was the key factor 
involved in pricing even if accountants did not have 
dominating influence. This suggests that wider studies 
comparing degrees of market competition with accounting/ 
marginalist pricing practices might explain much.
Furthermore, during that phase, all the companies, 
with the exception of S.D.R., who have a large share of 
the market, exhibited a tendency to plan for their price 
increase presumably because of their abilities to initiate 
those increases for the rest of their markets; the price 
followers, particularly Blue Nile and Ascot product R, 
suggest that companies in their market position are likely 
to increase their prices on ad hoc bases according to the 
initiative of the market leaders.
In the next chapter, it will be attempted to examine 
the impact of the introduction of the Price Commission on 
what has been established regarding this phase.
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Chapter Nine
Analysis of Interview Data:
Part III; The 1973 - 77 Price Code.
9.1. Introduction.
This chapter looks at companies' attitude towards 
pricing practices after the implementation of the 
mathematical formula as the only criterion by which 
companies could increase their prices. It will be 
remembered that Hyp 1 and Hyp 2 argue that during the era 
of the first code, the accounting department was powerful 
and that prices were fixed predominantly by reference to 
accounting data no matter what state of competition was 
prevailing. Alternatively, as Alt.Hyp.1 suggests, it may 
be the state of market competition which mainly determines 
when prices can be increased even under price controlled 
environment. If so it is still possible that we find 
support for Hyp.3 which argues that when the market is less 
competitive, the accountants do become more dominant through 
the COTipany's greater reliance on accounting data to signal 
price increases. This means that Hyp.3 will only hold if 
Alt. Hyp.l is established.
In this chapter, we shall also examine the hypothesis 
dealing with the extent to which companies' information 
processing systems were adapted to cater for the extra 
work required by the Price,Commission so that the 
information produced for internal decision making was not 
squeezed and thereby no dysfunctional decisions took place.
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Therefore, it is expected that by comparing and 
describing the pricing decision making process of the 
companies in our sample, the above hypotheses would lead 
us to find either:-
1. that during this period, the marketing department 
lost its power over pricing decisions because the 
information required by the Price Commission gave 
the accounting department a power base and 
accordingly prices were fixed predominantly by 
reference to accounting data regardless of the 
degree of competition which the firms in our 
sample were facing.
or:-
2. that the introduction of prices control had no 
effect on when prices could be increased since it 
depended on the degree of competition each of the 
companies in our sample was encountering. Moreover, 
if the market of any of the companies was 
uncompetitive, we should expect the accountants to 
be dominant because of the firm's dependence on
the accounting data to identify the needed price 
increase.
The hypothesis tackling companies' information 
processing systems would lead us to find:-
whether the companies in our sample were forced
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to drop important information produced for 
internal decision making because of the 
inadaptability and scarce capacity of their 
information processing systems to meet the extra 
information required by the Commission and as a 
result dysfunctional decisions took place.
9.2.______The Less Competitive Group;
Rank and Blue Nile.
It is believed that during the 1973 - 77 Price Code,
the position of the companies in this industry
"continued much as it had 
been right up to 1977 ,
because the one factor 
which caused the change 
in the market and the 
market shares of 
individual companies 
was the change in the 
system of (product) 
taxation".
Blue Nile further points our that
"in terms of market 
consideration about 
structure and market shares, 
it was still much as it had 
been in the previous five 
years. The difference was 
in the way on which people 
would go for a price 
increase and the frequency 
with which they thought to 
take them".
In Rank the work of the Price Commission was looked 
aftertythe Commercial and marketing department which is 
separate from the finance department; however, that 
department "gradually realized that we needed the back 
up to the finance department because of the increasing
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complex information which the Price Commission was 
demanding". As with regard to Blue Nile, the financial 
planning director makes it clear that it was his 
"responsiblility to supervise and co-ordinate all the work 
we had to do for various purposes in connection with the 
Price Commission".
Both companies agree that increases in costs were
mainly behind the increases in their prices and Rank
suggests that the identification of and suggestions for
price increases were the same as before. Although in Blue
Nile, the accounting department continued to identify the
changes in costs, it seems that the practice of doing that
had changed. According to the financial director
"we developed our planning 
and financial forecasting 
abilities and then we were 
producing profit projections 
which might have been for 
two or three periods ahead.
We also took account of
price increases that should
be available under the Price 
Commission".
He further points out that
"we also established a 
regular procedure whereby 
we could continuously 
monitor movements in 
unit costs and calculate 
the potential price 
increase that tends to 
be available from those 
cost movements. If the 
unit cost showed that 
there was an increase 
that would justify the 
price increase then we 
would find out the total 
value that we could seek 
as a yield from the price
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increase and the 
marketing department 
would then decide how 
to spread that amount 
over our range of 
products".
Hence, it can be realized that the impact of inflation and 
the regular increases that could be secured under the rules 
of the Price Commission seem to have caused Blue Nile to 
forecast and plan for its price increases.
Although the marketing department in Rank "always
looked very carefully at whether the increases in prices
would be accepted by the market", it seems that
"the accounting department 
was influential enough to 
convince the board and had 
most increases passed over 
to the consumer as soon as 
they were ratified by the 
Price Commission".
The marketing director further adds that
"the main concern of the 
accounting department seems 
to have been to take the 
price increases that were 
available for them under 
the legislation rather 
than to forgo a price 
increase for the benefit 
of gaining some advantage 
in the market".
Apparently, the understanding that dominated the 
attitude of Rank towards price increases during that period 
was that
"all the other companies 
were suffering similar 
types of cost increases ; 
the level of costs may 
have been different and
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the unit of costs may 
have been different 
but they were all 
subject to the same 
pressure".
It was also believed that "all the other companies sought 
price increases on a fairly regular bases".
During that era, the dominance of the accounting
department in Rank over pricing decisions could be realized
from the remarks of the marketing director who admitted that
"the Price Commission 
increased the importance 
of the accounting 
department in the sense 
that its information was 
required to justify a 
decision which affected 
the survival of the company".
In addition, it seems strange that although the requirements
of the Price Commission were mainly costing information, in
Rank as mentioned above, the commercial and marketing
department was the contact of the company with the Commission
However, it is hardly surprising that when discussing price
increases with the Commission, the director of that
department "found it necessary to have a senior accountant
with me". Such a situation seems to have made the senior
accountant "feel very important since it depended on him
to explain the mechanics of the suggested increase to the
Price Commission". Furthermore, he was invited to the
board of directors, in which the finance director is a
member, to give his opinion on matters regarding the Price
Commission; and it was also reported that the grading system
that was used for performance evaluation took into
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consideration the success of the accountants in having 
sixteen application approved by the Commission. Thus, 
such repercussions of the introduction of the Price 
Commission seem to have helped in mobilizing the power 
which is believed to have been gained by the accounting 
department during that era over pricing decisions.
Apparently, Blue Nile was experiencing similar
organizational changes during that phase. It seems that
"the marketing department 
was attempting to make 
marketing considerations 
play a good part in 
pricing decisions, but 
this'was only intermittently 
because they were 
concentrating more on 
advertising, promoting 
certain bands and selling 
the products".
On the other hand,
"the accounting department 
was eager to have as much 
increases as possible 
that could be allowed 
by the mathematical 
formula because of the 
impact of inflation on 
our profits. Certainly the 
effect of the Commission 
increased the involvement 
of the accounting function 
in that area and the 
process of price increases 
became much more frequent 
anyway".
The financial planning director further claims that
"the finance director 
would seek to satisfy 
himself that we were 
taking as much by way 
of price increases as
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the cost increases 
would warrant unless
there was a very good '
marketing reason not
to do so. If we worked
out that we could take
a price increase that
would yield half a
million pound then he
would be anxious to




yield that amount. If
it was less than half




of other brands by
sufficient amount to
produce the total sum
that was available".
It is also believed in Blue Nile that "since the
existence of cost increases was the trigger which' prompted
a price increase action", the accounting information did
become important. In addition,
"as far as the Commission 
encouraged one to compare 
costs on regular bases, 
and it provided a 
mechanical system for
assessing whether or
not price increases 
were available, one 
like all other companies, 
took advantage of that 
in terms of when the 
accounting figures 
required a price increase 
notification, we thought 
to make a price increase".
Hence, the changes in both companies in the role of their
accounting departments when compared with the previous
phase. The role here is one of identifying the required
price increases as well as committing the company to these
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increases; and the marketing departments were left with the 
burden of spreading the required sum of money on the range 
of products. Previously, it appears that it was up to the 
discretion of the marekting departments to initiate price 
increases or not.
According to Rank, prices were considered and hardly 
not increased whenever the.:: accounting data did suggest 
that there were increases in costs which could be justified 
under the mathematical formula. It was believed that this 
was necessary in order that the company's "profits could 
keep pace with the inflation". Blue Nile also seems to 
have followed the same pattern of price increases as Rank. 
Indeed, "prices were invariably increased when the rules 
allowed it except during the time when there was a likely 
increase in duty".
One can therefore realize that the attitude to price 
increases in these two companies was different from what 
it had been prior to the introduction of the Price 
Commission. According to Blue Nile, such a change could 
be because
"the way in which the 
legislation was drawn 
out, probably created 
a state of mind that 
whenever the accounting 
department managed to. 
produce a total sum of 
money that was permitted 
by the Commission, 




"managers became mentally 
tuned to accept the 
suggested increases ; 
whereas in the absence 
of price control they 
would have taken a lot 
more account of the 
 ̂ market conditions 
because of the 
marketing people 
resistance".
Thus/ it could be argued that although both companies 
agree that there had been no significant changes that 
occured in the degree of competition that was prevailing 
in the previous phase, the frequency of price increases 
did change and prices were increased by reference to 
accounting information. This appears to be due to the 
power gained by the accounting departments in both 
companies as a result of the introduction of the 
mathematical formula of the Price Commission.
Newbridge Ltd.
Since the common pricing agreement that governs the 
pricing decisions in this industry was also binding during 
the 1973 - 77 phase, the market conditions of Newbridge 
can still be considered uncompetitive as was argued in the 
previous chapter.
The managing director points out that increases in
costs were the main factors that caused the company to
consider increasing its prices. It seems that




and came up with the 
figures that could 
be justified under 
the formula and a 
price application 
would be sent to the 
Commission on regular 
bases".
Apparently,
"it was upon 
identification of 
costs that we (all 
the companies bound 
by the agreement) 
went for a price 
increase since 
one had to work like 
the speed of a convoy".
Although Newbridge could sometimes justify cost 
increases of, for example, six per cent and another 
company in the industry could only manage four per cent, 
then all th companies had to take the four per cent i.e. 
the lower figure. This is because since all the companies 
implement the same price, a higher percentage would make 
the companies suggesting low percentage fall beyond their 
profit margin limits and thereby be subject to the Price 
Commission enquiries.
Given the market conditions that have been prevailing
in this industry, it is expected that "the market was
always ready to accommodate these increases and there was
no fall in demand". This is supported by the comparisons
of changes that were carried out between the type of work
volume and product consumption volume and it appears that
"there was no indication 
whatsoever that the (type 
of work) volume had gone 
down because of increases
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in the prices of (product); 
so there has been no 
indication that (product) 
has priced itself out of 
the market".
The managing director also believed that "there was
no differences between the marketing and accounting
departments" regarding price increases. He further states
that "I am sure the introduction of the Commission
affected the importance of accounting information and it
did strengthen the accounting department enormously".
This seems to have been
"because it was so much 
an emphasis on what the 
accountants could 
manage to get through 
as well as what they 
could put in 
successfully to a 
price increase 
notification".
It is also believed that price increases were 
considered and increased in this industry whenever the 
rules of the Price Commission allowed it; and prices were 
always increased by reference to accounting data using 
cost plus. "We were eager to reverse the trend of our 
low return on capital employed".
It is possible to recognize from the above that the 
Uncompetitiveness of this market together with the 
introduction of the first code seem to have greatly 
enhanced the power of the accounting department in 
Newbridge, and very likely in the other companies of this
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industry, over pricing decisions. In additions, it 
appears that the use of cost plus method in pricing the 
products of this industry and the regular increase of 
prices is a further evidence of the dominance of the 
accounting department in this company.
Tecno Ltd.
The only significant changes that appears to have 
taken place during this phase with respect to the degree 
of competition in Tecno's market was in product X. The 
company began to put together a strategy whereby it could 
increase its market share after its competitor had 
successfully launched a new product. Tecno claims that it 
contrived "to reverse the situation and we are now ahead 
of (competitor)".
After the first code was introduced, the work of the
Price Commission was allocated to the finance department
and apparently it found it necessary "to take on some more
people including a senior and a junior managers". It seems
that the changes that took place in Tecno after the
introduction of the code were appreciable to the finance
director who believes that
"the power of the finance 
department, which I don't 
think was good, increased 
and I also think that the 
pressure to take price 
increases on the bases of 
cost greatly increased; 
whereas in the past, 
increases in costs didn't 
necessarily lead to price 
increases".
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It is also highly likely that the determination of 
prices on costing information was so large to the extent 
that
"what the finance department 
was not prepared to do in 
that time was to let the 
chance of a price increase 
go, as one didn't know if 
he was going to get it back".
Thus, what tended to happen was that
"the financial department 
made damn sure that we 
put our prices up when 
we could i.e. if the 
Price Commission formula 
said we have a right to 
put our prices up, we 
normally wanted to 
exercise that right".
Tecno seems to have adopted what it calls a global 
approach towards pricing decisions during that era. This 
meant that if the company didn't have to increase the 
price of a product whose cost had increased then it would 
compensate that unrecovered cost by rising the price of 
a quite different product which had best bare a price 
increase in the short run. By so doing the company 
believes that it "had a wide scope to make sure we 
recovered all our costs, which we were allowed by the code 
without necessarily losing market share".
Regarding the differences in views between the
marketing and accounting departments, the financial
director is of the opinion that
"the marketing department 
had been more cautious
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than the accounting 
j department. However, 
we were listened to in 
the board because the 
margins were tied through 
this period and what was 
clear to the management 
was that to let the 
margins go down by not 
recovering costs in a 
situation where the 
controls were changing, 
was a very risky thing 
to let it happen because 
you may not recover it.
So, we made damn sure that 
we made the permissable 
margin by whatever tiny 
fraction. As such, there 
were enormous pressures 
in a not profitable 
time not to lose 
opportunitiies since they 
may never come back and we 
might put our company on 
a new even lower profit 
base from which you will 
be controlled in the 
future. So think of the 
force of that argument 
against someone saying 
I don't really know 
whether we can stand it 
in the market place or 
not. Jolly well go and 
try" .
Indeed, the power of that argument of permanent loss of 
margins plus the Price Commission seems to have "changed 
the ethos of the place".
It is admitted in Tecno that the role of the 
accounting department was affected by the introduction of 
the Price Commission. It seems that "it made it increase 
its strength because they are the people who interpreted 
the control and were held responsible for maximising the 
profitability under that control". The financial director
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also adds that "the accounting function was setting the
limit very clearly and it wasn't saying which brand should
have those price increases". However,
"we were merely
insisting, and being
heard, that the total
cost recovery was
made, we were still
left with the decision
as to where it (price
increases) was to be
made which was a
marketing affair. So
one was no longer




price do you think
optimizes your brand
while beginning to .
try and optimize the
company's as a whole.
It was a change in the 
nature of the decision".
The apparent power of the accounting department
during that time seems to have led to prices being
considered and increased almost everytime the accounting
information identified increases in costs. As with respect
to the response of the market place to these increases, it
is claimed that
"our competitors too were 
likely to do the same
thing. They had the same
fears that unrecovered 
costs in one period may 
well be lost for ever 
with a permanent loss 
of margin".
In addition it was suggested that the company also "had 
(its) own means to cushion the effect on the market place; 
you allow old price dealing and you change the amount of
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promotion money off the list price".
Like the other two competitive companies in this 
category, Tecno appears to have experienced a shift in 
the department's dominance over pricing decisions. In the 
previous phase, the marketing department because of its 
expertise to deal with the competition in the market, seems 
to have been very influential in setting pricing decisions. 
However, the introduction of the first code appears to have 
given the accounting department a source of power which it 
had used to dilate its limited role in pricing decisions to 
include not only the identification process, which it 
already had, but also the ability to commit the company to 
increase prices once costs had increased and to some extent 
where those increases should be.
United Ltd.
During that era United suggests that
"the situation was 
beginning to get more 
competitive in the 
take-home market 
because of the 
continuous growth 
of (the electrical 
appliances) though 
perhaps not as much 
as it is now".
The market as a whole was growing apparently due to the 
tax that was removed in 1973 from the product and which made it 
"comparatively cheaper and consequently there was a really 
measurable change in the volume sold of (product) round the 
country". However, the removed tax was reimposed in the
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form of value added tax and that had the opposite effect 
particularly when it was met with a bad season. This meant 
that "in 1974, competition got even more intense". The 
remaining period of that phase seems to have varied from 
year to year depending on the weather which is considered 
one of the major factors that affect the volume of sales 
in that industry.
The introduction of the first code tended to make 
United
"monitor our costs very 
regularly so that we 
could constantly put 
in an application for 
a price increase because 
we didn't want any time 
to lag before we got it 
in" .
The financial director further states that "it was much
more the situation that having identified cost increases,
we were very keen to push that cost through to the public
as soon as it was identified". Hence,
"the code gave us the 
impetus to increase 
prices more often than 
one did previously 
because one worked on an 
annual plan and tended 
to increase prices less 
frequent".
Both the marketing and accounting directors in
United suggest that they had different views during that
period. According to the marketing director,
"the marketing department, 
like any other marketing 
department in fast consumer
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goods companies, didn't 
like to see upward 
changes in the price 
of the products because 
they (changes in prices) 
inhibit potentially the 
consumer demand".
However, the finance director advocates the view that
"the marketing department 
might have made the 
argument that by 
increasing prices it is 
going to affect the volume.
Yes, they were always in a 
bit of fear to put prices 
up but they couldn't put 
down so much pressure to 
stop us from actually 
putting prices up".
Indeed, the marketing director admits that
"the accounting function 
held absolute supremacy 
and it was through the 
chief executive and 
managing director that 
they managed to put 
pressure on our 
department simply to 
recognize the need for 
a change. Yes, we had 
to accept the change in 
the rules of the game as 
a fact of life".
The marketing department argues that the role of the
finance department
"had changed dramatically 
and it became much more 
authoritarian in the 
sense that yes you could 
do and no you can't. Also 
there had to be a lot more 
policing of the requirements 
of the marketing department 
to make sure it conformed 
in every detail to the way 
that the regulations had 
converted them to think".
— 2 3 6 “ *
On the other hand, the finance director believes that the
role of their department was affected
"because all the other 
departments were relying 
upon us for actually 
taking some action rather 
than they themselves being 
expected to know whether 
their product fitted into 
the price structure in 
the market place. I 
believe, we changed from 
being a service area 
connected with pricing 
to being actually the 
indicator of costs have 
changed so prices 
better change".
The change in the role of the finance department seems 
to have had a positive repercussions on the company as 
pointed out by the following remarks of the marketing 
director.
"In retrospect, I 
think it had quite 
a good effect in that 
it tended to be 
related very much to 
costing information.
The Commission really 
brought the accounting 
function much closer 
to the relationship 
between revenue and 
volume and growth 
product performance.
That is a good thing".
The two directors agree that price increases were 
considered as well as implemented when the finance 
department prsented to the board that the company could increase 
its prices under the mathematical, formula. However, as to the 
possible response of"the market, the finance director expressed 
the view that "all what the people in the market
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seemed to bother about was how one could get permission 
from the Commission to put his prices up". This view ' 
appears not to have been totally accepted by the marketing 
director who believes that the impact of the regular 
increases on the market was that "in some of those years, 
the market did badly in terms of volume".
It seems clear from the above that as a result of the 
introduction of the first code, the accounting department 
managed to gain a source of power which it has used to 
swing the emphasis from basing pricing decisions mainly on 
marketing conditions, as was the practice in the previous 
phase, to more involvement of costing information as a 
criterion to increase prices. Thus, its previous role as 
a service department with respect to pricing decisions was 
broadened to determine the required increases as well as 
to influence its views on the marketing department in terms 
of what it can and can not do.
In comparing the pricing practices of the companies in 
this group, it can be realized that the accounting departments 
became dominant over pricing decisions due to the introduction 
of the mathematical formula of the Price Commission and as 
a result there was a greater tendency to base pricing 
decisions on accouting information. Furthermore, as this 
category includes competitive and uncompetitive markets 
and price leaders and followers, it can be argued that 
pricing decisions were determined by the dominance of the 
accounting departments irrespective to the degree of
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competition or a company's position in the market.
9.3. The Not Highly Competitive Group;
Beta Ltd.
During that period. Beta believes that there were no 
changes in the degree of competition as was stated in the 
previous chapter and it did continue to be the market 
leader of that industry.
The finance department in Beta was given the 
responsiblity of looking after the requirements of the 
Price Commission because "the required information was 
very much cost orientated and therefore it was thought 
that it was best to let the finance people handle it".
The additional work incumbent on the finance department 
required that one of the senior employees to be shifted 
from another function to look after the information of the 
Price Commission. His duty included knowing what the 
whole code was about and how it could be applied.
According to the marketing manager,
"it was mainly 
increases in costs 
that pushed the 
finance department 
to almost totally 
trigger price 
increases because 
it became a cost 
orientated price 
change and they had 
access to that 
information i.e. 
things changed from 
a market orientated
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price to a cost 
orientated one"
Suggestions for price increases were put before the board
and the finance department "presented the maximum price
we could get based on the cost increases that were
incurred".
The finance director pointed out that
we differed with the 
marketing department- 
They argued for and 
emphasized the concept 
of volume but we would 
simply not care because 
for us the most important 
factor that was given 
consideration was that 
our profit margins 
were not erroded".
He further states that
"everyone in the company 
understood that price 
increases were necessary 
to protect our margins 
and therefore we were 
listened to. Every 
department also depended 
on our success to achieve 
the required price 
increase".
Indeed, this dominance of the finance department over
pricing decisions is confirmed by the marketing manager
who commented that
"the accountants took 
over because of their 
information that was 
required by the 
Commission and they were 
able to demonstrate how 
the company could survive.
We therefore had very 
frequent price increases 
subject to the Commission's
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terms and the accountants 
took the running".
Therefore, like the other companies in our sample, "the
balance of influence had shifted to the finance department
and we became very strong while the marketing people lost
most of their grounds".
Both departments in this company agree that "prices
were increased almost every time we could justify it to the
Commission". According to the finance director,
"Our theory was to 
increase prices and 
then test the market 
later, rather than 
take precautions.
We also believed that 
if you ever let the 
profit margins slip 
away, it would be very 
difficult to bring 
them back to their 
original level".
On the other hand, the marketing manager states that "most
manufacturers were in the same boat. They were all
experiencing increases in basic costs and the consumer was
expecting prices to increase".
The marketing manager further adds that
"the formula of the 
Commission did not force 
companies to be efficient 
with respect to their 
cost structures. Any 
increases in costs which 
firms were able to 
justify were automatically 
passed on to the consumer 
and there was no need to 
go through the classical 
response of whether the 
market would stand
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the increase or not.
All what mattered was 
here is a code we would 
follow it".
Beta's experience seems to be similar to the other 
companies in the less competitive group in terms of the 
power which the finance department had gained as a result 
of the introduction of the first code and which enabled 
it to influence pricing decisions by using accounting 
information.
Ascot Ltd.
Ascot product S was still the market leader and 
according to the company the response of the market was 
the same as now. Therefore the market of product S can 
still be uncompetitive during the first code phase. It is 
also believed that there were no changes with respect to 
the competitive market of product R and Ascot remained as 
a price follower.
The legislation was seen in Ascot "as very much the 
responsibility of the accounting department to understand 
it and advise the firm of the possible increases that were 
available". Increases in costs were the major impetus for 
a price increase and they were produced from each month's 
management accounts to the board where the pricing decisions 
were finally approved. The accounting department 
demonstrated to the board tie amount that was needed to be 
recovered and the kind of increases that could be achieved 
within the rules.
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The marketing director points out that
"it was almost inevitable 
to have differences in 
opinion between the two 
departments. It was a 
difference of orientation, 
the marketing department 
recognizing the 
unnecessary evil of price 
increases and the 
accounting department 
measuring the required 
revenue increases in 
very mechanistic terms 
without necessarily 
appreciating the 
impact on the business 
long and short terms".
However, the chief accountant believes that
"to the marketing department 
it was a game of competitive 
pressures of having difficulty 
in allocating price increases 
to the product in the market, 
particularly (product R); 
whereas the finance department 
wanted a price increase each 
time the rules allowed it to 
maintain our margins".
Given these differences, the marketing director
admits that
"the accounting department 
became very important and 
influential. They exerted 
a lot of pressure on us to 
increase prices every time 
they thought it was possible 
and they managed to bring to 
the management attention the 
degree of cost increases which 
may not have been given top 
priority".
The accounting department also seems to have realized
that it
"was influential in that 
with the work we were 
doing in preparation for 
any increases and we were
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highlighting the fact that 
we were in a position to 
cover our costs rather 
than the marketing department 
coming back and saying (the 
market leader) hasn't gone up, 
no we can't".
Furthermore,
"we used to say to the 
marketing department you got 
to find ways of spreading 
a price increase of say a 
million pounds across the 
range of our products. Go 
away and work it out and 
we want the answer back 
by Friday because we got to 
give 28 days notice".
As with respect to the ability to increase prices
whenever the rules of the Commission allowed it regarding
both products, the chief accountant states that
"we used to put in an 
application to increase 
our prices almost every 
three months. We always 
assumed that (the market 
leader of product R) was 
on the same boat. In a 
way we were pushing them 
(market leader of product R) 
to get their prices up and 
we even tried to influence 
their finance department 
to push their marketing 
department for a price 
increase".
The marketing department on the other hand believed that
the competitors of product R
"were following similar policies 
of price increases anyway i.e. 
whenever the rules allowed it 
they would increase their 
prices. After all they were 
experiencing similar cost 
increases in the same product 
area by definition".
It was also stated that "we had no problem with (product S)"
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Ascot's attitude towards pricing does not seem to be
fdifferent from the companies we have examined so far. The 
influence of the accounting department seems to be very 
apparent even though one may realize that the company might 
have been hesitant to increase the prices of product R 
because of its low share of the market. However, it can 
be recognized that the dominance of the accounting department 
over pricing decisions seems to have been helped by the 
impact that the Price Commission had on the perception of 
companies and which led them to assume that their competitors 
were also suffering similar cost increases and therefore 
would be applying for price increases. Thus, we can 
reiterate what has been stated at the concluding remarks 
of the less competitive group that during the era of the 
first code companies tended to increase their prices 
according to accounting information because of the power 
of the accounting departments irrespective to their position 
in the market or the degree of competition.
9.4. The Highly Competitive Group;
South Pacific
There seems to have been no major changes in the 
degree of competition in the market of South Pacific and 
the company still considered itself a market leader. 
Therefore, according to the perceptual data criterion, this 
market remains an uncompetitive one.
The previous finance director believes that
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"the accounting information 
became very much crucial to 
price increases at that time 
because of the costing 
information which was needed 
to put in an application form".
He adds that "it was therefore, appropriate to allocate the
Commission's work to the finance department because it had
the necessary information". Although the need for "price
increases arose mainly because of increases in costs and
its effect on profit", the company was also "trying to
increase (its) profitability.
On looking at the possible effect which the
introduction of the Commission had brought about with
respect to the role of the finance department, it was
pointed out that
"the legislation helped 
the accountants in terms 
of acceptance by their 
colleagues, and although 
it was not observable at 
that time, it created a 
sort of dependence on 
them by the (general 
management)department".
Consequently, it was realized that
"the accountants spent 
more time with top 
management than now, 
discussing the way to 
approach the Price 
Commission and the way 
in which pricing policy 
would go. This didn't 
happen before and that 
in itself increased 
their status and 
influence in the company".
Therefore, what tended to happen was that the finance
department
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"would show whether we 
needed a price increase 
or not and then inform 
the (general management) 
department of its 
intentions. It was then 
left to the (general 
management) department to 
decide how to spend that 
increase in terms of 
individual products".
Apparently, the general management department was
influenced by the figures presented by the finance
department because "it tended to brush aside the marketing
people saying we can't have price increases. We did have
price increases".
As to whether prices were increased whenever the rules
of the Commission were satisfied, the previous finance
director pointed out that
"we identified the cost 
increases that were 
affecting our profit 
margins and all we had 
to decide then was the 
timing of when we went 
to the Price Commission 
with the price increases 
that we wanted. We never 
actually knew whether the 
market was ready or not, 
however, as a matter of 
policy we decided when 
we wanted a price 
increase we would go 
for it. We knew that 
to a large extent our 
competitors would tend 
to follow us when we put 
our prices up. In fact 
we were ahead of the 
other major companies 
in terms of pricing".
Thus, it could be argued that although the general
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management department was in charge of pricing decisions 
and responsible for the company's profitability, it was 
very much influenced by the accounting department to 
increase prices whenever accounting information indicated 
that such increases were necessary and would be allowed 
by the Commission.
S.D.R. Ltd.
S.D.R. suggested that the degree of competition was
very much similar to the previous phase. The managing
director says that
"the degree of competition 
didn't change and we saw a 
situation where the margins 
were suddenly dropping very 
quickly and inflation 
shooting up; people fought 
like mad to get prices up 
in line with the rate of 
inflation".
It is worth mentioning that the major competitors of 
S.D.R. are the imported products which according to the 
managing director were not affected by what was happening 
in the U.K. or subject to the Price Commission's rules.
In S.D.R. it is thought that, like the other companies,
the company has
"a sophisticated standard 
costing applied to 
individual products so we 
became very alert to what 
was going on to our 
business in terms of cost 
increases and the whole of 
the business became more 
cost conscious".
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However, since the company was "seeking and achieving 
the Price Commission's approval on historical information 
rather than projected information", it came to realize 
that
"the thing never caught 
up because if we 
presented a case to the 
Commission on a three 
months historical 
information, by the 
time we had it approved 
and sorted out the 
individual product 
pricing strategy, we 
found that we were two 
months behind because 
of historical information".
The dependence of the company on accounting information
to trigger price increases appears to have "sharpened the
importance of the accounting department and I think they
saw themselves as the people who would primary obtain
approval from the Commission". Accordingly, the accounting
department seems to have been able
"to put a regular quarterly 
claim for a price increase 
at the earliest possible 
moment, and having secured 
the increase it was then 
left to the marketing 
department to decide how 
to spread that among our 
products".
The influence of the accounting department to increase
prices regularly seems to have caused the company to "price
(itself) out of the market in some products". Moreover,
"during that time we were 
forced to increase (product) 
because our raw material 
costs went up so what 
happened was that imported
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(product) took over the 
market in this country; 
meanwhile the marketing 
department was saying 
we are losing our market".
This was hardly surprising to the marketing people who
saw the attitude of the whole company being changed to
that of "once an approval was given then everything moved
up in tandem rather than saying well maybe we should wait
and see how the market would respond".
The case of S.D.R. can therefore be considered to be 
similar to the other companies in our sample in terms of 
the influence of pricing decisions by the power of the 
accounting department which it derived from the first 
code of the Price Commission.
9.5. Concluding Remarks.
Figure 9.1. gives a summary of the major findings of 
this chapter concerning the 1973-77 first code phase. It 
suggests that the implementation of the mathematical 
formula to regulate pricing decisions appears to have 
led to a shift away from the dominance of the marketing 
department over pricing decisions to the accounting 
department. It further suggests that the pricing practices 
of the companies in our sample were increased by reference 
to accounting data. This seems to have taken place 
irrespective of the competitive and uncompetitive markets 
of the companies as perceived by their decision makers, 
or the position of these companies in the market. 
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terns of the classification of the concentration ratios 
as depicted in Fig. 9.2.
Thus, the findings depicted in both figures tend to 
establish the hypothesized impact of the Prices Code on 
pricing practices and give support to Hyp. 1 and Hyp. 2 
which claim that during this era, the accenting department 
was dŒiiinant and that prices were fixed by reference to 
accounting data regardless of the degree of competition 
which firms were experiencing. Hence, this means that 
Alt. Hyp. 1 which stresses the determination of prices 
accoridng to the state of market competition as well as 
Hyp. 3 which asserts that where market states are less 
competitive the accountants become more dominant, are 
disconfirmed.
The findings of Evely (1976) which are mentioned in
chapter two are relevant to this phase. He argues that
"the consensus view emerging from the 
survey was that since the onset of the 
recession the dominant factor governing 
prices has been market conditions rather . 
than the controls inherent in the Price 
Code" (Evely, 1976 p.50).
Evely's conclusions are based on his interviews with 
71 manufacturing companies when asked (a) how their current 
market prices compared with what they might have been if 
the Code had not been implemented and (b) how much their 
current prices could be increased without infringing the 
Code if market conditions permitted.
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Although Evely's questions did not probe this issue 
in more depth, it is interesting to note that two fifths 
of the manufacturing companies stated that the Price Code 
had kept their prices down while another equal percentage 
believed that their current prices were about the same as 
they would have been if the Price Code had not been 
implemented. Hence, given the various aspects of the 
pricing decision making process that are covered in this 
thesis, it is hardly surprising to find that at least 40 
per cent of the companies included in Evely's study bear out 
the hypotheses arguing the dominance of the Price Code in 
determining price increases and not the state of market 
competition.
Although Evely had shown that not all the companies 
in his sample had been affected by the Price Commission, 
our study demonstrates the process of fixing prices and 
how the degree of influence over these decisions exercised 
by the different organizational, subunits was affected. We 
are interested in the organizational impact of the Price 
Commission and not whether prices reached an absolute level 
during the Commission's era, or whether prices were higher 
or lower than otherwise would have been.
The substantiation of the above hypotheses regarding 
the power of the marketing and accounting departments over 
pricing decision in--the previous and current phases 
respectively, add a unique dimension to as well as throw 
grave doubts on what is suggested in the literature on
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pricing. It projects the need for more attention to be 
devoted to the internal organizational factors e.g. subunits 
power, that are likely to influence pricing decisions and 
which have been ignored in the economics literature 
because of its misemphasis on external factors as being the 
only relevant grounds for analysing pricing decisions.
Indded, Simon (1977) lamented the exaggerated
dependence on the economic theory of rational choice which
seems to have led to the lack of realistic models that
adequately demonstrate what decision makers do in reality
in their decision making fuirtion, as distinct from what
economic theory suggests they should do. In addition,
McMillan (1980 p.23) points out that
"the few studies that deal with actual 
decision outcomes tend to deal with what, 
in general, are relatively simple issues,
i.e. those where application of 
statistical techniques greatly simplify 
the organisation situation, or where, as 
in the case of business firms, the 
decision criteria can, with a few 
assumptions, be reduced to quantitative 
criteria, including pricing allocation 
mechanisms".
In the next chapter it will be attempted to ascertain 
whether the changes that took place in the criteria by which 
companies could increase their prices, have caused any 
disturbance in the structure of power established by the 
accounting departments during this period; and if this 
had an effect on companies' pricing practices.
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9.6._______Information Processing Systems,
One of the hypotheses that was developed in chapter 
six pertaining to this phase attempts to examine the 
response of companies' information processing systems to 
the requirements of the Price Commission. It was suggested 
that in supplying the information required by the Commission 
during the first code, the inadequate spare capacity and 
the unadaptability of the processing system led to the 
squeezing of the information produced for decision making 
and as a result dysfunctional decisions took place.
In Rank, the commercial and marketing director, who 
was the main contact of the company with the Price 
Commission, points out that "the firm had to employ a full 
time cost accountant to help in fulfilling the Commission's 
requirements and most of our employees were working 
overtime to finish the work in time". However, although 
it is believed that the company's information system was 
capable to maintain the previous management information 
system as well as to satisfy the requirements of the 
Commission, he admits that "certain management information 
was delayed in terms of priority but this was routine 
unimportant information".
In Blue Nile, the requirements of the Commission 
resulted in the employment of extra people. However, this 
company seems to have been lucky because according to the 
financial planning director, during that time it was
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"intending to go through a period of change, of increasing 
our abilities within the financial function. We were 
developing an improved system and to some extent we were 
computerizing. We were trying to insure that all the 
individual functions within the financial area were 
properly staffed. So we were in a position to produce 
greater range of information and therefore the requirements 
of the Commission were built into the system".
In Newbridge, it was realized that "the company had to 
employ 21 extra accountants and use our computer facilities 
later on" in order to satisfy both requirements for 
information. Furthermore, "some had to work overtime".
Tecno, too, "had to take on more people on the 
management level" and in addition, the company was "at 
the stage where we were computerizing quite a lot of 
accounting information. We also had a cascade costing 
system for operating costs as opposite to materials which 
was of great help. So if we hadn't had that, we would 
have either sacrificed our own information or increased 
the resources which we were using".
United experience seems to have been similar to the 
other cCTTipanies. The financial director believes that 
"generally speaking, it was a time when the pressure on 
the finance department was pretty heavy. We relied very 
much on the use of office information system and computers 
to reduce the extra pressure of the Price Commission and
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I think we succeeded".
f
In attempting to satisfy the Commission's requirements, 
the financial director of Beta points out that "we had to 
allocate one of our staff to be fully responsible for the 
information required. However, a number of our staff had 
to do a considerable amount of overtime to process the 
extra amount of the Commission's information, but this 
easied a lot when.the presentation of the information 
became routine".
The chief accountant of Ascot affirms that "our 
mangement information system was capable to accommodate 
the extra work of the Commission". He adds that "we had 
to employ more people and also work late. We were also 
helped very much by our computer facilities."
The response of South Pacific was not different from 
the rest of the companies in our sample. According to 
the previous financial director, "the staff of the 
accounting department had to work overtime and later on 
we started to computerize most of the data".
The managing director of S.D.R. believes that their 
information processing system managed to satisfy both 
requirements for information "because our system was very 
good and flexible. Yes, with a bit of shuffling and 
working late we managed that extra work of the Commission".
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Thus, the hypothesis has not been confirmed. It 
appears that the companies in our sample did not fail to 
appreciate the need for more manpower or the use of data 
processing and computers to cater for the extra information 
work which was required by the Price Commission. Indeed, 
its seems that their processing systems, particularly the 
data processing and computers which most companies tended 
to rely upon, were flexible and adaptable to these 
external pressures and none of these companies were 
forced to sacrifice any important information for 
decision making in order to satisfy the Commission's work.
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Chapter Ten 
Analysis of Interview Data;
Part IV; The 1977 - 79 Price Code.
10.1. Introduction
In this chapter it will be endeavoured to find out 
whether the shift from the mathematical formula of the 
first code to the vague criteria adopted in the second code 
distorted the dominance which the accounting department 
gained over pricing decisions in the previous chapter.
Indeed, Hyp.l and Hyp.2 argue that the accounting 
department was powerful during the 1977-79 era and 
consequently pricing decisions were fixed predominantly by 
reference to accounting data with little attention to the 
degree of competition faced by the companies. However, as 
Alt. Hyp. 1 suggests that there is also the possibility that 
it is the state of market competition which mainly determines 
when prices can be increased even under price controlled 
environment. Furthermore, if Alt. Hyp. 1 holds then it 
may also be possible to test Hyp. 3 which advocates the 
dominance of the accountants when market states are less 
competitive because of firms' reliance on accounting data 
to signal price increases.
An additional hypothesis that caters for the changes 
introduced in this era, argues that companies were 
encouraged to develop improved product costing schemes than 
would have otherwise existed and that led to wider corporate
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benefits.
Therefore, the above hypotheses to be tested in this 
chapter will lead us to find:
1. that the ambiguous criteria which were used by the 
Price Commission during the second code to regulate 
price increases, led the marketing department to 
depend on the accounting department for the 
interpretation of the legislation as well as to bear 
the risk of investigation should the Commission 
decide to conduct one. As a result, we expect the 
accounting department to sustain the power base it 
established previously and influence the increase of 
prices by the use of accounting data unheeding the 
state of market competition. It is also expected that 
Alt. Hyp. 1 and Hyp. 3 not to be supported during 
this phase.
2. that since the rules enforcing the increases of prices 
in terms of total cost were relaxed, companies would 
make more use of their product costing information 
and thereby achieve wider corporate benefits.
10.2. The Less Competitive Group.
Rank and Blue Nile
As was mentioned in chapter seven, the new indirect 
tax proposed by the government caused a radical change in 
the structure of the tax levied on the products of this 
industry. The new tax structure which was implemented 
during this phase favoured the large size products in terms 
of value for money. Accordingly, companies "were seeking to positi
- 261 -
their brands in price terms where they would be competitive
after the change in tax system"• The financial planning director o
Blue Nile points out that this seems to have been because
"Unless one repriced certain brands, 
consciously and deliberately, the effect 
of the tax would have been to make some 
relatively expensive brands (the large 
size) cheap and some cheap brands (the 
small size) relatively expensive; so, 
all the range of products tended to 
change in their position".
Rank's objective was therefore
"to switch the majority of our customers 
from the small size brands that we have 
into a (large size products) which would 
provide us with more profit and obviously 
a more competitive position in the market 
because the sector of the (large size 
products) was expected to grow".
On the other hand. Blue Nile seems to have been attempting
"to ensure that, we as a company, 
capitalize from our previous strength 
in (the large size products) which was 
rightly judged to be a sector of the 
market of growth potential. Our aim was 
to price our brands in a way that would 
make them very competitive after the 
change in tax occured; and in order to 
do that we had to suffer a short term 
loss before the tax was implemented so 
as to make our (large size product) 
competitive with the smaller cheaper 
products".
Apparently, every company in that industry was giving 
considerable attention to the changes in the tax structure 
since this meant that whoever contrived to capture a 
greater share of the large size brands market would become 
the market leader. Thus, what tended to happen was that 
the market became rather competitive and a price reduction 
war was witnessed in the industry. It is therefore not 
surprising to learn that the two companies in our sample
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were giving during that period more attention to the changes 
in the tax structure than the second code.
The finance and marketing departments in Rank seem not 
to have had differences in views regarding pricing decisions. 
The company was "very much involved in establishing our 
products in the market". The marketing director further 
adds that
"it was a very critical time and the 
marketing department expertise was most 
needed. I think, no price increase would 
even be initiated without our consent".
Indeed, it was pointed out that price increases were
considered but not increased when the accounting department
identified increases in costs. The company was also of
the opinion that
"we had a lot of room to manoeuvre in 
terms of providing a justification for 
a price increase because we were not 
increasing prices to the level we were 
permitted".
The financial planning director of Blue Nile admits that
the two departments had no differences in views regarding
pricing decisions. Apparently, he thinks that
"because of the company's long term 
objective, the opinion of the marketing 
people would prevail. They were 
influential and we really shifted to a 
marketing approach and price increased 
became much less frequent. I think it 
was the changes in the tax structure that 
upset the influence we had".
He also points out that
"price increases may have been 
considered but not automatically 
increased even when the code allowed 
it because the marketing people were 
worried about the market. We did 
consider where we stood and we did 
consider the opportunity under the
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the legislation but in the end it 
was the adopted market strategy that 
applied".
The changes introducted in the second code didn't 
appear to have an impact on the use of product costing 
information when considering pricing decisions in both 
comapnies. In rank it was believed that this was because 
the company had a very sophisticated product costing system 
and product costing information has always been used in 
pricing decisions. The financial planning director of 
Blue Nile advocates that "product costing information has 
always been considered when assessing the amount of price 
increases".
The marketing director of Rank points out that "the 
main fact why we were investigated was because we were the 
market leader". It is believed that the company's pricing 
policy was not affected by the risk of being investigated 
by the Price Commission because "we expected the 
investigation and we decided to get prepared for it". The 
investigation was controlled by the commercial and marketing 
department apparently because of its contact with the 
Commission. However, neither the increase that was granted 
to the company nor the monitoring of the investigation by 
the concerned department seem to have had any repercussions 
on the balance of power over pricing decisions because of 
the company's attitude towards the investigation which was 
described as "a headache which we all fought to get rid of 
and nobody was looking for an achievement other than the 
increase applied for".
— 264 —
It can therefore be realized that the changes which 
were introduced in the tax structure had a more crucial 
impact on the pricing stratégies of Rank and Blue Nile 
than the changes of the second code. This appears to have 
caused a shift in the balance of power in favour of the 
marketing departments which didn't seem to hesitate to have 
prices increased according to what they perceived the market 
place would stand. This seems also to be evident from the 
two companies' attitude which was not similar to the 
previous phase where prices were considered and increased 
almost every time both companies could fulfil the rules 
of the Price Commission.
Newbridge Ltd.
As stated in the previous chapter, the market of 
Newbridge is considered to be uncompetitive because of the 
common pricing agreement which regulates price increases 
for all the companies in the industry.
According to the managing director
"there had been no changes in the way 
of increasing our prices. We (all 
companies bound by the agreement) 
continued to notify the Commission 
about our price increases everytime we 
realized that cost had gone up".
Like the first code, the finance department was responsible
for the requirements of the Price Commission, and as the
managing director has stated, "I would still say the
finance people had absolute control over price decisions".
Although the rules of the code had changed, what seems to
have strengthened the role of the accounting department
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was that "it became more of a judgement than an opinion".
It appears that there has been no impact on the use 
of product costing information as a result of the changes 
that were introduced in the second code. Newbridge argues 
that "this information is indispensible for the purpose of 
pricing our range of products".
This company seems to have pursued the same attitude 
of Rank regarding the risk of being investigated. Indeed, 
the company also expected that it was going to be investigated 
because "the Commission was not pleased with our common 
pricing agreement". The finance department monitored the 
investigation and Newbridge was granted the increase.
It is therefore hardly unexpected to recognize that the 
dominance of the finance department in Newbridge over 
pricing decisions, and possibly in the other companies of 
this industry, had continued during the era of the second 
code. This power seems to have been enhanced by the total 
reliance on accounting information to increase prices because 
of the absence of price competition in this industry.
Tecno Ltd.
This era witnessed the significant increase in the share 
of product X market and Tecno became the market leader. 
According to the finance director, the company "was able to 
reverse the situation by deliberately setting our prices on 
a lower level and making use of the very large economies of 
scale in our business".
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The finance department still identified and triggered 
the need for a price increase. Furthermore, it is believed 
that
"the finance department still maintained 
its influence over pricing decisions 
although the changes introducted in the, 
second code tended to reduce it because 
the great pressure to make the margins and 
the recovery of all our costs at a 
certain time no more existed."
Indeed, "our department tended to have many differences
with the marketing department", and "we were moving to a
stage where market considerations were also given some
weight particularly (product Z)". Yet, "prices were
frequently increased in order to recover our costs which
were also going up". It therefore appears that although the
finance department maintained an influence over pricing
decisions, apparently because "the rules were vague and
needed to be interpreted", one can realise that the market
conditions were also taken into consideration.
It seems that the changes introducted in the second
code did have an impact on the use of product costing
information in Tecno. The finance director claims that
"it enabled us to move more strongly, 
particularly the early part of the period, 
to a contribution bases for very short 
decisions. When we are looking at a 
pricing decision, we are looking at
profits after variable cost i.e. contrib­
ution; whereas under the first code 
one was looking at the total cost of the 
business. We moved more towards 
contribution accounting".
It appears that the risk of being investigated did not 
influence the company's pricing policy. Tecno, too, was 
expecting the investigation and it was the finance department
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which looked after the investigation process. However, 
the finance director does not believe that by being 
granted the price increase they applied for, they gained 
extra power over pricing decision, although "it may have 
helped in terms of prestige".
United Ltd.
During the second code, the competition in the take- 
home market became very fierce since it is believed that 
"more than 40 per cent of the households now have (electrical 
equipment) and so this market has established itself".
The finance department was still responsible for the
work of the Price Commission and according to the finance
director, the company
"had less frequent price increases 
compared with the period of the first 
code. You see we returned to the 
principle of our planning where we can 
fairly calculate what is likely to happen 
to costs and therefore we can plan our 
price increases on a longer term bases".
During the first code "we had to wait for costs to go up
first before we can increase our prices".
The marketing director admits that
"finance people were still influential.
We were particularly anxious about the 
timing of the increase and would like 
to hold our price for long. The 
accountants would end up saying look 
that wouldn't do for the cash flow 
and profit margins if we don't increase 
our prices as planned. The chief 
executive would come back to me and 
say quite frankly if you look and see 
the impact that increase will have, 
you can't argue against it. I'll say 
well, I can but I don't understand what 
is being said and therefore we do it". .
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Thus, it appears that the power of the finance function
in the company continued during the second code and price
increases were to a large extent being planned and
implemented on the bases of accounting information.
Indeed, the marketing director further remarked that
"what the accounting department would 
do, was to say to the board look this 
is the level of cost, the level of 
input cost that you are facing in the 
next 3, 6, and 12 months, what are we 
going to do about it".
The finance director points out that the changes 
introduced in the second code had no effect on the use of 
product costing information because "it was already fully 
utilized in arriving at our pricing decisions".
In comparing the companies in this category, it 
appears that the changes in the tax structure of Rank and 
Blue Nile products were more important to the two companies 
than the changes in the code and consequently the balance 
of power was distorted to favour the marketing departments. 
However, in the remaining three companies, the accounting 
departments maintained their dominance and pricing 
decisions were determined by reference to accounting 
information although in Tecno market considerations were 
also taken into account.
10.3. The Not Highly Competitive Group
Beta Ltd.
The degree of competition in Beta's market "remained 
fairly similar" to the previous phases and it is believed
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that there were no appreciable changes in the market 
structure of this industry.
The finance director believes that
"the influence of the finance
department was of the same degree
as before. We still managed to
have our prices increased when we
feel that our costs ought to be
recovered".
However, "there was a general feeling in the company
that the fewer the price increases the better". Moreover,
it appears that the dominance of the finance department 
was partly due to the fact that "the rules were very much 
arbitrary and no one except the accountants was ready to 
understand them". Therefore it is highly likely that this 
has led to a situation where "the marketing department 
became dependent on us as to what it can and can not do".
The finance director further adds that price increases
were considered whenever accounting information indicated
that costs went up but that the frequency of implementing
those increases was not as often as during the first code.
It was also pointed out that during this period, with
respect to the
"branded products, we dictated our 
prices, however, as for the label 
products every time we had to 
increase our prices, we had to go and 
fight for it with the retailers who 
dominated the market. We could't 
afford to allow the margin between 
the two to widen beyond a certain 
percentage".
It appears that the changes introduced in the second 
code didn't have an appreciable impact on the use of
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product costing information in pricing decisions at Beta.
The finance director believes that'"that information is 
very important for us and I can't think of a time when it 
wasn't used in our pricing decisions".
The main reason why Beta was investigated appears to
have been "because we are the market leaders". It was
stated that
"we learned from other companies that 
were investigated before us and 
accordinly we planned our strategy. I 
was the only one who was responsible 
for the investigation and nobody was 
allowed to deal with the investigating 
team without my prior consent".
The finance director adds that "there was no risk whatsoever
on myself nor on the accounting department" if the notified
increase was not approved. In fact, after the Commission
approved the price increase the finance department "was
looked at with an eye of achievement".
Thus, it could be argued that the finance department 
in Beta maintained the power over pricing decisions which 
it gained during the first code and as such pricing 
decisions were influenced by accounting information.
Ascot Ltd.
The share of product S market was still very high 
during this period and the company didn't fear any 
increases in prices as it was believed that it wouldn't 
have any significant impact on its market share. Regarding 
product R, the share of the market leader of that product
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has decreased apparently because of
relative ̂ structural- factors in the industry 
e.g. the (companies) ownership of 
(similar products to R) companies and 
the development of those brands in 
the market place".
As with respect to the effect of the changes in the
code, the chief accountant believes that
"it didn't have a great effect on us 
except that we had to give a longer 
period notice. We still pushed the 
marketing department for price changes 
and we didn't slow down the frequency 
of increases and, in the main, we 
virtually got down to ninety days 
price increases as was with before".
On the other hand, the marketing director seems to have felt
the influence of the accounting department by remarking
that "they were responsible for that legislation and kept
asking for price increases as before". As regarding the
response of the market of product R, he adds that
" (the market leader) was ahead of us 
and they also increased their prices 
very often. I don't think we priced 
ouselves out of the market and it was 
only once that we delayed an increase 
by a month".
Concerning the possible impact which the changes in 
the code might have had on the use of product costing 
information, the chief accpuntant doesn't seem to have 
realized any effect and his remarks were that "it only 
made it easier to justify price increases. We have been 
making use of our factory standard costing for a long time".
It therefore seems that the accounting department 
in Ascot contrived to preserve its influence over pricing 
decisions and stick to the ninety days period for regular
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price increases. Apparently, the company hasn't experienced 
any shift in its attitude towards the pricing practice that 
it was pursuing in the previous code.
The companies in this grouphave demonstrated similar 
pricing practices as those in the less competitive category, 
with the exception of Rank and Blue Nile, in terms of the 
dominance of their accounting departments over pricing 
decisions. Prices were therefore increased by reference 
to accounting information and this seems to have taken place 
despite the degree of competition in the market place or 
companies position in the market.
10.4 The Highly Competitive Group:
South Pacific.
This era seems to have witnessed no significant changes 
in the degree of competition, and the market of South 
Pacific remained uncompetitive since it was claimed that 
the company could increase its prices without any negative 
impact on its market share.
When prices were justified by the mathematical formula, 
the dealing with the Price Commission at South Pacific was 
at the level of the chief accountant because it was, to 
some extent, production of routine information. However, 
during the second code, "it became a discretionary matter 
which meant at that stage, the finance director had to take 
over the dealing with the Commission in controlling the 
operations". The previous finance director adds that
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"the (general management) department 
was dependent on us to get the thing 
through the Price Commission and this 
consolidated the power which we already 
had since the first code. I think it 
was a matter of great significance both 
to this company and our parent company 
that we (accounting department) get the 
price increase and handle the Commission 
correctly. I therefore had much more 
dealing with the chief executive, and 
the top management depended totally 
on us because the Commission element 
was very important".
Accordingly, the role of the accounting department 
with regard to pricing decisions "became a leading one and 
we were highly thought of by the other departments".
South Pacific tended to have its prices increased
every three months and this is though to be the main
reason why the company was investigated by the Price
Commission. However as to the market responses to these
increases, the previous finance director is of the opinion
that "to some extent we got out of line with the market
because we were probably pushing harder than others".
In addition
"we didn't care about the market to a 
great extent because of our dominant 
position and to some extent we can say 
to hell with the others. We can go 
with the policy we want to follow".
It is claimed that, the changes introduced in the 
second code which relaxed the increases of prices in terms 
of total cost, did not have any effect on the use of 
product costing information, and, apparently, "all it had 
an impact on was how to put the case across the Price 
Commission".
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It is believed that South Pacific was investigated 
because
"we applied for a price increase 
which was allowed by the Commission 
and we were told that they don't 
expect to receive another application 
from us for at least six months. But 
we couldn't wait longer than three 
months".
As such the risk of being investigated "didn't affect our 
pricing policy". The finance director was in control of 
the investigation, and because the price increase was 
approved, it seems that the repercussion this had was 
"from my career point of view, it did me some good because 
you get exposed and if the thing goes successfully then 
that is good news".
It can therefore be realized from the above that the 
finance department maintained its dominance over pricing 
decision because it seems that the discreationary nature 
of the second code made the general management department 
totally dependent on it. Accordingly pricing decisions 
were increased every three months by reference to accounting 
information. This also seems to have been partly helped 
by the uncompetitive nature of the comapny's market.
S.D.R. Ltd.
The managing director believes that during this phase
"the competition was very much influenced 
by changes in Europe and not what was 
happening in the U.K. and I think a 
5 per cent or more wouldn't have had 
so much an impact on our share of the 
market".
As such the market of S.D.R. became uncompetitive during 
this period.
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The accounting department was still responsible for 
the work of the Price Commission and the pressure for price 
increases arose mainly because of increases in raw materials 
cost. The company was attempting to catch up and it seems 
that the accounting department exploited this situation and 
"prices were increased on regular bases so as to recover our 
costs and maintain our profit margins".
However, as to whether the market place responded 
positively to these increases, the managing director states 
that
"we were confronted with a situation 
where the import prices were fluctuating 
and we had to recover our costs so the 
accountants were preparing the amounts 
needed and the role of the marketing 
department was to see how these amounts 
can be applied".
He further adds that "everyone in the comapny felt the
influence of the accounting department simply because they
managed to handle our affairs with the Commission".
Regarding the changes in the use of product costing 
information for pricing decisions during the second code, 
it was argued that "we have always regarded product 
costing information as a highly important area and it is 
fully used in pricing our products".
It can be argued, from what seesm to have been going 
on in S.D.R. at that time, that the accounting department 
was able to pursue its dominance over pricing decisions and 
have prices increased according to accounting information.
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It also appears that the market was perceived to be 
uncompetitive during the second code and so it is highly 
likely that the company didn't price itself out of the 
market as happened in the previous phase.
10.5. Concluding Remarks.
Figure 10.1 gives a summary of the main findings of 
this chapter according to what decision makers perceive to 
be competitive. It can be realized that, with the 
exception of Rank and Blue Nile, in all the other companies, 
the accounting departments were capable of preserving the 
power over pricing decisions which they gained in the 
previous phase and consequently prices were to a great 
extent increased by reference to accounting information. 
Furthermore, such pricing practices appear to have taken 
placé in some companies that were facing competitive market 
conditions and others of uncompetitive nature; and in 
companies that are market leaders and others that are price 
followers. In addition, a similar picture seems to emerge 
when the classification of concentration ratios is used as 
suggested in Fig. 10.2.
In the case of Rank and Blue Nile, it seems that it was 
due to the changes in the tax structure, which were 
considered more important than the code, that reversed 
the balance of power and enabled the marketing department 
to increase prices according to what they perceived the 
conditions in the market place would stand. This tends to 
give some support to Alt. Hyp. 1 which emphasises the
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dominance of the market state in governing prices irres­
pective of the existence of prices code. Accordingly, the 
hypothesized impact of the Price Code on pricing practices 
in this era should be treated with caution.
Hence, although the situation of Rank and Blue Nile 
does not conform to what is hypothesized in Hyp. 1 and 
Hyp. 2 concerning this phase, and being confirmed by the 
pricing practices of the other companies, that the 
accounting department was powerful and that it used its 
dominance to influence the increase of prices according to 
accounting information, it is still in line with the 
general argument which claims that subunits power is not 
constant over time but varies with the changes in the 
environment that are relevant to pricing decisions.
Indeed, the notion that power is not constant over time
is hardly spelt out in the organisation theory literature
since the views expressed are essentially static in that
little attention is given to those processes whereby
power is accumulated or diminished in a relationship.
Pfeffer (1977, p255) justifies this by suggesting that
"because power can be used to affect 
allocation decisions, which then provide 
symbolic reaffirmation of relative 
influence as well as the resources to 
maintain power, it is the case that the 
distribution of power within organizations 
is most often quite stable. Only external 
contingencies that can no longer be 
adequately handled, or mistakes in 
managing the internal coalition can 
produce meaningful shifts in the 
distribution of influence within 
organizations."
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Clegg (1977, p25) also implies that the relative power
position of two groups should not be taken as always static.
He argues that
"the assumption of 'resources' based 
explanation of 'power' ought also to 
entail an exposition of how some 
people come to have access to these 
'resources' while some others do not.
The prior possession of resources in 
anything other than equal amounts is 
something which a theory of 'power' 
has to explain."
Hence, what is being established in this chapter, 
disconfirms further the two hypotheses regarding the 
impact of the state of market competition, and that of 
the dominance of accounting group when the market state is 
less competitive.
Furthermore, it was also apparent from our findings 
that none of the companies, except Tecno, experienced any 
significant changes in the use of product costing 
information in pricing decisions nor were they encouraged 
to develop improved product costing schemes as a result of 
the changes introducted in the second code. This seems 
to be because these companies did not alter the way in 
which they have been using that information. Thus, the 
hypothesized impact on product costing schemes is hardly 
corroborated.
The next chapter will address itself to ascertain 
whether the abolition of the Price Commission had any impact 
of the balance of power which the accounting department had 




Analysis of Interview Data;
Part V: The Era After The Aboliton Of The Price Commission
11.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the possible impact of the 
abolition of the Price Commission which took place after 
the conservative party assumed power and adopted a strict 
monetary policy to fight the double figure rate of 
inflation. As a result, the U.K. has been experiencing an 
increasing level of unemployment and a deep recession. It 
is worth mentioning that the degree of competition of each 
company's market for this present period was established 
in chapter seven.
It is argued in this chapter that during this period 
the state of market competition is the dominant external 
factor which governs prices. Consequently it is believed 
that the marketing departments regained prime influence 
over pricing decisions and as such prices were fixed 
according to what these departments perceived the market 
place would bear. If so then those parts in Hy. 1 and Hyp.
2 relating to this phase would be borne out.
Furthermore, if it is the state of market competition 
that really matters in terms of when prices can be 
increased then there is the possibility that we find support 
for Hyp. 3 which advocates the dominance of accountants
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where the market state is less competitive.
It is therefore expected that in this chapter we
find:
that after the abolition of the Price 
Commission, the accounting department 
has lost its power base which it 
derived from the existence of the 
Prices Code. Moreover, it is the 
market forces which mainly determine 
prices in this era and as a result 
the marketing department regained its 
dominance over pricing decisions. In 
addition, it is expected that prices 
to be fixed predominantly according 
to what was perceived the market would 
stand.
However, since it is expected that the 
state of market competition to dominate 
prices then there is the possibility 
that the accounting group to become 
powerful because of firms' dependence 
on their information to indicate price 
increases.
11.2. The Less Competitive Group
Rank and Blue Nile.
Both these companies tended to follow the strategies 
which their marketing departments developed in the previous 
phase in order to secure a high share of the large size 
products which, because of the changes in the tax 
structure, became the growing sector of the market.
In Rank, it was reported that
"these days marketing considerations 
continue to be of prime importance in 
our pricing decisions. I would say 
the question of our pricing strategy 
which is nursed by the marketing 
department determines our price 
increases."
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Hence, the company's efforts "to arrest a good share of
the (large size) products and we have been putting a
great deal of money in the U.K. market to regain that
market". Thus, it is expected that
"the accountants don't want to 
involve themselves in pricing 
decisions as they did during the 
Commission's time; but you have 
to remember that we still work from 
our plans, projections and the 
figures from the accounting function".
The marketing Director further adds that "prices are not
increased every time costs have gone up".
In Blue Nile, the situation is explained by the
financial planning director who claimed that
"there are no differences between 
the two departments and we now 
pursue marketing policies in 
pricing our products. I think, 
since the changes in tax, the 
marketing people took over the 
business of pricing and we (finance 
department) would be very happy as 
long as they produce an appropriate 
level of profits".
As with regard to the role of the accounting department
after these changes, he believes that "we lost the
impetus to press for a price increase and we just produce
the required data to the marketing department to see what
it can do best".
Such a situation seems to have left the accounting
.department in Blue Nile in a position where
"even if our cost increases would 
justify quite a high level of price 
increases, we have come to know for 
some years now that we are not in 
the sort of position as to say do or
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do we not need to increase our 
prices. I don't think we can 
increase our prices unless the 
marketing people approve of the 
right opportunity in the market 
and the action of our competitors".
It is therefore possible to argue that the marketing 
departments in both Rank and Blue Nile continued to have 
the power they gained in the previous phase and as a 
result pricing decisions were fixed predominantly 
according to what the perceived traffic in the market place 
would bear.
Newbridge Ltd.
Price increases in this industry "has slowed down after
the abolition of the Price Commission and this is natural
under the current severe conditions in the economy".
However, the managing director believes that
" (the independent association} still 
relies on companies costing information 
to fix the common price to be charged.
It is still the same process where the 
accounting department checks its 
figures and supply the necessary 
information to the (association) and 
start pushing for a price increase.
It is still a totally accounting 
exercise".
Such a reliance on acocunting information seems to be 
solely due to the "clear monopoly situation" of the 
market of this industry where price competition is absent.
Thus, it can be argued that the state of uncompet­
itiveness which this industry has been witnessing since the 
era prior to the introduction of the Price Commission, has
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made this industry rely on accounting information as 
it was the only source relevant for pricing decisions 
and accordingly the accounting department predominantly 
decided when and by how much prices should be increased,
Tecno Ltd.
At the time of interviewing, Tecno has just completed
its plan for the next year and the finance director
pointed out that
"although the accounting data was 
fed into it in terms of increases 
in costs, the question that is being 
asked can we afford to increase our 
prices. The market pressures are 
rather intensive at the moment and it 
is up to the marketing people to say 
whether we can have our prices up or 
down."
In such a situation both departments hardly had any
difference in views. According to the finance director,
"the Price Commission gave the 
accountants a special influence in 
pricing. Now, I think it is the 
responsibility of the marketing 
people and it has become a metter of 
whether the market would bear it or 
not".
It is the practice in Tecno that "every month we 
provide a forward forecast of our costs and what amounts 
should be covered." Accordingly, price increases would 
be considered but not increased at once. The marketing 
department now decides when and by how much prices should 
be increased. "I think they have regained control over 
pricing decisions". The abolition of the Price Commission
286 -
therefore appears to
"have removed that control which we 
had and we now got rid of three senior 
people. It also lessened the dependence 
of the marketing department on us and 
gave them the chance to restore the 
priority of the market place".
Thus, it seems that the abolition of the Price 
Commission has deprived the accounting department in Tecno 
from the power which it derived from the existence of the 
first and second codes. On the other hand, the marketing 
department regained its dominance over pricing decisions 
and consequently prices were increased in accordance with 
what it percieved the market conditions would stand.
United Ltd.
In this company the expected increases in the retail
price index are still linked to its plan and on these bases
price increases are suggested. The company realizes from
its planning that "since the costs of basic materials will
be going up, we expect our competitors also to be thinking
of increasing their prices even if they rumor other-wise."
However, the marketing director points out that
"since the dialogue is now a much more 
marketing orientated one rather than a 
Price Commission, we (marketing department) 
have become very strict in the time and 
the level of price increase".
It has also been realized in United that the role of 
the accounting department was affected after the abolition 
of the Price Commission. The marketing director made the 
remark that
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"in its simplist form, there was a 
great necessity previously for the 
information precisely on the prices 
changes to be carefully assimilated 
and annotated by the accounting 
function for a clearness with the main 
group and the Price Commission. That 
doesn't happen any more and we are now 
more independent and are capable of 
looking after the pricing decisions by 
ousleves".
Moreover, he believes that
"the influence of the accounting 
department was in the interpretation 
of the legislation and we would be 
listening to that and would alter our 
decisions accordingly. Now, the 
accounting funtion is making the 
input much more on the bases of what 
is seen as a business dealing and the 
discussion is a fairly marketing one".
United seems to have had a similar experience to 
Tecno where the marketing department has regained its 
power over pricing decisions because of the abolition of 
the Price Commission and consequently prices were increased 
according to what is perceived as the prevailing market 
conditions.
The abolition of the Price Commission, seems to have 
had an impact on the balance of power of Tecno and United 
only in this category. The accounting department in 
Newbridge tended to control pricing decisions because of 
the relienace on its information while in Rank and Blue 
Nile the marketing departments maintained the dominance 
they already gained in the previous phase.
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11.3. Thé Not Highly Competitive Group;
Beta Ltd.
According to the finance director of this company,
"the differences that we used to have 
with the marketing people during the 
time of the Commission don't exist now.
You see, the consumer has a say now on 
prices because of the recession and we 
appreciate the difficulty of increasing 
prices".
It is further believed that "prices are no more increased 
as frequent as before and they (marketing department) have 
a big say in what the company can increase".
On the other hand, the marketing manager of Beta seems
to agree with the above and claims that
"it is our pricing philosophy that is 
implemented and I think it is all over 
now for them (accounting department).
It is only when the margins have 
erroded that we would then think of 
having a price increase".
Regarding the role of the accounting department and the
impact which the abolition of the Price Commission might
have on it, the finance director pointed out that "we feel
that we can no longer push price increases. The marketing
people are no longer dependent on us and they are becoming
influential".
It seems from the above that the abolition of the 
Price Commission has enabled the marketing department to 
regain its power over pricing decisions and was therefore 
capable of influencing price increases according to its 
own pricing philosophy which is basically what it perceives 
the market place would bear.
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Ascot Ltd.
In Ascot it is believed that pricing process is back 
to the previous days. It tends "to start from the budgeting 
process and in looking at cost forecast we build into the 
budget the suggested increases in prices". However, it 
appears that the frequency of price increases was not as 
it used to be and according to the chief accountant the 
company "stopped having quarterly increases as market 
competition is given more importance now and we are talking 
about two or less price increases a year".
As for the differences between the two departments, the
marketing director believes that "there is a recognition by
the finance department that they can not increase the prices
of (product R) mechanistically anymore in raltion to costs".
He further adds that the finance department
"has lost its influence and although 
they are still involved, they do not
set an overall revenue target as they
used to do, so there is more flexibility".
Indeed, the chief accountant admitted that "they (marketing
department) have a lot of influence and any suggested price
increase is filtered as to what they see best in the present
situation".
Thus, it appears that, similar to what has taken place 
in Tecno, United and Beta, the marketing department in 
Ascot has become dominant over pricing decisions after the 
abolition of the Price Commission and as a result price 
increases were fixed according to what the marketing 
department perceived the traffic in the market place would
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stand.
11.4. The Highly Competitive Group.
South Pacific.
The finance department in this company continues to
produce as before the accounting information which the
general management department needs in order to determine
the prices to be charged. However, the previous finance
director points out that
"although the (general management) 
people appreciate our view that costs 
have to be recovered, they now have 
their own discretion on prices, and 
both of us agree that prices have to 
be increased so that the company's 
profitability is maintained. We did 
manage to convince them that we have 
to move prices up in line with the 
general level of inflation and I think 
from a marketing point of view we can 
afford that".
It has also been argued that
"the marketing people would prefer 
that we don't increase prices because 
it would be easier to sell without 
the increase. But I don't think that 
the (general management) department 
would delay a price increase if we 
demonstrate that costs have gone up 
and we need to maintain our profit 
margins.
He further adds that "price increases in our company have 
always tended to follow cost increases'.'.
It appears from the above that although the general 
management department has great influence in determining 
prices, it still tends to rely heavily on accounting 
information since price increases, to a large extent.
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follow the trend of cost increases. This is highly likely 
due to the uncompetitiveness of the company's market. The 
case of South Pacific appears to be very similar to that of 
Newbridge in terms of their dependence on accounting 
information possibly because of their markets uncompetitive­
ness .
S.D.R. Ltd.
After the abolition of the Price Commission, it is
believed that price increases in this company are considered
with much more flexibility and much more regard as to how
that flexibility could be used. According to the managing
director, the two departments seem to have differences in
their views.
"The marketing department now does most 
of the decisions and it became more 
polarized and focus attention on a 
range of areas where before it was 
constrained within limits".
As with regard to the accounting department, after the
abolition of the Price Commission, "one can see that their
involvement has been curtailed and they have lost the
influence which was built up during the Commission's time".
Regarding the increase of prices whenever the 
accounting information indicates increases in costs, the 
managing director suggests that "prices are only increased 
after a careful examination of the market place".
It appears that the case of S.D.R. is not dissimilar 
to those in the previous groups where the marketing 
departments became powerful after the abolition
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of the Price Commission. Price increases are 
therefore set according to what the marketing department 
perceives the market conditions may allow.
11.5. Concluding Remarks.
Figure 11.1. gives a summary of the main findings 
of this chapter in terms of the decision makers' perceptions 
of competition. The abolition of the Price Commission seems 
to have given the marketing departments in our sample, 
except in Newbridge and South Pacific, the chance to 
regain the power which they had over pricing decisions 
during the period prior to its introduction. This appears 
to have enabled the marketing departments to fix pricing 
decisions predominantly according to what they perceive the 
traffic in the market would bear. Furthermore as Fig. 11.2 
suggests, a similar reversal of influence seems to emerge 
if we adopt the classification of companies according to 
the concentration ratios, although as in chapter 8, class­
ification by such ratios gives a more confusing picture than 
does classification of competition based on managers' 
perceptions.
Thus, it can be argued that the findings emerging from 
both figures tend to bear out the assertion that it is the 
state of market competition which mainly determines prices 
during this phase. Accordingly, the dominance of the 
marketing departments over pricing decisions gives support 
to Hyp. 2 and the part in Hyp. 1 which claims that prices 
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One again, as in the pre-Prices Code era, the case of 
Newbridge tends to give supporting evidence for Hyp. 3 
concerning the dominance of the accountants where the 
market state is less competitive. Moreover, South 
Pacific retains a dominating reliance on accounting 
information. Suffice it to say that in the industry of 
Newbridge there is absolutely no price competition and so 
it should not be unexpected that the accounting department 
to be dominant and increase prices according to accounting 
data. On the other hand, the organizational structure of 
South Pacific appears to have led the dominant general 
management department to exploit the uncompetitive market 
of its product and rely on accounting information to 
increase prices.
The next chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis 
and presents the conclusions that have been reached. It 
also endeavours to fairly scan some of the possible 
implications which may be relevant for further research.
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Chapter Twelve 
Conclusions and Further Research Required
12.1 Conclusions
This thesis has availed itself of the splendid 
opportunity provided by the advent and abolition of the 
Price Commission to shed light on some of its 
repercussions on corporate pricing practices and thereby 
illuminate how the endeavours to refine the polemical 
arguments in the literature on pricing, which are rooted 
in micro-economics, accounting practices and some rather 
simple behavioural and organizational goals, will remain 
in vain if no scrupulous attention is devoted to the 
assertion that pricing decisions are negotiated and 
influenced by sub-unit power.
Hence the basic underpinning theme of this thesis is 
that the mechanism by which prices are settled will be 
determined by organizational sub-unit power which will not 
necessarily be constant over time. Indeed, the evidence 
emerging from the empirical work which was undertaken 
initially at Hekmats and afterwords tested in the other 
nine companies, strongly substantiate the hypotheses which 
argue :
Hyp. 1
That prices were fixed predominantly 
according to what the market would 
bear in phases (i) and (iv), and by 
reference to accounting data in 
phases (ii) and (iii) irrespective 




departments dominated pricing 
decisions in phase (i) and (iv), 
and Accounting/Finance departments 
in phase (ii) and (iii) irre­
spective of market competition.
Hence, the bearing out of the above hypotheses 
indicates that when the Prices Codes were in operation 
during the era 1973 - 79, they were the dominant external 
factors that governed the pricing practices and not the 
state of market competition encountered by each of the 
companies. It follows that Alt. Hyp. 1 which argues
Alternative Hyp. 1
That it is the state of market 
competition which mainly 
determines when prices can be 
increased even under price 
controlled environments,
is not confirmed.
However, the case of Rank and Blue Nile reminds us 
that we should treat the above findings with some caution 
since the pricing practices of these two companies during 
the second code give supporting evidence for Alt. Hyp. 1 
which means that it was the state of market competition 
and not the Prices Code that determined prices. 
Consequently, it was not surprising to find that the 
marketing departments in both companies dominated pricing 
decisions and fixed prices according to what was perceived 
the market place would stand.
During phases (i) and (iv) , the state of market
—  298 —
competition was the external dominant factor that 
determined prices. However, although Hyp. 2 suggests that 
under such conditions the marketing department would be 
dominant, the case of Newbridge tends to give support to 
Hyp. 3 which asserts:
Hyp. 3.
That where market states are less- 
competitive, accountants become 
more dominant through the company's 
greater reliance on accounting 
data to signal price increases 
irrespective of whether prices are 
controlled or not.
Nevertheless, the case of Newbridge seems to be the 
exception because of the absolute absence of price 
competition in that industry and therefore the marketing 
department hardly had any role in pricing decisions. 
Furthermore, the case of Ascot product S throws doubt on 
Hyp. 3 because of the dominance of the marketing department 
over pricing decisions where the market state is 
uncompetitive.
The pricing practice of South Pacific during these
two phases is also worthy of attention. It seems that
while prices were increased by reference to accounting 
data, because of the uncompetitive market state which 
this company was facing, it was the general management 
department which dominated pricing decisions. It is very 
likely that the power of this department is derived from 
the organizational structure of the company which gives
the department the sole responsibility over pricing.
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Taking the cases of Newbridge, Ascot (S) and South 
Pacific together there at least seems to be weak evidence 
suggesting that accounting approaches to pricing is more 
crucial in less competitive markets.
In reviewing the four phases together it can be seen 
that no evidence was found that would substantiate 
Hyp. 4 which argues;
Hyp. 4
That the dominant department will 
tend to enforce its own pricing 
practice philosophy on the 
company irrespective of the state 
of market competition or the 
existence of prices control.
This hypothesis is therefore not confirmed.
However, a methodological limitation exists. Whilst 
this thesis has attempted to adhere to the study of 
decision making process in order to test the advocated 
impact of power on pricing practices, several writers have 
argued against what they label as the excessive 
behaviouralism implicit in this approach. For example, 
Bacharach and Baratz (1962) voice the argument that 
concentration on actual decision making are likely to 
conceal those incidents where issues are prevented from 
becoming the subject of decision making. Viewing the 
above two approaches as 'one dimensional' and 'two 
dimensional' respectively, Lukes (1974) propogates what 
he calls 'three dimensional'. In his comprehensive 
perspective, he considers the issues which are never 
spelt out or even realized by the reopient in the power
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relationship, as well as those issues are prevented 
from reaching the decision making arena.
Although one is likely to agree that any of the two 
approaches referred to above may delineate a better account 
of power relation in organization, it has to be appreciated 
that the time and opportunities that were available to this 
research would have made it impossible to pursue such 
broad approaches especially since they seem to require 
longitudinal study using participant observation method. 
Hence, there appears to be a need for further research to 
cater for these requirements and thereby bring to light 
those factors that were not covered when studying the 
decision making process and how they affect pricing 
decisions.
The other major issue pertinent to the pricing
literature which this research has embarked upon, tackles
the misgivings in micro-economics theory regarding the
concept of competition. By emphasising the decision
making realities and stressing the notion of the decision
maker's perception of what constitutes competition, and
how this is affected by the interaction process that takes
place between the firm and the market, a better picture
is believed to be exhibited of what the concept of
competition should mean. Hence, the implementation of
perceptual data in classifying the markets of companies 
as competitive or uncompetitive unveiled a lot of
differences to that suggested by the concentration ratios.
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The concatenation of the two concepts of power and 
perception of competition is manifested during the phases 
where the marketing department is powerful. It has been 
demonstrated that the dominance of the marketing 
department enabled it to fix prices according to what its 
decision makers perceived the traffic in the market place 
would stand.
In testing the hypothesis
that in supplying the information 
reguired by the Price Commission 
during the first code, the 
inadeguate spare capacity and the 
inadaptability of the processing 
system led to the sgueezing of 
the information produced for 
decision making and as a result 
dysfunctional decisions took 
place;
it was. found that the information processing systems of 
all the companies in our sample seem to have been adapted 
to the extra work imposed on them by the Price Commission 
in terms of more manpower and the use of data processing 
and computer facilities. Accordingly, it was not found 
necessary to squeeze some of the information which is 
produced for internal decision making. Thus, what appears 
to have happened at Hekmats was not experienced by the 
other companies.
Furthermore, with the exception of Tecno, none of the 
other eight companies appears to have undergone any changes 
during the second code in the use of their product costing 
information nor were they tempted to develop improved
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product costing schemes. This seems-to have been because
of the way in which these companies have used their
product costing information in pricing decisions. Thus,
the hypothesis that
during the second code, companies 
were encouraged to develop 
improved product costing schemes 
than would have otherwise existed 
and that this led to wider 
corporate benefits;
was not corroborated.
In ending this thesis, it is hoped that it has 
elucidated the general corporate experiences with respect 
to the Prices Codes so that an insight knowledge could be 
gained regarding the following six issues outlined at the 
end of chapter five;
1 The way to introduce Prices Control (if it has to 
be introduced); it seems from the material 
presented in chapter 9, which deals with the first 
code, that when a rigid mathematical criterion is 
imposed to regulate price increases, companies may 
tend to become very keen to secure any price 
increase that becomes available under the Code. 
Hence, it is highly likely that such type of Code 
would increase inflation and not curb it as was 
the objective. On the other hand, a vague 
criterion like the one implemented in the second 
code would tend to discourage companies from 
applying for price increase because of the havoc 
of investigation and the fear of being exposed in
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the reports published by the Commission.
2 What impact it may have on companies? The 
significant impact which the Prices Code had on 
companies seems to be the change in the process by 
which prices were determined in terms of sub­
units power.
3 What style of Code is best? It is unfortunate 
that the information collected can not enable us
to draw any conclusions with respect to this issue.
4 The influence of different professional groups on 
pricing practices; it became apparent that the 
dominant group would tend to enforce its own 
approach to pricing. For example, when the 
accounting group was dominant it tended to increase 
prices by reference to accounting data, and when 
the marketing group was dominant it tended to 
increase prices according to what it perceived the 
market would bear.
5 What influences professional group dominance in 
companies? The dominant groups seem to derive 
influence from their ability to cope with 
environmental uncertainty. In the case of the 
Price Commission this was in the form of providing 
the required information which affected companies' 
survival.
6 Deeper knowledge of the way in which economic 
and accounting models of pricing interact in real
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world business conditions; by viewing the use of 
these models in a wider organizational perspective 
and focusing on the pricing decision making process, 
it was possible to learn that the use of these 
models was largely influenced by the group which 
had the power.
12.2 Implications for Further Research
The various theoretical issues raised by the conception 
of pricing decision making as a political process are 
liable to have some implications for the state of the art 
of pricing literature. It should be apparent by now that 
the efforts exerted by economists to portray marginal 
analyses as the main method for examining the salient 
factors in the determination of pricing decisions, and 
their simultaneous over-reliance on the economic theory 
of rational choice as a realistic model of managerial 
decision making, have resulted in a rather parochial 
view of what occurs in reality. Indeed, part of this 
misemphasis may be due to the constant and unquestioned 
use of quantitive models. As McMillan (1980, p.23) has 
correctly remarked, these models have all the benefits 
of closure, rigorous logic, and precision, but at the 
expense of realism.
On the other hand, it can be realized that the greater 
part of the accounting literature regarding pricing 
decisions has concentrated on the merits of applying 
absorption costing, direct costing, and rate of return.
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The focus on these various costing techniques appears to 
have obscured consideration of more crucial issues that 
concern how the decisions to implement these models are 
made and on what terms.
Equally, those who have consecrated their studies to 
the understanding of simple behavioural and organizational 
goals, seem to have missed the gist of pricing decision 
making. They have failed to recognize more pertinent 
issues, like who makes these decisions and how pricing 
decisions are influenced by sub-unit power.
Hence, this thesis evokes a broad vista of further 
research that would consist of more in-depth studies 
dealing with a wider range of organizational factors 
involved in the process of arriving ât pricing decisions. 
Furthermore, additional research seems to be warranted on 
specific issues that takes place in the pricing 
environment (for example the Price'iComiiiission) and their 
impact on organizations' pricing practices; rather than 
the general models which are assumed to be applicable under 
any conditions.
The findings regarding the determination of the state 
of market competition on the bases of the decision maker's 
perception should be appealing to all those who attempt to 
use concentration rations as a measure of industries' 
degrees of competition. This should be heeded particularly 
when studies based on the economic measures are used to
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analyse corporate pricing behaviour, since a rather 
misleading picture may be drawn.
Finally, while our study of one external factor, the 
Prices Code, has demonstrated how power shifted between the 
two concerned departments, more detailed studies relating 
to other external influences may show how balance of power 
shifts within a firm and do more to explain pricing and
other decision processes than accounting and economic 
techniques viewed in logico-rational isolation.
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Appendix A
Criteria of the Price Commission Act
1 It shall be the duty of the Commission, in performing 
any functions mentioned in subsection (3) of this 
section -
(a) to have regard to all matters 
which appear to the Commission 
in the particular circumstances 
to be relevant with a view to 
restraining prices of goods and 
charges for services so far as 
that appears to the Commission 
to be consistent with the 
making of adequate profits by 
efficient suppliers of goods 
and services; and
(b) to have regard in particular to 
the matters mentioned in the 
following subsection so far as 
the Commission consider them 
relevant,
and not to have regard to any other matters
The matters aforesaid are -
(a) the need to recover costs 
incurred in efficiently 
supplying goods and services 
and in maintaining the value 
of the relevant businesses;
(b) the desirability of encouraging 
reductions in costs by improve­
ments in the use of resources 
and of securing reductions in 
prices of goods and charges for 
services in consequence of such 
improvements ;
(c) the need to earn, from selling 
goods and providing services 
in the United Kingdom, profits 
which provide a return on the 
capital employed in producing 
the profits which is sufficient
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taking one year with another -
(i) to defray the cost of the 
capital (including com­
pensation for the risk 
involved in producing the 
profits), and
tii) to provide money for, and 
to encourange the promo­
tion of, innovations and 
technical improvements in 
and the expansion in the 
United Kingdom of the 
enterprises which consist 
of or include the 
relevant businesses;
(d) the need to take account of 
charges in prices in deter­
mining the value of assets;
(e) the desirability of maintaining 
the quality of goods and 
services and satisfying the 
demands of users of goods and 
services ;
(f) the need to safeguard the 
interests of users of goods and 
services by promoting competition 
between suppliers or, where 
competition must be restricted
or cannot be promoted (either 
because certain suppliers control 
a substantial share of the 
relevant market or for any other 
reason), by restricting prices 
and charges;
(g) the desirability of establishing 
and maintaining a balance 
between the supply of goods and 
services and the demand for them; 
and
(h) the need to avoid detriment, from 
restraints on prices and charges, 
to the United Kingdom's balance 
of payments and the need to 
increase the share of United 
Kingdom enterprises in markets in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
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Appendix B 
Hekmats Limited 
INTERVIEWER'S CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO COVER
Section A; Prior to introduction of the Price Commission
1. Did the accounting and marketing departments have 
different pricing philosophy?
- If yes - What were they?
- Who was most influential in setting 
pricing decisions?
- What criteria was used in setting pricing 
decisions?
- If no - What was their pricing philosophy?
- What criteria was used in setting pricing 
decisions?
2. Who identified that a price change may be required?
- Why was it this department or group?
3. By what process were changes in prices arrived at?
- How were alternatives for price changes developed?
4. Who decided and finally approved the price to be 
charged?
- Was the final approval ever taken to top management?
- Why?
5. To what extent do you think that accounting 
information was used in pricing decisions?
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- Over 75% of price decisions?
50%- 75% of price decisions?
25%- 50% of price decisions?
Under 25% of price decisions?
6. To what extent did non-accounting information play 
a part in your pricing decisions?
- Was it very important, important, not important?
- Why?
- What sort of non-accounting data?
Section B; 1973 - 1977 Price Code
1. How did your firm make its preparation for this new 
piece of legislation?
- Did the firm allocate the work of the Price 
Commission to a certain department or group?
- Why that department or group?
- Did the firm have to employ internal and/or 
external experts to prepare itself for' the Price 
Commission?
- What and why experts?
2. Did the accounting and marketing departments have 
different pricing philosophy?
- If yes - What were they?
- Who was most influential in setting 
pricing decisions?
- What criteria was used in setting 
pricing decisions?
- 311 -
- If no - What was their pricing philosophy?
- What criteria was used in setting 
pricing decisions?
3. Who identified that a price change may be required?
- Why was it this department or group?
4. By what process were changes in prices arrived at, 
specifically concentrating in the differences in 
procedures before 1973?
- How were alternatives for price changes developed?
5. Who decided and finally approved the price to be 
charged?
- Was the final approval ever taken to top management?
- Why?
6. Did the company adopt a strategy in dealing with the 
Price Commission?
- If yes - What strategy did it adopt?
- What did you hope to achieve from this
strategy?
- Did that strategy originate from other 
factors beside the Price Commission?
7. How did the firm respond to the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
(a) Did the company have to change the number of 
employees?
- If yes - Why?
I - By how many did the company have to 
change the number of employees?
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- Has there been any transfer of 
employees from other work?
- If yes - From where?
- What type of work did they 
do?'
- How serious was this to 
the company?
- "Do you think this change of 
employees was enough to perform the 
job?
- Why?
- How much do you think this 
recruitment cost?
- If no - Why do you think so?
- Did the company have an increase in 
the amount of overtime?
- If yes - Was it very often?
- If no - Were employees transferred 
from other activities?
- If yes - From where and
what type of work 
did they dô?
- Was this serious 
for the company
i.e. important 
jobs not being 
done?





- If no - Do you think 
• you had a sur­
plus of 
employees?
- Yes + No - Did you have to recruit new types
of personnel or to provide training 
for existing personnel?
- Did this create any problems?
- How much did it cost?
(b) Did the company reallocate some responsibilities 
between different functional groups?
- If yes - Which ones and why?
- Was that done within the accounting 
department?
- Why? and if yes - H o w  and what?
- Did the firm make any such changes 
between the accounting department 
and any other^department?
- Why? and if yes - How and what?
- Did this reallocation affect your job?
- If Yes - How?
- Do you think that this reallocation of 
responsibilities led to the fulfilment 
of the Price Commission requirements 
in an efficient and effective manner?
- Why and how?
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- What were the organizational 
repercussions of this reallocation?
- If no - Why?
(c) Did the company attempt any shift towards data 
processing and/or computerization?
- If yes - Why?
- Was this in addition to the change in 
employees or instead of it?
- Why?
- Do you think it helped in fulfilling 
the requirements of the Price 
Commission?
- Why?
- How much did it cost?
- Was there any training involved, if 
so, how much did it cost?
- What were the organizational 
repercussions of this shift?
- Were there any advantages^gained from 
the use of data processing and/or 
computers in addition to fulfilling
the requirements of the Price Commission?
- If yes - What were they?
(d) Did the company find that it had to collect any 
new basic data to comply with the requirements 
of the Price Commission?
- If yes - Why?
- What sort of data was this?
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- Do you think that this data helped in 
fulfilling the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
- If yes - How?
- Did the company find that this data 
was useful for other purposes?
- How?
- Do you think that the collection of 
this data has led to changes in the 
number of employees and/or shift 
towards data processing as outlined 
above?
- Did the company find that the Price 
Commission required certain information 
which it was not able to provide?
- If yes - How did you overcome this 
problem?
- Was it epensive to do so?
- If no - Why?
(e) Did the company need to change the structure of 
the accounting department?
- If yes - Why?
- Do you think the new structure helped 
in performing the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
- How?
- In what way do you think that this new 
structure coped with the reallocation
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of responsibilities mentioned above?
- Was your own job affected by this new 
structure?
- How (relate to decentralization or 
centralization of decision-making)?
- Were there any organizational 
repercussions of this new structure?
- Was there any training involved as 
part of this process?
- If yes - How much did it cost?
- If no - Do you think that it woùld have been
useful for the company to make changes 
in the structure of the accounting 
department in order to be able to 
satisfy the requirements of the Price 
Commission?
- Why (note the possibility of not being 
able to do so)?
- If Q.7 (b) was yes - Do you think it 
would have been better :to change the 
structure of the accounting department 
to cope with the reallocation of 
responsibilities?
- Why?
Which activities of your company were affected by the
requirements of the Price Commission?
- What aspects of your firm's business was the Price
Commission interested in?
- Do you think that there were important aspects of your 
firm's activities that the Price Commission should
-  3 1 7  -  
have covered and did not?
- If yes - What were they?
- Why were they important?
9. Did the Price Commission affect the importance of 
accounting information in your firm?
- If yes - How?
- To what extent do you think this has led to 
changes in the use made of accounting 
information in pricing decisions?
- Did this lead to better (i.e. more profit­
able) pricing decisions?
- Why?
- If no - Why do you think it has not affected it?
- To what extent do you think accounting 
information was used in pricing decisions?
10. To what extent would you say that the Price Commission, 
rather than the market, induced a price change for your 
products?
- Over 75% of price decisions?
50 -75% of price decisions?
25 -50% of Price decisions?
Under 25% of price decisions?
- To what extent do you think that accounting
information was an important input for pricing 
decisions in the light of your previous answers 
(very important, important, not important)?
11. To what extent did non-accouhting information play a
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part in your pricing decisions?
- Was it very important, important, not important?
- Why?
- What sort of non-accounting data?
12. To what extent did the Price Commission affect the
role of the accounting department and its relationship
with other departments?
- How?
- Has this been affected by any reallocation of 
responsibilities such as were mentioned in Q.7 (b)?
- How?
13. Did the accounting information system manage to
maintain the previous management information as well
as to satisfy the requirements of the Price Commission?
- If yes - Was that done with the normal working hours
or did you have to work overtime?
- If yes - How much did it cost?
- Do you think the accounting information 
system managed to do this after the change 
in employees and/or shift to data 
processing?
- If no - Why?
- Was this in any sense due to union 
restrictions or to say deterioration in 
employee relations?
- What did you do to cope with both 
requirements?
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- Do you think there could have been a 
better way?
14. Assuming the Price Commission had priority, did you 
ever decide to drop, delay or filter out any specific 
aspect of management information?
- If yes - Why?
- What sort of information was affected?
- What is the importance of that information 
to the company?
- Why?
- For how long did you continue doing that?
- What did the company do in order to 
overcome this problem?
- How did this affect the relation of this 
department with other departments?
- If no - Do you think there was a surplus of
resources which the department was able 
to use to cater for the requirements of 
the Price Commission?
- Did the company have to increase the number 
of employees, use more overtime etc?
- Was the department able to provide all the 
information required of it?.
15. Do you think that the requirements of the Price 
Commission ever led to poor management decisions because 
of the extra work involved in producing statutory 
information?
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- If yes - Why?
- What sort of decisions were mainly 
involved?
- How serious has this affected your own 
job, your department and the company in 
general?
- What do you think the company might have 
done in order to avoid such problems?
- If no - How was it that the accounting information
system was able to provide this extra, 
statutory information without the normal 
day-to-day work being affected?
16. Did you ever find that information that you had to 
provide for the Price Commission was useful for the 
Company's purpose?
- If yes - How did^ou find it useful?
If no - Why?
- Do you think it was a duplicate of what you
already had?
17. Were there any cases where requirements of other 
government agencies overlapped with the requirements 
of the Price Commission?
- What agencies were they?
- Do you think that these requirements complemented 
or contradicted the work of the Price Commission?
- How?
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18. Did the work of the Price Commission require a certain 
level of understanding?
- Which employees were allocated to the work?
- What departments did they come from?
- Why were they selected from those departments?
19. In your opinion which were the important documents 
submitted to the Price Commission?
- Who prepared those documents?
- How long did they take to prepare?
- Were there any problems involved in preparing these 
documents?
- If yes - What were they?
- Can I have a look at these documents?
20. How did your company manage to maintain the 
consistency of information submitted to the Price 
Commission in the various documents?
- Which in your opinion was the most important of 
these documents?
- Why?
Section C; 1977-1979 Price Code
1. How did your firm make its preparation for this new 
piece of legislation?
- Did the firm allocate the work of the Price 
Commission to a certain department or group?
- Why that department or group?
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- Did the firm have to employ internal and/or 
external experts to prepare itself for the Price
Commission?
- What and why experts?
2. Did the accounting and marketing departments have 
different pricing philosophy?
- If yes - What were they?
- Who was most influential in setting pricing 
decisions?
- What criteria was used in setting pricing 
decisions?
- if No - What was their pricing philosophy?
- What criteria was used in setting pricing 
decisions?
3. Who identified that a price change may be required?
- Why was it this department or group?
4. By what process were changes in prices arrived at,
specifically concentrating in the differences in 
procedures before 1977?
- How were alternatives for price changes developed?
- Did the company follow a strict commercial policy,
a policy which would ensure that it never attracted 
the attention of the Price Commission, or any other 
policy?
- Why?
5. Who decided and finally approved the price to be 
charged?
- 323 -
- Was the final approval ever taken to top management?
- Why?
6. Did the company adopt a strategy in dealing with the 
Price Commission?
- If yes - What strategy did it adopt?
- What did you hope to achieve from this 
strategy?
- Did that strategy originate from other 
factors beside the Price Commission?
7. How did the firm respond to the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
(a) Did the company have to change the number of 
employees?
- If yes - Why?
- By how many did the company have to 
change the number of employees?
- Has there been any transfer of 
employees from other work?
- If yes - From where?
- What type of work did they do?
- How serious was this to the 
company?
- Do you think this change of employees 
was enough to perform the job?
- Why?
- How much do you think this recruitment 
cost?
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- If no - Why do you think so?
- Did the company have an increase in the 
amount of overtime?
- If yes - Was it very often?
- If no - Were employees transferred from
other activities?
- If yes - From where and what type 
of work did they do?
- Was this serious for the 
company i;e. important 
jobs not being done?
- If yes - Were there any
organi zational 
repercussions?
- If no - Do you think you
had a surplus of 
employees?
- Yes+No - Did you have to recruit new types of
personnel or to provide training for
existing personnel?
- Did this create any problems?
- How much did it cost?
(b) Did the company reallocate some responsibilities 
between different functional groups?
- If yes - Which ones and why?
- Was that done within the accounting 
department?
- Why? and if yes - How and what?
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- Did the firm make any such changes 
between the accounting department and 
any other department?
- Why? and if yes - How and what?
- Did this reallocation affect your job?
- If yes - How?
- Do you think that this reallocation of
responsibilities led to the fulfilment 
of the Price Commission requirements in 
an efficient and effective manner?
- How and why?
- What were the organizational 
repercussions of this reallocation?
- If no - Why?
(c) Did the company attempt any shift towards data 
processing and/or computerization?
- If yes - Why?
- Was this in addition to the change in 
employees or instead of it?
- Why?
- Do you think it helped in fulfilling
the requirements of the Price Commission?
- Why?
- How much did it cost?
- Was there any training involved, if so, 
how much did it cost?
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- What were the organizational 
repercussions of this shift?
- Were there any advantages gained from 
the use of data processing and/or 
computers in addition to fulfilling the 
requirements of the Price Commission?
- If yes - Whât were they?
(d) Did the company find that it had to collect any 
new basic data to comply with the requirements of 
the Price Commission?
- If yes - Why?
- What sort of data was this?
- Do you think that this data helped in
fulfilling the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
- If yes - How?
- Did the company find that this data 
was useful for other purposes?
- How?
- Do you think that the collection of this 
data has led to changes in the number
of employees and/or shift towards 
data processing as outlined above?
- Did the company find that the Price 
Commission required certain information 
which it was not able to provide?
- If yes - How did you overcome this
problem?
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- Was it expensive to do so?
- If no - Why?
(e) Did the company need to change the structure of 
the accounting department?
- If yes - Why?
- Do you think the new structure helped 
in performing the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
- How?
- In what way do you think that this new 
structure coped with the reallocation 
of responsibilities mentioned above?
- Was your own job affected by this new 
structure?
- How (relate to decentralization.or 
centralization of decision-making)?
- Were there any organizational 
repercussions of this new structure?
- Was there any training involved as 
part of this process?
- If yes - How much did it cost?
- If no - Do you think that it would have been
useful for the company to make changes 
in the structure of the accounting 
department in order to be able to 
satisfy the requirements of the Price 
Commission?
- Why (note the possibility of not being
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able to do so)?
- If Q.7 (b) was yes - Do you think it
I
would have been better to change the 
structure of the accounting department 
to cope with the reallocation of 
responsibilities?
- Why?
8. In your opinion what were the factors that led to 
your company being investigated by the Price 
Commission?
- Why do you think so?
9. Which activities of your company were affected by the 
investigation of the Price Commission?
- What aspects of your firm's business was the Price 
Commission interested in?
- Do you think that there were important aspects of 
your firm's activities that the Price Commission 
should have covered and did not?
- If yes - What were they?
- Why were they important?
10. Did the Price Commission affect the importance of 
accounting information in your firm?
- If yes - How?
- To what extent do you think this has led 
to changes in the use made of accounting 
information in pricing decisions?
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- Did this lead to better (i.e. more 
profitable) pricing decisions?
- Why?
- If no - Why do you think it has not affected it?
- To what extent do you think accounting
information was used in pricing decisions?
11. To what extent would you say that the Price Commission, 
rather than the market, induced a price change for your 
products?
- Over 75% of price decisions?
50%- 75% of price decisions?
25%- 50% of price decisions?
Under 25% of price decisions?
- To what extent do you think that accounting 
information was an important Input for pricing 
decisions in the light of your previous answers 
(very important, important, not important)?
12. To what extent did non-accounting information play a
a part in your pricing decisions?
- Was it very important, important, not important?
- Why?
- What sort of non-accounting data?
13. To what extent did the Price Commission affect the




- Has this been affected by any reallocation of 
responsibilities such as were mentioned in Q.7 (b)?
- How?
14. Did the accounting information system manage to 
maintain the previous management information as well
as to satisfy the requirements of the Price Commission?
- If yes - Was that done with the normal working hours
or did you have to work overtime?
- If yes for second part - How much did it 
cost?
- Do you think the accounting information 
system managed to do this after the change
in employees and/or shift to data processing?
- If no 1 Why?
- Was this in any sense due to union 
restrictions or to any deterioration in 
employee relations?
- What did you do to cope with both 
requirements?
- Do you think there could have been a better 
way?
15. Assuming the Price Commission had priority, did you 
ever decide to drop, delay or filter out any specific 
aspect of management information?
- If yes - Why?
- What sort of information was affected?




- For how long did you continue doing that?
- What did the company do in order to overcome 
this problem?
- How did this affect the relation of this 
department with other departments?
- If no - Do you think there was a surplus of
resources which the department was able to 
use to cater for the requirements of the 
Price Commission?
- Did the company have to increase the 
number of employees, use more overtime etc?
- Was the department able to provide all the 
information required of it?
16, Do you think that the requirements of the Price 
Commission ever led to poor management decisions 
because of the extra work involved in producing 
statutory information?
- If yes - Why?
- What sort of decisions were mainly 
involved?
- How serious has this affected your own job, 
your department and the company in general?
- What do you think the company might have done 
in order to avoid such problems?
If no - How was it that the accounting information 
system was able to provide this extra.
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statutory information without the normal 
day-to-day work being affected?
17. Did you ever find that information that you had to 
provide for the Price Commission was useful for the 
company's purpose?
- If yes - How did you find it useful?
- If no - Why?
- Do you think it was a duplicate of what
you already had?
18. Were there any cases where requirements of other 
government agencies overlapped with the requirements 
of the Price Commission?
- What agencies were there?
- Do you think that these requirements complemented 
or contradicted the work of the Price Commission?
- How?
19. Did the work of the Price Commission require a 
certain level of understanding?
- Which employees were allocated to the work?
- What departments did“they come from?
- Why were they selected from those departments?
20. In your opinion which were the important documents 
submitted to the Price Commission by your company?
- Who prepared those documents?
- How long did they take to prepare?
- Were there any problems involved in preparing these
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documents?
- If yes - What were they?
- Can I have a look at these documents?
21. How did your company manage to maintain the
consistency of information submitted to the Price 
Commission in the various documents?
- Which in your opinion was the most useful of these 
documents?
- Why?
Section D; After the abolition of the Price Commission 
(current position)
1. Do the accounting and marketing departments have 
different pricing philosophy?
- If yes - What are they?
- Who is most influential in setting; pricing 
decisions?
- What criteria is used in setting pricing 
decisions?
- If no - What are their pricing philosophy?
- What criteria is used in setting pricing 
decisions?
2. Who identifies that a price change may be required?
- Why is it this department or group?
3. By what process are changes in prices arrived at?
- How are alternatives for price changes developed?
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4. Who decides and finally approves the price to be 
charged?
- Is the final approval ever taken to top management?
- Why?
5. To what extent do you think accounting information is 
used?
- Over 75% of price decisions?
50%- 75% of price decisions?
25%- 50% of price decisions?
Under 25% of price decisions?
6. To what extent does non-accounting information play a 
part in your pricing decisions?
- Is it very important, important, not important?
.- Why?
- What sort of non-accounting data?
7. Has the company had to change the number of employees?
- Why?
- Were employees released to do other work?
- If yes - How vital?
- Are there any organizational repercussions?
- Is the accounting department overstaffed?




9. Has the company attempted any shift towards data 
processing and/or computerization?
- Is this resource used for other jobs or did the 
company find that it had idle resources?
- Why for the second part?
10. Has the company found that it has to collect new basic 
data to comply with the requirements of the Price 
Commission?
- Why?
11. Has the company had to change the structure of the 
accounting department?
- Why
12. To what extent has the abolition of the Price 
Commission affcted the importance of accounting 
information in your firm?
- Why?
13. If the Price Commission rather than the market, 
induced a price change in your products, to what 
extent would you say that this had changed after its 
abolition?
- Why?
14. To what extent has the abolition of the Price 
Commission affected the role of the accounting 
department and its relationship with other departments?
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- Why?
- Are there any organizational repercussions as a 
result of this change?
15. Have you continued to produce the information you had 
to provide for the Price Commission if you found that 
it was useful for the company's purposes?
- Why?
- If no - Does this have any organizational
repercussions?
- Have you stop having this information after the 
Price Commission yras abolished?
- If yes - For how long did you keep having it?
- Why?
- How much do you think it could have cost 
you?
- If no - Did you find you had excess of employees?
- If yes - How much is this costing you?
- Did this have any organizational 
repercuss ions ?
16. Now that the Price Commission has been abolished, do 
you see any new movements in the future which you 
have not managed to achieve yet?
Section E; Evaluating the Price Commission
1. What did you think of the Price Commission?
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2. How did it affect your department?
3. How did it affect your own job?
4. What do you think about the abolition of the Price
Commission in the light of your previous answers?
— 338 —
Appendix C
INTERVIEWER'S CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO COVER 
(All questions relate to U.K. sales and activities)
Section A; General Background of Company (current position)
1. What industry does your firm trade in?
2. What are the major products that your firm
manufactures for sale in the U.K.?
3. How many firms sell in the U.K. similar product(s) to 
those produced by your firm?
I
4. What is the percentage of your market share (U.K. only) 
for each major product group?
- What is the proportion of revenue of each group?
5. To what extent is your firm a price setter; a price
follower or a price taker regarding the major 
products(s) it sells in the U.K.?
6. To what extent is consideration given to the threat
of entry of firms outside the industry regarding each 
major product group market in the U.K.?
7. In your perception to what extent do you think the
following changes in prices would affect your firm's
U.K. market share?
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increases: 5% 10% 20%
decreases: 5% 10% 20%
8. To what extent would such price changes be feasible 
bearing in mind the need (i) to earn a profit;
(ii) achieve other corporate objectives (what 
objectives)?
Section B: Prior to the introduction of the Price
Commission
1. Were there any changes in Section A during this period 
with respect to each major product group?
- Why?
- Were these changes of significance to affect your 
pricing policy for each product group?
- If yes: How?
2. How did the pressure for price changes arise?
- What were the major factors that triggered price 
increases?
- Did they always tend to be the same factors?
- Why?
- If NÔ: What circumstances led to the change?
- Were they the same factors for all product groups?
3. Who identified the need for a price change?
- What information was used to identify it?
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- What calculations and reports were made to suggest 
the price change?
- Were they standard procedures or ad hoc studies?
4. How were the suggestions for price changes considered?
- Who considered the change?
- Were there formal meetings held?
- If yes: How many:
Who attended them?
- Were there informal meetings held?
- If Yes: How many?
Who attended them?
- Were there standard procedures?
5. Did the accounting and marketing departments 
consistently tend to have different views regarding 
the suggested change in prices?
- If yes : - Why?
- What were they?
- Which pricing view of the two was pursued 
in setting prices?
- Why?
- If no: - What was their pricing view?
- Who developed that pricing view?
6. Who really influenced the pricing decision?
- Why?
7. Were price increases considered whenever accounting
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data identified an increase in cost?
- If yes; - Why? ,
- To what extent was the market state taken 
into consideration?
- If No: - Why?
- How important were the formal accounting 
documents in determining the price change?
8. Were prices increased whenever accounting data identified 
an increase in cost beyond some margin?
- If yes: - Why?
- To what extent was the market ready to
absorb the increase?
- What accounting method was used in setting 
prices?
- If no: - Why?
- What was the role of accounting data in 
pricing decisions?
9. Who finally approved the price to be charged?
- Why?
- Was the final approval ever referred to top 
management?
- Why?
10. Were there any strategic factors considered in making 
the pricing policies?
- Was there any long run pricing strategy which was 
later affected by the Price Codes?
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Section C; 1973 - 1977 Price Code
1. Were there any changes in Section A during this period
with respect to each major product group?
- Why? .
- Were these changes of significance to affect your 
pricing policy for each product group?
- If yes: How?
- Compared with the period 1970-73 did the trend in 
the degree of competition change?
- If yes: How?
- If no: Why?
- Was this change in any way due to the Price 
Commission?
2. How did your firm make its preparation for this new
piece of legislation?
- Did the firm allocate the work of the Price Commission 
to a certain department or group?
- What increase in responsibilities did that department 
or group gain as a result of carrying out the work 
of the Price Commission?
- Why?
3. How did the pressure for price changes arise?
- What were the major factors that triggered price 
increases?
- Did they always tend to be the same factors?
- Why?
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- If No: What circumstances led to the change?
- Were they the same factors for all product groups?
4. Who identified the need for a price change?
- What information was used to identify it?
- What calculations and reports were made to suggest 
the price change?
- Were they standard procedures or ad hoc studies?
5. How were the suggestions for price changes considered?
- Who considered the change?
- Were there formal meetings held?
- If Yes: How many?
- Who attended them?
- Were there informal meetings held?
- If Yes: How many?
- Who attended them?
- Were there standard procedures?
6. What really determined the pricing decision during 
this period?
- Why?
7. Did the accounting and marketing departments 
consistently tend to have different views regarding 
the suggested change in prices?
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- If yes - Why?
- What were they?
- Which pricing view of the two was pursued 
in setting prices?
- Why?
- If no - What was their pricing view?
- Who developed that pricing view?
8. Did the Price Commission affect the importance of 
accounting information in your firm?
- If yes - How?
- Did this lead to changes in the use made 
of accounting information in pricing 
decisions?
- Why?
- Did this lead to better (i.e. more 
profitable) pricing decisions?
- Why?
- If no - Why do you think it has not affected it?
- To what extent do you think accounting 
information was used in pricing decisions?
9. Did the marketing department have any particular 
pricing strategy that was dropped when the Price 
Commission was introduced?
- Why?
10. Did the Price Commission affect the role of the 
accounting department and its relationship with
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other departments?
- If yes - How?
- What was the organizational repercussions 
of this effect?
e.g. joining pricing committees, 
responsibilities over other decisions.
- If no - Why?
11. Were price increases considered whenever accounting 
data identified an increase in cost?
- If yes - Why?
- To what extent was the market state taken 
into consideration?
- If no - Why?
- How important were the formal accounting 
documents in determining the price change?
12. Were prices increased whenever the rules of the Price 
Commission allowed it?
- If yes - Why?
- Did the market always absorb the price 
increase without loss of sales?
- If yes - Why?
- Were prices increased by 
reference to accounting data?
- If yes - Why?
- What accounting method 
was used in setting 
prices?
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- If no - Why?
- What criterion was used 
in setting prices?
- What was the role of 
accounting information 
in pricing decisions?
- If no - Why?
- How frequent were prices 
increased?
- What criteria were used in setting 
prices?
- What was the role of accounting 
information in pricing decisions?
- If no - Why?
- What was the role of accounting data in 
pricing decisions?
- Why?
13. Compared with the period prior to the introduction of 
the Price Commission, to what extent were price 
increases influenced by the department responsible 
for the Price Commission's requirements?
- Why?
14. Who finally approved the price to be charged?
- Why?




15. As a result of the introduction of the Price 
Commission, did your firm contemplate to concentrate 
more on exports?
- Why?
16. Did the accounting information system manage to 
maintain the previous management information as well
as to satisfy the requirements of the Price Commission?
- If yes - How - 1. increase in employees;
2. use of data processing and/or 
computer facilities;
3. use of surplus resources;
4. any other means.
- If no — Why?
- Assuming the Price Commission had priority, 
did you decide to drop any specific aspect 
of management information?
- If yes - What sort of information was 
affected?
- Was this information important?
- If yes - Why?
- How did the dropping of 
this information affect 
the firm?
- For how long did you 
drop the information?
- What did the company do 
to overcome this problem?




- If no - Why was it produced?
- For how long was the 
information dropped?
- If no - What did the company do to fulfil 
both requirements for information?
Section D; 1977 - 79 Price Code
1. Were there any changes in Section A during this period 
with respect to each major product group?
- Why?
- Were these changes of significance to affect your 
pricing policy for each product group?
- If yes - How?
- Compared with the period 1973 - 77, did the trend 
in the degree of competition change?
- If yes - How?
- If no - Why?
- Was this change in any way due to the Price
Commission?
2. Which department was responsible for the requirements 
of the Price Commission during this period?
- Compared with the first code, did the responsibilities 
of that department change as a result of carrying out
the work of the Price Commission during the second code?
- Why?
3. How did the pressure for price changes arise?
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- What were the major factors that triggered price 
increases?
- Did they always tend to be the same factors?
- Why?
- If no - What circumstances led to the change?
- Were they the same factors for all product groups?
4. Who identified the need for a price change?
- What information was used to identify it?
- What calculations and reports were made to suggest 
the price change?
- Were they standard procedures or ad hoc studies?
5. How were the suggestions for price changes considered?
- Who considered the change?
- Were there formal meetings held?
- If yes - How many?
- Who attended them?
- Were there informal meetings held?
- If yes - How many?
- Who attended them?
- Were there standard procedures or ad hoc studies?
6. What really determined the pricing decision during 
this period?
- Why?
7. Did the accounting and marketing departments 
consistently tend to have different views regarding
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the suggested change in prices?
- If yes - Why?
- What were they?
- Which pricing view of the two was pursued 
in setting iprices?
- Why?
- If no - What was their pricing view?
- Who developed that pricing view?
8. The changes introduced in the second code relaxed 
the increase of prices in terms of total cost. Did 
this have an impact on the use of product costing 
information when considering price increases?
- If yes - How?
- Did this lead your firm to introduce any 
changes in its product costing system?
- Why?
- If yes - What benefits did your firm gain
from these changes?
- If no - Why?
- What was the role of product costing 
information in pricing decisions?
9. Compared with the first code, did the changes 
introduced in the second code affect the role of 
accounting department and its relationship with other 
departments?
- If yes - How?
- What was the organizational repercussions
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of this effect? e.g. joining pricing 
committees, responsibilities over other 
decisions.
- If no - Why?
10. Compared with the first code, to what extent were 
price increases influenced by the department 
responsible for the second code?
- Why?
11. Were price increases considered whenever accounting 
data identified an increase in cost?
- If yes - Why?
- To what extent was the market state taken 
into consideration?
- If no - Why?
- How important were the formal accounting 
documents in determining the price change?
12. How frequent were prices increased whenever the 
criteria of the second code were satisfied?
- Why?
13. Was your company investigated by the Price Commission?
- If yes - What were the factors that led to the 
investigation?
- Was your firm's pricing policy influenced 
by the risk of being investigated by the 
Price Commission?
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- If yes - How?
- If no - Why?
- Which department was monitoring the 
investigation?
- Was the company granted the price increase 
it applied for?
What were the organizational repercussions 
of this? e.g. influence over other 
decisions.
- If no - Why?
- To what extent did your firm pursue a pricing 
policy that did not attract the attention
of the Price Commission?
- What was the impact of that policy on the 
company's profitability?
- Did this have any organizational 
repercussions?
14. Who finally approved the price to be charged?
- Why?
- Was the final approval ever referred to top 
management?
- Why?
Section E; After the abolition of the Price Commission 
(current position)
1. How does the pressure for price changes arise?
- What are the major factors that trigger the change?
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- Are they the same factors for all product groups?
2. Who identifies the need for price changes?
- What information is used to identify it?
- What calculations and reports are made to suggest 
the price change?
- Are they standard procedures or ad hoc studies?
3. How are the suggestions for price changes considered?
- Who considers the change?
- Are there formal meetings held?
- If yes - How many?
- Who attends them?
- Are there informal meetings held?
- If yes - How many?
- Who attended them?
4. Do the accounting and marketing departments 
consistently tend to have different views regarding 
the suggested change in prices?
- If yes - Why?
- What are they?
- Which pricing view of the two is pursued in 
setting prices?
- Why?
- If no - What is their pricing view?
- Who develops that pricing view?
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5. Has the abolition of the Price Commission affected 
the role of the accounting department and its 
relationship with other departments?
- Why?
- What are the organizational repercussions of this 
effect?
6. Are price increases considered whenever accounting 
data identifies an increase in cost?
- If yes - Why?
- To what extent is the market state taken 
into consideration?
- If no - Why?
- How important are the formal accounting 
documents in determining the price change?
7. Are prices increased whenever accounting data 
identifies an increase in cost beyond some margin?
- If yes - Why?
- To what extent is the market ready to 
absorb the increase?
- What accounting method is used in setting 
prices?
- If no - Why?
- What is the role of accounting data in 
pricing decisions?
8. Who finally approves the price to be charged?
- Why?
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- Is the final approval ever referred to top 
management?
- Why?
9. Has the Price Commission required the production of 
new information which has been continued after its 
abolition and seen to benefit the company?
- If yes - What information?
- How has it been of benefit to the company?
- If no - Why?
- 356 -
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